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Abstract 
 
Electoral frauds and electoral malpractices relate to the domain 
of electoral affairs, which is the one of the core elements of a 
regime with representative institutions. During the last decades 
at the international level there have been many documents, 
charters and organizations that contributed to craft the standards 
of electoral integrity. With the end of the Cold War these 
standards have been spread and adopted in almost every 
country in the world. Yet, more than 25 years later elections are 
still rigged especially in hybrid regimes. During the last years 
many research have been conducted to analyse why elections 
fail, what is their role in hybrid as well as authoritarian regimes, 
and there is a growing stream of literature that is investigating 
electoral frauds and electoral malpractices.  
 
This thesis provides a contribution in this debate by pointing to 
one of the less analysed factors in the study of electoral frauds 
and electoral malpractices, which is the international dimension. 
The latter is conceptualized in two ways: the first one relates to 
Western democratizing pressure and how it can affect the 
change or the evolution of electoral frauds and malpractices. The 
second one concerns socialization dynamics in terms of methods 
of frauds and malpractices among authorities in different 
countries. It is argued that where there is a stronger Western 
democratizing pressure authorities change the way they conduct 
elections, even if this change does not forcefully means 
democratization. Rather, along with formal improvements in 
elections management, authorities alter and modify methods of 
frauds and malpractices as a way to elude Western criticism. In 
order to properly modify electoral frauds and malpractices, 
authorities resort to learning practices by looking at other 
experiences. 
 
These theoretical arguments have been verified on three cases 
study, which are Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These 
countries share some key characteristics, which allowed for 
cross-temporal and spatial analysis regarding electoral frauds 
	 18	
and malpractices since their independence from the Soviet 
Union. The empirical analysis demonstrates that the more a 
regime suffers from Western democratizing pressure, the more 
authorities would change methods of frauds and malpractices. 
In doing so, they learn from other positive and negative 
experiences. Therefore, thanks to the inclusion of the 
international dimension in the study of electoral frauds and 
malpractices, this thesis argues that electoral mismanagement 
changes, evolves and adapts to new international conditions and 
poses continuous challenges to the electoral integrity.  
 
Keywords: Election, Electoral Fraud, Electoral Malpractice, 
International Dimension, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Western 
Democratizing Pressure, Learning, South Caucasus, Hybrid 
Regimes.		
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Introduction 
 
Elections have always been the engine of a democratic 
regime’s development. The integrity of the electoral process is 
one of the first factors that affects democratic quality. Of course, 
elections alone are not sufficient to make a democracy work, yet 
they are still essential institutions for a participatory, competitive 
and legitimate self-government (cf. Bratton and van de Walle 
1997, Lindberg 2006). The relevance of the electoral process is 
well underlined by Andreas Schedler (2013), who claims that a 
democratic election holds a logical sequence of seven necessary 
conditions (empowerment, freedom of supply, freedom of 
demand, inclusion, insulation, integrity, decisiveness), 1  which 
form the ‘chain of democratic choice’. Schedler firmly underlines 
that an election is fully democratic if and only if each of these 
seven conditions are respected and fulfilled, otherwise the 
‘election is not less democratic but it’s undemocratic’ (Schedler 
2013:86). Therefore, the management and mismanagement of 
elections is a crucial factor to be analysed in order to understand 
how regimes evolve and can avoid a full transition to 
democracy. This research stems from these arguments and it 
aims to further investigate how South Caucasian post-soviet 																																																								
1 Please find hereby more detail about the seven different elements: 
Empowerment: Political elections are about citizens wielding power; 
Freedom of supply: The idea of a democratic election presupposes the 
free formation of alternatives. Elections ‘without choice’ do not qualify 
as democratic, and neither do elections with choice confined to a 
narrow menu of state-licensed options; Freedom of demand: Democratic 
elections presuppose the free formation of voter preference; Inclusion: 
In the contemporary world, democracy demands universal suffrage; 
Insulation: Once citizens have freely formed their preferences, they 
must be able to express them just as freely; Integrity: competent and 
neutral election management must count their votes honestly and 
weigh them equally; Decisiveness: elections that end without 
consequences are not democratic. The winners must be able to assume 
office, exercise power, and conclude their terms in accordance with 
constitutional rules. (cf. Schedler 2013:83-87). 
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regimes managed and mismanaged elections. In doing so, this 
study addresses one of the most underestimated factors for what 
concern the analysis of frauds and electoral malpractices: the 
international dimension.  
 
The concept of electoral integrity refers to elections ‘respecting 
international standards and global norms governing the 
appropriate conduct of elections’ (Norris 2015:4). The 
international community takes elections seriously and drafted 
some key principles in international documents,2 which were 
subsequently adopted by the majority of the states around the 
world. Moreover, since the early nineties the international 
community developed a wide portfolio aimed to help post-
soviet countries to consolidate their democratic institutions. 
Thanks to these efforts, in all regimes around post-soviet space, 
people can vote through alleged democratic elections. However, 
since their independence the electoral process has always been 
affected by the presence of fraud and electoral malpractice, 
which has proved detrimental to the levels of political 
accountability of the ruling elites. Many studies have addressed 
this issue from democratisation theory standpoints, as well as 
from structural and domestic constraints. Yet, to my knowledge, 
there have not been any analyses that consider the international 
dimension from the following two perspectives: the first one 
refers to the assessment of international forces on electoral 
frauds and malpractices. The second one considers the 
international dimension as a space of socialisation for learning 
mechanisms regarding frauds and electoral malpractices.  
 
As a matter of fact, according to Pippa Norris (2015) electoral 
integrity is affected by four main factors. These are structural 
constraints, institutional checks, electoral management bodies 
and international forces. The latter consist of three types of 
external factors: ‘cosmopolitan communication that diffuses 
global norms to strengthen international standards of electoral 																																																								
2 From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the 
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the 
Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990).  
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integrity, the provision of electoral assistance and development 
aid to build local capacity and the deployment of observer 
monitoring missions to strengthen transparency and 
accountability’ (Norris 2015:89). It is submitted here that this 
standpoint did not include many other factors which have a 
strong impact on the quality of democracy (see for example 
Morlino 2011), that shape the international dimension of 
regimes’ development (Levitsky and Way 2010).  
 
The decision to focus on electoral frauds and electoral 
malpractices emerges from the assessment that the three South 
Caucasian countries, as well as the other post-Soviet countries, 
since their independence undertook a process which eliminated 
the Soviet formal structure in order to develop liberal democratic 
institutions, including multiparty elections. On the one side this 
process led to the creation of new legal frameworks that ruled 
the elections and transformed the citizens’ participation in the 
political sphere of the country (see for example Herron 2009). On 
the other side, incumbents faced new constraints to their rule 
and therefore needed to find new solutions to preserve their 
positions of power. Authorities started to falsify and therefore to 
nullify the chain of democratic choice by recurring to a disparate 
set of frauds and electoral malpractice. 
 
The process of consolidating a democratic legal framework was 
complex and full of challenges (see for example Anderson et al. 
2001). Therefore, domestic authorities and international actors 
cooperated together in order to overcome difficulties and 
obstacles, and they gave shape step by step to democratic 
constitutions, democratic electoral codes, and democratic 
electoral management bodies (EMBs). Since their independence, 
the three South Caucasian countries’ electoral frameworks 
improved dramatically, even with substantial differences among 
them. Indeed, the three South Caucasian countries offer three 
different outcomes for what concerns electoral integrity and 
international outlooks. This is one of the main reasons why this 
thesis selected these case studies.  
 
The South Caucasus is a small regional agglomeration that 
testifies the conundrum of international dynamics and regime 
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development. There have been numerous analyses and studies 
that have addressed this topic from different perspectives (yet to 
my knowledge there are no analyses on the other side of the 
electoral management, i.e. electoral mismanagement). Drawing 
from these considerations, the main research questions that 
underpin my research are, ‘To what extent are electoral frauds 
and malpractices affected by international forces?’ and ‘Do 
socialization mechanisms apply to the elections’ rigging?’ 
 
This topic is addressed from two main arguments. The first one 
is that electoral management evolved substantially in all 
Southern Caucasian countries which, at least formally, abruptly 
modified Soviet’s voting institutions. Western democratizing 
pressure was limited in this process, yet subsequently it became 
more influential. Thus, I claim that as the West began to increase 
its democratic pressure toward the countries in order to have a 
better election management, authorities started to change the 
methods of fraud and electoral malpractices. In other words, I 
am arguing that malpractices changed not only because the 
electoral management evolved over time, but also because the 
international forces played a decisive role. There are two basic 
international dimensions: the first one is the Western 
democratising pressure, which is based on Levitsky and Way’s 
theory of linkage and leverage (2010). The second one is that the 
international dimension allows for socializing methods of frauds 
and electoral malpractices.  
 
With regards to the Western democratizing pressure, I stem the 
research from the years following the end of the Cold War, when 
the international context changed and Western actors spread the 
principle of electoral integrity in new regions in the world. In 
this new context, South Caucasian countries strived for 
independence and gained freedom; subsequently they reformed 
the state according to new norms/values, which were fostered 
worldwide by Western actors. However, this process produced 
controversial results because of the international system’s 
dynamics, which characterized the decades subsequent the Cold 
War, and affected the extent of different regimes’ development. 
According to this study, the controversial outcomes of these 
process are fully visible at the electoral management level; in the 
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three South Caucasian countries more than twenty years after 
their independence, electoral management is still in quest for full 
integrity. Georgia only recently had a first peaceful 
governmental turnover, and it would be premature to speak 
about ‘founding’ election in transitional terms. Armenia is a 
perfect example of a competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky 
and Way 2010; Roessler and Howard, 2009) and Azerbaijan is by 
now a consolidated authoritarian regime. Therefore, in all cases 
it is possible to observe a formal evolution of electoral 
management, but at the same time an inconsistent development 
of the quality of democracy and the electoral integrity. In order 
to analyse and explain such variances I am going to take into 
consideration the international dimension and its effects on 
electoral mismanagement.  
 
The second pillar of this research is to understand how 
malpractices changed and evolved. To address this issue, I 
suppose that electoral malpractices’ strategies are not fixed and 
they can be updated and ‘ameliorated’ by the socialisation 
mechanism, namely learning. Thus, the second argument of this 
thesis is aimed to find out and to specify the evolution’s 
mechanisms of electoral malpractices. In doing so, I am taking 
into consideration the international dimension. Yet, this time the 
international dimension is considered as a space for interactions, 
exchange and socialisation. This understanding follows a huge 
literature born out democratization studies, which I address in 
the next chapter. Indeed, I argue that thanks to the opportunity 
of international socialisation, incumbents have different options 
to ameliorate the methods of fraud. Stemming from a recent 
literature about socialisation and learning mechanisms, this 
thesis argues that incumbents in the South Caucasus learnt how 
to rig elections both from past experiences and from abroad. 
Learning is a key factor and can be articulated in different forms. 
I will explain how this process works and what the 
methodological implications are in order to trace such 
conclusions. As a matter of fact, despite the study of learning 
and mimicking among non-democratic regimes still being in its 
infancy (Bank and Edel 2013), I am confident that research on 
these types of practices can provide important elements in order 
to understand how electoral mismanagement has evolved.  
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The above-mentioned arguments are supported by two main 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that election frauds and 
malpractices change according to the level of Western leverage 
and Linkage that states experience. Western Leverage is a 
concept by Levitsky and Way that stands for ‘states’ 
vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure’ (Levitsky and 
Way 2010:24), whereas Western Linkage refers to ‘the density of 
ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) 
and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, 
and information) between particular countries and the United 
States and the EU’ (Levitsky and Way 2010:23). The two authors 
claim that the vulnerability of a state depends on its bargaining 
power vis à vis the West: ‘where countries lack bargaining power 
and are heavily affected by Western punitive action, leverage is 
high; where countries possess substantial bargaining power 
and/or can weather Western punitive action without significant 
harm, leverage is low’ (Levitsky and Way 2010:41).  
 
When the concepts of Linkage and Leverage are referring to 
electoral affairs it can entails different aspects: from election 
observation mission (EOM) to international conditionality, from 
cooperation agreements to electoral assistance programmes, 
from acknowledgment of election results to diplomatic ties. In 
particular, for what concern international forces that exert 
leverage on South Caucasus countries in electoral affairs, there 
are the OSCE and Council of Europe (that includes Venice 
Commission). These institutions were often backed by other 
international actors, such as the European Union and United 
States agencies (USAID); all together these actors managed 
millions of dollars in terms of funds, aid and other tools for 
international cooperation.  
 
It is difficult to speak about socialization mechanism in the South 
Caucasus, as it is a region characterized by a high level of 
political fragmentation, which is exacerbated by unresolved 
conflicts (Georgia with Russia concerning South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, Armenia with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue), and it is sealed by different international integrations’ 
paths (Georgia toward a deeper cooperation with the European 
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Union, Armenia integrated within the Eurasian Union and 
Azerbaijan who which its ability to deal with different actors). 
There is not a common platform for socialization initiatives 
among South Caucasian countries at a regional level. Yet, in this 
study I hypothesize that the three governments have been 
looking and drawing important lessons from each other in the 
field of electoral management and electoral mismanagement. 
One of the key characteristics of learning mechanisms is 
geographic proximity (Bank and Edel 2015). Therefore, despite 
regional fragmentation, the second hypothesis is that 
incumbents learn from neighbors’ experiences to rig elections. In 
addition, to have a full picture of learning mechanisms I must 
include also learning from past experiences. History, as the 
Cicero affirms, is Magistra Vitae and so it is also for what 
concerns electoral malpractices’ strategies.  This hypothesis 
stems from a recent branch of study that analyzes non-
democratic learning and authoritarian cooperation. Learning 
might come from other countries or past practices; moreover, 
learning could be both from positive or negative examples. For 
the sake of the argument, learning is important insofar others’ 
experiences might trigger policy or practice changes, which 
otherwise wouldn’t have taken place, and overall they might 
affect elections’ results. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows: in the first chapter I am going 
to present the literature that addressed the different topics 
intertwined in this thesis. Therefore, it is organized by sectors 
and for each one I am going to explain where this project stems 
from and what types of gap it tries to fill. In the second chapter I 
am going to elucidate my theoretical framework and the concept 
that I am referring to. In the third chapter, I am going to analyze 
the Western democratizing pressure in the region by looking at 
the main actors that had a role in shaping the electoral 
management in the three countries. Subsequently, in chapter 
four, five and six I am going to analyze each country by looking 
at the evolution of electoral management and mismanagement 
since their independence from the USSR. In the conclusion I 
present the implications and the outcomes of this study. Finally, 
I sum up the main contributions of this thesis and I point to 
venues for future research.   
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Chapter 1:  
Elections, Frauds and Diffusion in 
Nondemocratic Regimes 
 
Introduction 
This thesis does not analyze regime changes or 
transitions to democracy or autocracy either electoral systems or 
political parties in non-democratic countries. Rather, it is a 
research focused on the in-depth understanding of frauds and 
electoral malpractices, which have characterized South 
Caucasian countries since their independence. In order to 
explain such themes, I would rely on several arguments that are 
drawing from a wide range of academic branches. I think it is 
important to mention that this study is at the crossroad of new 
studies in several sectors, and it does suffer from the 
uncertainties of the pioneers. Therefore, it is fundamental to 
clearly refer to the current frontiers of the academic research in 
order to properly identify the limits and possible rooms for 
contribution as well. The theoretical and conceptual implications 
come mainly from authoritarian and hybrid regimes’ analyses, 
from electoral studies - in particular concerning malpractices and 
manipulations, and from research on diffusionism and learning 
mechanisms: the literature review is organized accordingly. 
Moreover, a part of this literature review addresses how, at 
agglomerate level, post-soviet studies analysed the ‘betrayed 
democratisation’ (Di Quirico 2013) since the end of the Cold 
War. 
On Autocracy and Hybridity 
There is nowadays a substantial understanding about the 
shortcomings of the transitional approach (Carothers, 2002) and 
there is a growing consensus over the concept of permanent 
hybridization (Morlino 2008; Hale 2010; Di Quirico, 2013; 
Schedler, 2013) as well as on authoritarian resilience (Kagan 
2008, Ambrosio 2009, Levitsky and Way 2015). Hybridity is a 
concept that has been discussed and applied ever since the mid-
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nineties, and it was soon sided by the concept of electoral 
authoritarianism (Karl 1995, Collier and Levitsky 1997). The 
debate was triggered by reflections about the third wave of 
democratisation (Huntington 1991) and its consequences. In 
particular, the faith regarding the transition to democracy for all 
countries moving away from authoritarian rule, theorized by 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), started to be challenged. This 
debate had its decisive moment with the publication of an article 
called ‘The End of Transition’s Paradigm,’ by Thomas Carothers 
in 2002, which transformed the way most scholars saw the fields 
of democratisation and democracy promotion.  
 
Subsequently, two different strands of research started to look 
on one side to persistent autocracies and on the other to the huge 
club of semi-democracies. The latter debate has not yet come to a 
conclusion, but there is still a lively debate on labelling the 
disparate variety of regimes around the world according to the 
degree of ‘democratic/autocratic’ outlook. Within this literature 
there are authors who believe that somehow a transition from a 
semi-democracy to a full democratic regime is possible (Bunce 
and Wolchik, 2011; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, 
O’Halloran, 2006), thus focusing their research on what may 
contribute to transition; whereas, on the other those who started 
to conceptualise hybridity as regime per se (Larry Diamond 2002, 
Leonardo Morlino 2008, Levitsky and Way 2010, Hale 2011, 
Schedler 2013, Hale 2015), thus pointing their analyses to some 
characteristics of this regime. As a matter of fact, Steven Levitsky 
and Lucan Way describe competitive authoritarianism (that it is 
included in the broader set of hybrid regimes) as set apart from 
democracies ‘in which democratic institutions offer an important 
channel through which the opposition may seek power [and] 
those regimes in which democratic rules simply serve to 
legitimize an existing autocratic leadership’ (Levitsky and Way 
2002:54). Moreover, as Schedler affirms, the transitional 
paradigm is overcome by ‘the endogeneity of regime uncertainty 
and the pervasiveness of opacity (cf. Schedler 2013:12). 
The Concept of Hybridity 
The academic research has started to study hybridity only in 
recent years: as a matter of fact, Henry E. Hale claims, ‘The chief 
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goal of research has been less to understand how these regimes 
actually function and more to evaluate their prospects for 
becoming more democratic’ (Hale, 2011:23) despite the fact these 
regimes ‘account for an increasing portion of current regimes 
and the lion’s share of regime transitions’ (Epstein et al. 
2006:564). Indeed, the concept of hybridity is a challenging one, 
and highly contestable as it doesn’t refer to any normative 
model. Nevertheless, it is still possible to define the notion of 
hybrid regimes in order to differentiate it from the notion of 
transitional regimes. So as to understand what a hybrid regime 
is, it is also necessary to investigate what a hybrid regime is not 
(Morlino, 2011b). First of all, it is not a democratic regime. Here 
Morlino refers to the minimal requirements for democracy, such 
as (a) universal suffrage; (b) free, competitive, recurrent and fair 
elections; (c) more than one party; and (d) different and 
alternative media sources. Thus, a hybrid regime is not a regime 
where all those elements are present. Secondly, a hybrid regime 
is not an autocratic regime. Here Morlino refers to the definition 
by Linz, which claims that autocracy is a political system with 
limited and non-responsible political pluralism, without an 
elaborated and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities, 
without either extensive or intense political mobilisation, except 
at some points in their development, and in which a leader or, 
occasionally, a small group, exercises power from within 
formally and ill-defined, but predictable, limits (Linz, 1975). 
Thus, stemming from what democracies and autocracies are, 
Morlino drew a definition of what a hybrid regime is, namely “a 
set of ambiguous institutions […] lacking as it does one or more 
essential characteristics of that regime but also failing to acquire 
other characteristics that would make it fully democratic or 
authoritarian” (Morlino, 2008:7); in addition, Morlino identifies 
further characteristics that help to differentiates hybrid regimes 
from other types of regimes, ‘to avoid a misleading analysis of 
democratization processes, a hybrid regime can be defined as a 
set of institutions that have been persistent, whether stable or 
unstable, for about a decade; have been preceded by 
authoritarian rule, a traditional regime (possibly with colonial 
characteristics), or even a minimal democracy’ (Morlino, 
2011b:1115).  
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According to Hale, most of the post-Soviet countries are hybrid 
insofar they experience regular, cyclic behavior characteristics of 
a certain underlying type of regime; so that ‘What is most 
interesting and important about Georgia, for instance, might not 
be that it meets a standard for authoritarianism or is moving 
toward it in a given year, but precisely that it has displayed a 
pattern of moving back and forth between more democratic and 
more autocratic conditions’. So there is a push to pass from the 
logic of regime change to the logic of regime dynamics. This is a 
new way of looking at post-Soviet realities, which for the time 
being has been extensively analyzed from a transitology’s 
perspective. So according to Hale, ‘we thus should not discount 
«hybrid regimes» (those that combine important elements of 
democracy and autocracy) as «regimes» simply because their 
formal rules tend to change frequently or because these 
dynamics make them alternately closer to or more distant from 
more established regime types like autocracy and democracy’ 
(Hale, 2015:454). Hale stems from Gerardo Munk’s conception of 
political regime as ‘a set of rules that are at least strategically 
accepted and not normatively opposed by major actors and that 
govern which individuals have access to the most important 
state positions, how such access is obtained, and how binding 
state decisions are’ (Hale 2015:15 note 32). Hale also underlines 
how these rules do not need to be formally recognized, they 
might also be informal. The latter are what constitute the 
patronalistic hybrid regimes such as those in Eurasia (Hale, 2015: 
454).  
 
Other studies based on systematic comparative research have 
demonstrated that hybrid regimes can be durable, sustainable 
and resistant and that they hold some specific characteristics. For 
example, they do not even have to behave like half-democracies 
or half-autocracies (Hale, 2009:35); that they are more likely to go 
to war than either democracies or autocracies (Mansfield & 
Snyder, 2005), that they are more prone to state failure than 
either democracies or autocracies (Goldstone et al., 2000), and 
that they have lower rates of business confidence than in either 
democracies or autocracies (Kenyon and Naoi, 2010).  
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The ‘Institutional Turn’ in the Study of Nondemocratic 
Regimes 
Studies on hybrid regimes and autocratic revival flourished in 
particular after a worrying article published by Arch 
Puddington in which the author, relying on a Freedom House 
annual report, which warned that worldwide there was a 
‘pushback against democracy’ (Puddington 2007). This alarm 
claim triggered a new-born interest in all forms of 
nondemocratic regimes around the world. It was not since 
Lipset’s seminal book on authoritarian regimes (1975) that there 
had been such an attempt to understand how this type of regime 
works, focusing in particular on institutions.  
 
The new strand of research was in particular interested in 
analysing the role that allegedly ‘democratic institutions’ 
performed in nondemocratic regimes. At the basis of this 
approach there was the consideration that ‘(e)lites in 
authoritarian regimes use political institutions to structure 
political order. But these institutions are fundamentally 
vulnerable to strategic manipulation by the elites’ (Pepinsky 
2014:631). Researchers were thus focusing their efforts, mainly 
through comparative studies, to understand formal political 
institutions and their misuses by nondemocratic leaders. 
Hereunder I present some arguments drawn from some of the 
noteworthy books on this topic, which contributed to set the 
agenda of further research. 
 
Jason Brownlee, in his seminal book Authoritarianism in an Age of 
Democratization (2007), is one of the first authors who clearly 
assess the importance of the institutions in non-democratic 
regimes. According to him political parties, elections and other 
state institutions are fundamental to maintain the hold on power 
for authoritarian leaders. The latter cannot merely rely on their 
personalistic use of power, rather organisational restraints 
prolong and expand their power (cf. Brownlee 2007:202). 
Therefore, he claims that authoritarian institutions are political 
creations, constructed by ruling elites when they ‘decisively 
resolve their core conflicts’ (Brownlee 2007:37).  
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Scholars were referring to nondemocratic institutions mainly for 
their role in redistributive policy, which contributed to the 
creation and continuation of patronage and clientelism. This 
conceptualisation of authoritarian institutions has been 
transformed by Jennifer Gandhi, who authors another important 
book which has enriched the research on authoritarian regimes: 
Political Institutions under Dictatorship (2008). She provides a 
slightly different interpretation about institutions in 
authoritarian regimes. According to her, authoritarian rulers 
maintain democratic institutions, such as parliaments, elections, 
political parties, in order to co-opt possible opposition fringes 
and control the society. In doing so, authoritarian rulers with 
institutionalised regimes are keener to provide policy 
concessions to opposition groups in order to maintain power. 
Therefore, even if a non-democratic regime allows for elections 
or political parties, it does not mean that it is more democratic, 
as ‘democratic institutions under dictatorship do matter but in 
ways that differ from their counterparts in democracies’ (Gandhi 
2008: xxvi): vice versa legislatures and parties constitute a line of 
defence for autocrats against the opposition and protesters. 
These democratic-looking institutions, which are not simply 
‘window dressing’, are the playing field of limited policy 
concessions; their role is important as, according to Gandhi, 
those institutions play a central role in the construction, 
policymaking, economic performance, and durability of 
authoritarian regimes. In the second part of the book she 
evaluates the above-mentioned attributes of institutions in 
nondemocratic regimes; according to her analysis, 
nondemocratic regimes with formal democratic institutions 
provide more public goods and experience higher economic 
performances than non-institutionalized ones. However, her 
claims about the durability of the regime are less evident: the 
statistical tests she held ‘yield no relationship between 
institutionalization and regime survival, and she is forced to 
concede that this result could constitute a major strike against 
her claim that institutions preserve authoritarianism (Art, 
2012:360).  
 
Erica Frantz and Natasha M. Ezrow provide another outlook to 
understanding political institutions in authoritarian regimes. In 
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their book, The Politics of Dictatorship Institutions and Outcomes in 
Authoritarian Regimes (2011), the two authors claim that 
authoritarian institutions shape the struggle between the leader 
and the rest of the elites, as well as among elites themselves. 
According to them, leaders attempt continuously to maximise 
their power and to keep it as long as possible; they would try to 
‘gain personal control over as many key political instruments as 
possible throughout their tenure’ (Frantz and Ezrow 2011:6). 
However, the analysis is focused mainly on the role of the party 
and military institutions, leaving other institutions of 
representation aside. Their argument in a snapshot is that the 
internal architecture of autocracies plays a key role in shaping 
the relationships between leaders and their elite supporters 
(Frantz and Ezrow 2011:11).  
 
Finally, Boix and Svolik (2013) argue that dictatorships establish 
political institutions such as political parties, legislatures and 
other decision-making bodies in order to facilitate power-
sharing among the ruling elite. As a matter of fact, according to 
the authors ‘the central dilemma of any dictatorship is to 
establish a mechanism that allows the dictator and his allies to 
credibly commit to joint rule (Boix and Svolik 2013:300). Co-
optation of ruling elite members is a key aspect to have a 
sustainable and durable regime, and to avoid rebellion. Power-
sharing allows incumbents to signal on one side transparency 
and reduce misperceptions of the leader. On the other side, the 
dictator who complies with given institutional rules is signalling 
public openness and reliability. In other words, the authors 
support the idea that institutions generate power-sharing, which 
in turn reduces regime’s institutional and informational 
uncertainties.  
 
Overall, this new strand of research on authoritarianism has 
different merits. First of all, thanks to this new focus on 
institutions, researchers shown that institutions do matter, even 
in nondemocratic regimes. We now know that institutions are 
important for several reasons, not least to the regime’s stability 
and durability. Secondly, scholars are becoming more 
acquainted about the mechanisms used to counterfeit and 
manipulate representative and democratic institutions. This new 
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understanding allows for a better comprehension of the intra-
horizontal as well as vertical dynamics of power. Thirdly, as Art 
claimed these new studies ‘demonstrate the continued utility of 
comparative historical analysis for explaining both past and 
contemporary regime types’ (Art 2012: 352).  
 
The idea that ‘institutions matter’ led some scholars to speak 
about an ‘Institutional Turn’ in the study of authoritarian 
regimes (Schedler 2009, Pepinksy 2013). Yet, according to 
Pepinsky ‘the new institutionalist literature on comparative 
authoritarianism has failed to address basic theoretical and 
empirical challenges that emerge when scholars wish to make 
causal claims about the effects of authoritarian institutions on 
political outcomes.’ (Pepinsky 2013:649). Pepinsky clearly 
demonstrates that ‘[s]cholars may miss the true politics of 
authoritarianism if they focus on readily observable institutional 
structures. […] [S]cholars will find that institutions correlate 
with important political outcomes, but will mistakenly believe 
that institutions (rather than the factors that shape them) are 
doing the explanatory work.’ (Pepinsky 2013:650) and he solicits 
that ‘[s]tudents of authoritarianism more broadly will profit 
from systematically examining the non-institutional features of 
authoritarian rule. All of this will require detailed knowledge of 
individual regimes and careful attention to the logic of inference’ 
(Pepinsky 2013:649). Following Pepinsky’s call to study the non-
institutional features of authoritarian rule, I am going to provide 
a contribution in the study of something that it is not 
institutionalised. Yet, frauds and malpractices nonetheless do 
have profound effects on institutions and regimes.   
 
To conclude, I would like to clarify the use of words and concept 
in this thesis. I would avoid in the first place to carry out a 
distinction between hybrid, electoral authoritarian, and semi-
democratic regimes, I rather use nondemocratic regimes or 
hybrid as general concepts to describe all of them: as a matter of 
fact, ‘as electoral autocracies integrate formal institutions of 
representation into their systems of domination, they can 
fruitfully be described as hybrid regimes’ (Schedler 2013:80). 
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On Elections in Nondemocratic Regimes 
As it has emerged thus far, in recent years there has been 
an institutional turn in the analysis of authoritarian and hybrid 
regimes. Before that, scholars were far more focused on practices 
of domination and repression, whereas there is nowadays a 
growing interest in the institution of representation (Geddes 
2005, Gandhi 2008, Gandhi & Przeworski 2006, Schedler 2006, 
Schedler 2013, Boix & Svolik 2013). The focus on elections in 
nondemocratic regimes stemmed from the knowledge that 
although in the aftermath of the Cold War, liberal electoral 
systems were adopted all around the world—with only a 
handful of countries that did not allow universal suffrages—this 
process did not resort to a global transition of authoritarian 
regimes to democratic systems. Scholars were shocked and 
puzzled when they looked at authoritarian regimes holding 
multiparty elections and at the same time preserving and 
consolidating their power. They thought there was 
incompatibility between authoritarian regimes and elections.  
 
Since that moment on, elections have been analysed in a new 
paradigmatic outlook, and the literature that mushroomed 
accordingly provided different interpretations concerning their 
role in non-democratic regimes. Scholars have been devoted to 
addressing a diverse set of problems and issues concerning 
elections in nondemocratic regimes, and they tried to answer 
questions such as ‘Why do incumbents in non-democracies 
allow for scrutiny to take place? What is the role of elections in 
authoritarian regimes? Under which conditions could elections 
represent a real threat to the incumbent?’ Hereunder I offer an 
overview of such studies, and I will indicate where my research 
would add, if so, a contribution.  
The Role of Nondemocratic Elections 
At the earlier stage of this phase of research, following 
modernisation theory, some scholars have argued that elections, 
no matter how they were conducted, could be destabilising 
moments for nondemocratic regimes (cf. O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986, Di Palma, 1990). However, other scholars 
suggest that somehow elections were not always an 
undermining factor for authoritarian regimes (Linz 1975:236). 
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Subsequently, in the 90s other authors observed that rigged 
elections could actually reinforce and prolong autocratic rule 
(Joseph 1997:375, Chehabi and Linz 1998:18, Remmer 1999:349).  
 
At the same time elections in non-democratic regimes became 
the lynchpin for theorizing about the different nuances of 
authoritarianism. Hybrid, semi-democratic, competitive or 
electoral authoritarian regimes are the result of a careful analysis 
of election structures (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). For example 
Andreas Schedler defines an electoral authoritarian as a regime 
in which ‘elections are broadly inclusive, (they are held under 
universal suffrage) as well as minimally pluralistic (opposition 
parties are allowed to run), minimally competitive (opposition 
parties, while denied victory, are allowed to win votes and 
seats), and minimally open (opposition parties are not subject to 
massive repression, although they may experience repressive 
treatment in selective and intermittent ways)’ (Schedler 2006, 3). 
 
Nowadays, the most widespread understanding about elections 
in nondemocratic regimes is that they serve the incumbent elite’s 
purposes to co-opt, through spoil of offices or goods reward, 
other elites (Boix & Svolik 2008) or members/fragments from 
civil society (Gandhi & Przeworski 2006) or even other party 
members (Magaloni 2006). Others view elections as a way for the 
incumbent to cope with informational uncertainties about intra-
elites dynamics, power sharing, and popular support (Blaydes 
2008, Cox 2008, Brownlee 2007).  
 
In contrast to this understanding, where elections are somehow 
functional to regime’s survival, there are at least two relevant 
studies (Sjöberg 2011, Schedler 2013), which look at competitive 
elections in nondemocratic regimes considering possible 
unintended outcomes. These studies address the possibilities 
that the elections may not be functional of the regimes’ stability, 
but that they might also hold some risks. In particular, the two 
studies underline that even in nondemocratic regimes the 
elections can be competitive and may lead to the alternation in 
power. According to Sjöberg, in some contexts, the state capacity 
(or the organisational capacity) is very low but at the same time 
there are strong and contrasting elites. In this scenario, the 
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elections can be competitive not because of exogenous reasons, 
but because ‘if the mechanisms for coordinating elite behaviour 
are weak, as in the case of a weak ruling party, it makes perfect 
sense for resource-laden individuals to run for office, even if that 
means openly challenging the ruling elite’ (Sjöberg 2011:178). 
  
More recently, Andreas Schedler provides another 
understanding about elections in nondemocratic regimes, which 
is slightly different from his first ‘institutionalist’ approach 
(Schedler 2009). According to Schedler, elections in non-
democratic regimes are arenas of asymmetric struggle between 
incumbents and opposition parties that area characterized by a 
two-level game ‘in which the struggle for voters goes hand in 
hand with the struggle over rules at the meta-game level 
(Schedler, 2013:388). This struggle is characterized by political 
uncertainty, which is composed by institutional and 
informational uncertainties: Schedler claims that in order to win 
the struggle both incumbents and opponents must dominate 
those uncertainties. Of course, incumbents benefit from their 
position as they can manage more resources and institutions for 
their goal. Yet, nondemocratic leaders are physiologically 
insecure and they must recur to instruments of manipulation in 
order to fill the informational gap. Elections, which might end-
up with unexpected and unwanted outcomes for incumbents, 
are the emblematic and uneven playing field of the competition 
over uncertainty.  
 
This eventuality is well depicted by Valerie Bunce and Sharon 
Wolchik in their book Defeating Authoritarian Dictators in Post 
Communist Countries (2011). According to the two authors, 
opposition groups and parties can have one way to win the 
election, which is following the electoral model. The latter is a 
standard or example for imitation or comparison, which 
encompasses a wide range of electoral innovations 3 that 
opposition groups can adopt in order to create the widespread 
sense that victory is possible, so that it became much more 																																																								
3  Such as running ambitious political campaigns, orchestrating 
elaborate voter registration and voter turnout drives, and putting in 
place electoral monitoring procedures that in combination made 
oppositions more effective and more politically attractive to voters. 
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difficult for the incumbent to win the election (cf. Bunce and 
Wolchik 2011:246). Bunce and Wolchik posit great focus on how 
opposition groups in different countries can cooperate among 
each other in order to share electoral innovations. Their 
approach is useful insofar it focuses on the strategies and tactics, 
which compose the ‘micro-level’ of the electoral struggle. 
Moreover, this book shed light on several elements that so far 
have been underestimated in the analysis of the power struggle 
during the election. The two authors have the merit to go beyond 
the debates over whether elections reinforce or undermine 
nondemocratic regimes; rather Bunce and Wolchik are more 
interested in understanding under which conditions, both 
domestically and international, opposition activists can take 
advantage of electoral processes to defeat authoritarian 
incumbents. In doing so, they take into consideration 
mechanisms of learning and policy transfer from one country to 
another one, which rekindled with grounded empirical analysis 
the idea of the ‘snowballing’ effect.  
 
As a matter of fact, in this study I am sharing their approach in 
an attempt to better understand when and under which 
condition nondemocratic incumbents are forced to modify and 
change electoral malpractices, or vice versa when they are firmly 
holding power and therefore they do not need to change the way 
they rig elections.  
Defining Frauds and Electoral Malpractices 
The literature on frauds and electoral malpractices is very recent 
and it can be observed that it was triggered by the renowned 
interest in elections and institution of representations. As a 
matter of fact, systematic research on this field has rarely been 
comparative (cf. Alvarez et al. 2008, Birch 2011) and most of the 
time it takes the shape of handbooks or guidelines for electoral 
assistance or electoral best practices (Goodwin-Gill 1994, 
Goodwin-Gill 1998, International IDEA 2002). Only since early 
2000 have scholars started to be more attentive to frauds and 
malpractices with some in-depth analysis and monographs 
(Brusco et al. 2004, Lehoucq and Molina 2002, Lehoucq, 2003, 
Magaloni 2006).  
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Before passing to review the main analysis on this topic, I would 
like to clarify the distinction between electoral fraud and 
electoral malpractice. The first one, fraud, refers to the illegal 
effort to shape election results (Lehoucq, 2003), and it is 
generally understood to take place on the election-day and that it 
affects votes. Moreover, an act to be considered fraudulent must 
break the law. This element has important implications when we 
look at controversial behaviours during the election period. 
Lehoucq depicted a very clear-cut example: according to him 
landlords are not fraudulent if they pressurise their retainers to 
vote for a specific candidate/party without breaking the law. 
Therefore, even if it is possible to demonstrate that retainers 
voted against their interests, it is not possible to call this activity 
fraudulent unless a law has been broken (Lehoucq 2003:235). 
This understanding reduces lots of acts that can be considered as 
fraudulent.  
 
Other authors have provided a more comprehensive definition 
of fraud. For example, according to Schedler an electoral fraud 
‘involves the introduction of bias into the administration of 
elections [and] it can take place at any stage of the electoral 
process, from voter registration to the final tally of the ballots’ 
(Schedler 2013:99). This definition, which is more inclusive and 
flexible, may raise some problems at the moment of defining 
what is a fraudulent behaviour and what is not. Moreover, even 
the reference to the electoral process can be contested, as for 
example media freedom or civil society rules might be biased 
even before the electoral process begins.  
 
Yet, Schedler points to the fact that the integrity of the electoral 
process can be harmed even if a law is not broken. Therefore, I 
introduce hereby the concept of electoral malpractice, which has 
a broader mean. Sarah Birch, who has extensively studied frauds 
and malpractices, provides the most insightful definition. In 
order to mindfully identify malpractices, Birch stems from what 
an electoral malpractice is not: ‘electoral malpractice is not any 
violation of electoral conduct that hinders the ability of elections 
to realize policy accountability, but a particular type of violation: 
specifically, a violation that serves to substitute personal or 
partisan gain on the part of a restricted number of political actors 
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for popular control by all. In this sense, electoral malpractice 
represents a particularization of the electoral process.’ (Birch 
2011a:26). According to Birch, malpractices can be disparate and 
they can take different forms such as manipulating the 
institutions, manipulating vote choice and manipulating the 
voting act. Manipulation of voting institutions consists of 
‘altering the design of the institutions governing elections to the 
advantage of one or more electoral contestants, in violation of 
the principles of inclusivity, impartiality, openness, or 
transparency. The manipulation of vote choice includes all kinds 
of undue influence: both incentives for voters to misrepresent 
their preferences as well as actions that alter those preferences. 
The manipulation of the voting act takes many forms, including 
the uneven implementation of the regulatory framework, the 
biasing of administrative decision in favour of one or more 
electoral competitors, and of course, outright fraud.’ (Birch 
2011a:27).  
 
This broad understanding of electoral malpractice grasps 
different kind of practices, some that take place in pre-electoral 
period, others on voting day and post scrutiny. Stemming from 
the claim that electoral malpractices could be difficult to be 
observed (Lehoucq 2003), academic research has moved forward 
and it found out important elements for a better study of frauds 
and electoral malpractices. One of the classical aims of social 
sciences has always been to classify political and social 
phenomenon. Therefore, despite being challenging, there have 
been some tentative steps to number or classify different technics 
of manipulation. Two noteworthy categorisations are Hale’s 
SCEAOMIDD 4  methods to defeat opponents and Schedler’s 
menu of manipulation. Hale, based on Dahl’s Regime Typology 
(Dalh 1971), identifies SCEAOMIDD regimes as separated from 
Competitive Oligarchy and Inclusive or Closed Hegemonic on 
the basis of liberalisation and inclusiveness degrees regarding 
elections. As a matter of fact, in Competitive Oligarchy not all 
the population can participate in scrutiny or has different degree 																																																								
4  SCEAOMIDD stands for Semi-/Competitive/Electoral 
Authoriarianism or Managed/Illiberal/Delegative Democracy, see 
Hale 2011) 
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of political rights (e.g. Apartheid in South Africa), whereas in 
Inclusive or Closed Hegemony regimes opposition groups do 
not seriously contest elections. Instead in SCEAOMIDD regimes5 
‘at least some of the most important national political decision 
makers are chosen through regularly scheduled elections that 
feature the near-universal franchise and that are contested by at 
least two (sets of) candidates with substantially distinct interests 
or positions, but where state authorities and their collaborators 
significantly and systematically, through formal or informal 
coercive or corrupt methods hinder the ability of opposition 
candidates to gain public support and/or to convert this support 
into officially recognized votes’ (Hale 2011:35). Hale sorts these 
coercive or corrupt methods into seven groups: media 
manipulation, coercing or buying votes, supporting informal 
groups to attack opposition, manipulation of the choice set, 
pressuring or co-opting or blackmailing elites, selective 
prosecution, falsification. Hale provides for all these groups 
concrete examples that happened throughout the world. Yet I 
consider this categorisation too extensive, and as it includes 
disparate techniques and it do not allow for a proper 
conceptualisation. Nonetheless, it is useful to differentiate the 
goals of such techniques rather than the methods. It is 
noteworthy to specify that according to Hale ‘the application of 
these techniques when at least some true opposition is allowed to 
compete […] can produce cumulative effects that are typical of 
neither full democracies nor full autocracies’ (Hale 2011:37, Italic 
in the original). This claim is important insofar as it adds new 
specifications to hybrid regimes as category per se. Moreover, it is 
noteworthy for this research as it clarifies that the presence of an 
opposition affects how those techniques are implemented and 
contested by the population, leading them eventually to an 
evolution.  																																																								5 	All	 the	 three	 South	 Caucasian,	 despite	 they	 are	 undertaking	 three	different	paths,	they	did	share	the	fact	that	all	of	them	can	be	inserted	in	this	regime	categorisation:	Georgia,	Armenia	(according	to	Schedler)	and	Azerbaijan	 (according	 to	 Susan	 Hyde	 and	 Nikolay	 Marinov	 2009)	 are	SCEAOMIDD	regimes.	Even	in	a	recent	book	by	Nodia	and	Stefes	the	two	authors	 claimed	 that	 the	 three	 countries	 are	hybrid	 regimes	 (Nodia	 and	Stefes	2015).	
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Another work that categorizes different electoral malpractices is 
the renowned Menu of Manipulation by Andreas Schedler 
(2002a), which was subsequently refined in the Repertoire of 
Electoral Manipulation (2013). First of all, this menu is open-
ended and incumbents’ use of malpractices may change, thus it 
recognizes innovation and expansion of repertoires. Schedler’s 
claim is that authoritarian malpractices follow the democratic 
chain, which is composed by seven steps: empowerment, 
freedom of supply, freedom of demand, inclusion, insulation, 
integrity, and decisiveness. Incumbents in nondemocratic 
regimes adopt strategies aimed to nullify the seven steps of 
electoral democratic chain through: disempowerment, supply-
side restriction (exclusion, division, subversion), demand-side 
restriction (repression and unfairness), exclusive suffrage 
(formal and informal disenfranchisement), external interference 
(intimidation and corruption), redistributive electoral 
governance (discriminatory rules and practices) and 
indecisiveness (tutelage and reversion). This categorisation is 
helpful insofar as it allows on the one side other researchers to 
use this classification in order to further study malpractices and 
on the other it provides with a specific tool to identify different 
regimes. As a matter of fact, Schedler claims that ‘electoral 
democracies comply with all essential condition of democratic 
choice, while electoral autocracies severely and systematically 
violate at least one of them (Schedler 2013:102). Moreover, 
Schedler clearly states that rulers cannot randomly or arbitrary 
chose from the menu of manipulation, but that their choices are 
subject to costs, constraints, risks and failures. I would stem from 
this insight in order to further identify what are the constraints 
that affect manipulation’s choice.  
Researches on Electoral Frauds and Malpractices 
Beyond categorisation’s efforts there has also been a flourishing 
stream of literature that has aimed to explain and assess electoral 
frauds and malpractices. The results have been uneven and 
sometimes contradictory. Until today, to my knowledge there 
are just a couple noteworthy books that have systematically 
addressed the topic: Alvarez, Hyde, and Hall’s (eds.) Election 
Fraud Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation (2008) and 
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Sara Birch’s Electoral Malpractice (2011). The first book is a 
collection of different researches which highlight different facets 
of electoral frauds and manipulations. Some of those articles set 
the agenda for future research on the topic and identified the 
main problematic. Some of those studies are reviewed in the 
subsequent paragraphs.  
 
However, it is only with the advent of Sarah Birch’s book that 
the concept itself was defined and further investigated. As I have 
reported so far, according to Birch the electoral malpractice is a 
particular aspect of the electoral process, which can take 
different forms such as manipulating the institutions, 
manipulating vote choice and manipulating the act of voting. 
Beyond providing a definition, the main aim of Birch’s Electoral 
Malpractice was to assess how different structural domestic 
conditions increased or reduced the risk of electoral 
malpractices. In particular, her arguments refer to the cost-
benefits analysis for incumbents to resort to electoral 
malfeasances. Therefore, she assessed the impact of corruptions, 
freedom of the media, inequality, urbanisation, and protest 
capacity on the authorities’ recurrence to electoral malpractices. 
One of the main findings is that a country is expected to have 
fairer elections where there is a lively civil society and where 
there is less corruption. Moreover, the study found that electoral 
malpractices are positively related to economic growth, but it 
did not really explain the reasons for this (Norris 2015). 
Nevertheless, the book remains one of the best sources for the 
study of domestic structural conditions and electoral 
malpractices.  
 
A growing literature is adopting systematic forensic practices in 
the study of frauds, which aims to the post-hoc detection of 
possible fraud (Hyde and Marinov 2008, Alvarez and Boehmke, 
2008, Leemann and Bochsler 2014). They work with mainly two 
methods: the first one relies on ecological information, and it 
stems from the political structure of a district and claims that it is 
possible to predict the voting pattern observed (Alvarez and 
Boehmke, 2008). The second one looks at the distribution of 
digits: according to Leemann and Bochsler ‘[t]he basic idea is 
that when someone makes up numbers they fail to produce 
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numbers that are truly random in the way they would be in a 
truly fair election or vote.’ (Leemann and Bochsler 2014:37). 
However, there is still no consensus on the most reliable 
methods (Norris 2015) and therefore their validity contested.  
 
 Moreover, there has been growing interest in analysing more in 
depth some particular practices, on the other research aimed to 
identify what factors may or may not affect the presence of 
malpractices. In the first branch of study, researchers delve more 
in depth to better understand a type of malpractice. For example, 
one type of electoral malpractice that has received by now most 
of the research’s attention is electoral clientelism and its effects 
over voter choice. Clientelism is ‘a catch-all category that 
encompasses a variety of different political strategies’ (Mares 
and Petrova 2013:2), and includes a disparate set of practices 
such as vote buying, patronage and intimidation. Vote buying is 
the most studied practice in the recent literature (Brusco et. al. 
2004: 69, Stokes 2005, Bratton 2008, Vicente and Wantchekon 
2008, Schwartzberg 2012), and it has been reported to be present 
in many countries in the world. According to some scholars, vote 
buying implies vote and cash distribution before an election 
(Vicente and Wantchekon 2008), and thus they do not include 
goods distribution in this practice, which relates to patronage. 
Accordingly, Mares and Petrova claim that ‘patronage differs 
from vote buying along two dimensions. First, the benefits that 
are distributed to voters for political purposes involve resources 
of the state. They can be either policy benefits that are financed 
by public sources or the facilitation of particular administrative 
advantages to voters. Second, the intermediaries between 
politicians and voters in this political exchange are employees of 
the state.’ (Mares and Petrova 2013:5). Even patronage is a 
widespread practice, and there are studies that reveal this 
practice in many continents: Africa (Lemarchand 1972), Latin 
America (Calvo and Murillo 2004, Oliveros 2012) in Europe and 
the United States (Charnay 1964, Shefter 1994, Folke et. al. 2011).  
According to Mares and Petrova (2013), incumbents choose to 
rely on patronage or vote buying depending on the grip over 
state resources and administrative personnel. As a matter of fact, 
it is more likely that when incumbents are in power for a 
numbers of years they have much more possibilities to rely on 
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state resources (both financial and administrative), so that they 
can avoid recurring to vote buying. Mares and Petrova’s 
research is one among the few comparative analyses concerning 
malpractices. Indeed, for the time being, most malpractices have 
been analysed in cross-national comparisons to assess whether 
there were sufficient conditions for incumbents to win the 
election (Esfandiari 2003, Simpser 2005).  
 
Another branch of study started to investigate how frauds and 
malpractices are affected by domestic factors, such as electoral 
governance (Birch 2007; Lehoucq and Molina 2002) political 
competition (Lehoucq 2003), the role of the electoral 
management body (Elklit 1999; Elklit and Reynolds 2002; 
Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2008; Pastor 1999). In this field of 
study there is a study that diachronically analysed trends and 
patterns of electoral frauds and malpractices in post-Soviet 
Eurasia (Bader 2011). According to the author electoral 
malpractice are mostly affected by three variables: the type of 
elections (presidential or parliamentary), the presence of 
electoral competition (present in competitive elections, absent in 
hegemonic elections), and the advance of time. Interestingly, the 
findings demonstrate that electoral malpractices are as 
widespread in parliamentary as in presidential elections, they 
are more severe in hegemonic elections than in competitive 
elections and that they do not decrease over time. The results of 
this analysis suggest that electoral malpractices are not a 
temporary phenomenon, and that they change and adapt to new 
situations. Yet, Bader did not take into consideration the 
international dimension as a variable that may affect frauds’ 
patterns.  
 
From an international point of view, most of the studies argued 
that electoral observation missions could affect frauds and 
malpractices. Indeed authors have mostly included the 
international dimension of fraud and malpractices by analysing 
the role of electoral observers (Carothers 1997:22, Hartlyn and 
McCoy 2006, Hyde 2011, Hyde and O’Mahony 2010, Simpser 
and Donno 2012, Ichino and Schündeln 2012, Norris 2015). In 
particular, there are two strands of research that consider the 
observer’s effect substantially in different ways. On the one side 
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there are those who underline positive factors from elections 
observation, claiming that international or domestic observer 
developed along the year new methods to deter frauds and 
malpractices quite effectively (Carothers 1997, Hyde 2007). Other 
authors highlighted that local or international observer might 
not be able to deter all different types of frauds and malpractices 
(Hartlyn and McCoy 2006, Simpser and Donno 2008) and some 
other studies pointed to certain negative consequences caused by 
election observation (Simpser and Donno 2012, Ichino and 
Schündeln 2012). These researches posit the attention on two 
unintended consequences of election observation: frauds 
displacement in other districts and the development of other 
forms of governance manipulation. The latter entails that the 
presence of electoral observers may worsen governance’s 
performances as incumbents would be keener to manipulate 
legal, judicial and electoral institutions, which are less verifiable, 
rather than merely tamper elections’ results. Thus, according to 
Simpser and Donno, electoral observation activities may have 
more negative unintended consequences (2012). For what 
concern fraud displacement, Ichino and Schündeln (2012) 
verified that malpractices were displaced from one constituency 
to another because of the presence of electoral observers. The 
study was conducted during the 2008 national election in Ghana 
and it focused on the tampering of voter registration lists. 
Thanks to field experiment methodology the two authors were 
able to deter how tampering of voter lists was displaced from 
one constituency, where observers were present, to others 
nearby. Yet, their study takes into consideration only voter 
registration and it focuses on solely on the actual Election Day; 
moreover, the percentage of the displacing effect is quite low. 
Finally, there are works that questioned why non-democratic 
regimes still invite international observers to monitor the 
elections. Susan Hyde (2011) claims that observers are invited to 
monitor elections particularly from ‘leaders of regimes that were 
not already established democracies,’ since ‘democracy-
contingent benefits created an incentive for incumbent leaders to 
identify a credible signal that they were, in fact, holding 
democratic elections.’ (Hyde 2011:358); as a matter of fact, in her 
article she demonstrated that incumbents in non-democratic 
countries since the early 90s invited observers despite the fact 
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the observers were providing negative reports. These latter 
group studies, on external factors affecting frauds and 
malpractices, are important because they shed light on how the 
international system, through some specific actors, influences 
domestic realities. Yet, those are just small contributions that do 
not solve the black boxes of internal-external interactions in 
academic research, in particular for diffusion and 
democratisation studies.  
 
Recently, Pippa Norris provided an excellent work (2015) where 
she addressed the pertinent question, ‘why do elections fail?’. 
This book is not particularly on frauds and electoral malpractices 
in autocracies or hybrid regimes, but proved to be very effective 
to debunking common ideas about why elections fail. In her 
book she used fresh data from the Perception Electoral Integrity 
(PEI) dataset, which allowed her to test different reasons behind 
electoral failures. She weighted the impact of structural 
constraints, international forces, institutional checks and 
electoral management factors in order to understand which of 
these factors affect more electoral integrity. As far as the topic of 
this research is concerned, I am going to expand the concept of 
international forces as used by Norris. As a matter of fact, in this 
book the author has a limited understanding of international 
forces. Norris refers to three types of external factors: 
‘cosmopolitan communication that diffuses global norms to 
strengthen international standards of electoral integrity, the 
provision of electoral assistance and development aid to build 
local capacity and the deployment of observer monitoring 
missions to strengthen transparency and accountability’ (Norris 
2015:89). It is submitted here that this standpoint has failed to 
take into account many other factors which also have a strong 
impact on the quality of democracy (see for example Morlino 
2013), and that shape the international dimension of regime 
change (Levitsky and Way 2010). The three factors individuated 
by Norris are just some of the multiple factors that form what 
Levitsky and Way label Linkage, which is one of the two 
components of the international dimension of regime change; in 
particular Linkage refers to ‘the density of ties (economic, 
political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border 
flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) 
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among particular countries and the United States, the EU (and 
pre-2004 EU members), and Western-dominated multilateral 
institutions’ (Levitsky and Way 2010:43). In this analysis I am 
going to expand the concept of international forces in order to 
fully assess the different elements that can affect democracy and 
thus the quality of an election. At the same time, I am relying on 
Norris’ book for her excellent assessment of other alternative 
explanations, such as structural, institutional and EMBs.  
 
As reported so far, in the academic research, in the recent years, 
there has been a growing tendency to understand through cross-
national comparison frauds and malpractices. However, these 
efforts suffer from some shortcomings as they have been hardly 
systematic in analysing the phenomenon (addressing just one 
malpractice or focusing on the election day) and they are still 
leaving out a broader understanding of the international 
dimension as an explaining factor (focusing just on the role of 
elections observer, or considering only some aspects of the 
international forces). Therefore, I am confident that this research, 
relying on this precious literature, would be able to address 
some of the missing factors, and it would provide with a new 
assessment of the intervening international dimension in the 
field of fraud and electoral malpractice. As the literature review 
goes on, in the following paragraph I am going to introduce the 
international dimension of authoritarian regimes as well as how 
the international context affects domestic actors and practices.  
 
The International Dimension of Authoritarian Regimes  
 
This stream of literature is very recent and the scholarly concern 
for this ‘new’ phenomenon is only around a decade old. As I am 
going to describe below, research on this topic is ‘indebted’ to 
diffusion theories and democratisation literature. Most of the 
concepts and ideas that triggered analysis on authoritarian 
regimes adopted, transformed and sharpen theoretical 
implications, which were extensively used to describe for 
example European Union enlargement or the diffusion of the 
democratic ‘virus’ (see ‘snowball effect). Therefore, in this 
literature review I must include some of the most important 
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studies on democratisation, which subsequently became relevant 
to study nondemocratic regimes’ diffusion. 
 
Theories of Democratisation at the End of the Cold War 
Scholars interested in the democratization process are well 
aware about the importance of the international dimension of 
norms, values and principles linked to democracy. This 
dimension takes the shape in different international factors, such 
as international cooperation, soft power’s projection and the 
crystallisation of international system’s norms and values, which 
affect how domestic actors behave and act. Originating from the 
end of the Cold War the international system itself started to be 
considered as dominated by some norms and values, such as 
democracy, human rights and self-determination. Some scholars 
conceived it as the victory of democratic forces over tyranny and 
oppression (Fukuyama 1991), which would also imply 
democratic dominoes everywhere (Starr 1991). Therefore, 
stemming from the Fukuyama’s announcement that ‘Western 
liberal democracy [is] the final form of human government’ 
(Fukuyama 1991:3), in the aftermath of the Cold War, this claim 
was perceived as unquestionable and thus the norm of 
democracy ‘achieved striking universality in the current 
international system’ (McFaul 2004:148). Democracy became at 
least formally accepted, as there were few governments willing 
to publically sympathise with non-democratic systems.  
 
In turn, the fact that the democratic paradigm was lacking 
challengers ‘significantly shaped perceptions about the role 
external actors could, and should, play in assisting its spread 
across the globe.’ (Kurki and Hobson 2012:2). Many scholars 
have been addressing the international dimension of democracy 
for decades. Stemming from the works of Tilly (1975) and 
Putnam (1988), the idea that somehow the international system 
affects domestic regimes became prominent in with the advent 
of democratisation studies (Huntington 1991, Linz and Stepan 
1996, Withehead 1996, Gleditsch and Ward 2006). Moreover, 
other scholars started to look at how democracies diffuse, both 
intentionally and unintentionally, democratic norms and values 
(Whitehead 2001, Brinks and Coppedge 2006 Levitsky and Way 
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2005). Finally, another branch of studies delves into the effect of 
proper democracy promotion in nondemocratic regimes 
(Schimmelfennig 2007, Magen and Morlino 2009, Risse et al. 
2009). Therefore, the idea that in the international sphere the 
external conditions and actors are important in the development 
of democracies is well grounded in the literature.  
 
 This vision has been reinforced by globalization, which has 
increased scholarly attention to the importance of systemic 
factors. Some authors analysed globalisation from an economic 
perspective (such Frieden and Rogowski 1996, Andrews 1994, 
Oatley 2011) and they claimed that states are deeply affected by 
the international system, which is now overwhelming domestic 
factors. Others looked at the diffusion perspective instead, with 
the slogan that the spread of democracy will result in global 
peace (Maoz and Russett 1992, Ray 1995, Farberand and Gowa 
1997); democracy has become so intertwined with the current 
international system that it is becoming difficult to clearly 
differentiate between democracy promotion and the 
international advocacy of human rights (Burnell 2011:1). One of 
the most controversial outcomes of this understanding was 
George W. Bush’s declaration of war to tyrannies around the 
world. According to him, in order to assure global security and 
prosperity, all autocracies would have be eliminated and 
replaced with democracies.  
 
However there have been criticisms and doubts about western 
democracy’s supremacy throughout the world; some scholars 
started to reflect about other conceptualisations of democracy, 
which differed from Western liberal conceptions (Bunce and 
Wolchik 2012, Sadiki 2012). Others acknowledge that autocracies 
won’t extinguish and thus it is necessary at least to contain them 
through a ‘league of democracies’ (Kagan 2008). Meanwhile, 
some scholars have claimed that the autocratic revival was just a 
fascinating myth (cf. Deudney and Ikenberry 2009). Finally, there 
are scholars who started to criticise this international system 
from a hegemonic point of views (Gilpin 1987), where concepts 
such as ‘democracy’, ‘governance’ and ‘regime change’ are 
linked and promoted by the club of nations that compose the 
oligarchy of the system. In particular, Bertrand Badie speaks 
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about the Westernisation of the Political Order (2000 [1992]), which 
subsequently determined the creation of a core of countries that 
act as concert (club), pushing forward a vertical or hierarchical 
conceptualisation of the international system (cf. Badie 2011). 
This conceptualisation of the international system as an 
oligarchic drift is useful insofar as it entails existing dynamics, 
such as external actors pushing toward a convergence to similar 
domestic political and economic institutions, as well as it 
underlines the cost for those who do not converge.  
 
The idea of convergences or divergences toward democratisation 
or authoritarianism from an international perspective is well 
analysed by Levitsky and Way in Competitive Authoritarian 
Regimes: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (2010). First of all, 
already in title it is possible to understand that these regimes’ 
types are a product of a particular international context: the post-
Cold War era. Secondly, despite the fact that the book is not 
about regimes’ origins, the international dimension is articulated 
in two facets. As already mentioned in the introduction, Levitsky 
and Way speak about Western Leverage and Western Linkage as 
two driving forces for regimes’ dynamics. Western stands for 
‘states’ vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure’ 
(Levitsky and Way 2010:24), whereas Western Linkage refers to 
‘the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and 
organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and 
services, people, and information) between particular countries 
and the United States and the EU’ (Levitsky and Way 2010:23). 
The two authors claim that the vulnerability of a state depends 
on its bargaining power vis à vis the West: ‘where countries lack 
bargaining power and are heavily affected by Western punitive 
action, leverage is high; where countries possess substantial 
bargaining power and/or can weather Western punitive action 
without significant harm, leverage is low’ (Levitsky and Way 
2010:41). These factors raise the ‘external costs of 
authoritarianism, leading elites to adopt the trappings of 
democracy while abusing those same institutions to preserve 
their power’ (Art 2012:357). Thus, I claim that in this 
international system hybrid regimes suffer some costs from not 
choosing to align to the democratic norms of electoral integrity. 
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Obviously rigging an election breaks the electoral integrity and it 
may trigger international condemnations and sanctions.   
The Diffusion of Nondemocratic Regimes 
More recently, there have been scholars who started to consider 
how even nondemocratic regimes may have an international 
dimension, which can affect other domestic policies. This stream 
of literature rose from the negative assessments of democratic 
regimes’ performances in the international scenario that 
followed the end of the Cold war. According to some authors, 
less than twenty years after the Third Wave of democratisation, 
democratic regimes around the world were suffering from a 
backlash or a reverse wave (Ambrosio 2009, Puddington 2008, 
2009). According to Erdmann et al., the research on the 
international dimension of authoritarian regimes followed two 
strands: ‘first, scholars formerly interested in processes of 
democratization took notice of the authoritarian rollback that 
reversed many efforts of democracy promotion (Burnell and 
Schlumberger 2010, Burnell 2011). Second, scholars previously 
interested in the stability and durability of authoritarian regimes 
became increasingly aware of the importance of international 
factors (Art 2012: 201).’ (Erdmann et al. 2013:5).  
 
Scholars are still debating and trying to build a framework 
through which analyse the international dimension of 
authoritarian regimes. Hereunder, I provide a literature review 
concerning those studies that addressed the international 
dimension of non-democracies from a diffusionist perspective, 
which includes learning mechanism as a diffusion process. As 
mentioned so far, diffusion studies have been mostly 
investigating democratisation processes. Most of them rely on 
the concept of diffusion theorized by Rogers, which affirms that 
diffusion is a ‘process by which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a 
social system’ (Rogers 1996:10). Despite this definition leaves out 
the channels as well as the actors (Erdmann et al. 2013) other 
studies built on it started to specify the missing items (Börzel 
and Risse 2012, Elkins and Simmons 2005). These analyses 
brought interesting insights about the mechanisms that drive the 
process, yet ‘the empirical identification is still questionable’ 
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(Erdmann et al. 2013:19). Many other scholars in this field of 
research share the same concerns about methodology and 
verification tools (Bank and Edel 2015), and despite many efforts, 
there is still not a proper tool to clearly identify diffusion. 
Nevertheless, I think it is important to look at how the literature 
concerning authoritarian diffusion addressed this fascinating, 
but still young, topic.  
 
In a study concerning the diffusion of Coloured Revolutions, 
Beissinger (2007) provides a first attempt to conceptualise elite 
learning as an institutional factor that might hinder or slow 
down the diffusion of electoral revolutions. In other words, 
Beissinger claims that popular demonstrations in later-risers 
countries may have less chances to overthrown the regimes 
because incumbents learnt how to deal with protests from 
earlier-risers countries. In particular, he focuses on pre-emptive 
actions in order to avoid elites’ defections. With this study 
Beissinger recognizes the importance of elite learning during the 
Coloured Revolutions ‘in contrast to the modular spread of 
nationalism in the glasnost era […] we have seen an elite 
learning process occurring among later risers in the spread of 
modular democratic revolutions, raising the institutional 
constraints to action and likely limiting the further effect of 
example on outcomes (Beissinger 2007:273). This study has good 
implications for my research, even if it limits to operationalize 
learning only for pre-emptive actions. Moreover, for the sake of 
this argument I am not going to assess whether the learning was 
a success or a failure in its implementation. Thus, this study 
posits itself in between a comparative analysis and a study of 
practices’ innovation and diffusion. 
 
Since then, there has been a growing interest in the mechanisms 
of authoritarian diffusion that focused on mechanism of learning 
and set the agenda for further research. The first author who 
dealt with this topic and tried to build a theoretical framework is 
Thomas Ambrosio. In his article ‘Constructing a Framework for 
Authoritarian Diffusion’ (2010) he claims that democratization 
theories are not sufficient to explain this process and he prefers 
to borrow concepts from a ‘wide array of disciplines’ (Ambrosio 
2010:376). He acknowledges the idea that diffusion is composed 
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of two-part divisions (Elkins and Simmon 2005), and he further 
develops the concept of appropriateness and effectiveness, adding 
important reflections in a comprehensive framework. The 
concept of appropriateness comes from former studies (Elkins and 
Simmon 2005, DiMaggio and Powell 1983) that analysed how 
some norms and practices are more appropriate in a specific 
time/space set. In other words, appropriateness refers to the cost 
and benefits that different policy options hold if adopted in a 
particular (international/domestic) environment (cf. Ambrosio 
2010:379). Whereas for the concept of effectiveness, Ambrosio 
explains that it is ‘a learning process by which policymakers are 
better able to identify what works and what does not through 
the experiences of others’ (Ambrosio 2010:382). Therefore, some 
authoritarian regimes might look to other authoritarian regimes 
to find solutions or the best practices to adopt. Ambrosio then 
speaks about contributing factors, which have an impact on 
diffusion processes. Here, he includes geography, linkage, 
international organizations, major power prestige, and reference 
groups (Ambrosio 2010:384). This framework of analysis is very 
helpful for this study as it takes into consideration on the one 
side the international system and its constraints toward policy 
options, and on the other the effectiveness of other models. In 
addition, Ambrosio’s article points to some further possible 
venues for research, in particular related to learning 
mechanisms, which this thesis would like to address: are 
incumbents in nondemocratic regimes adopting similar policies 
in order to achieve similar results? Is there a pattern of 
innovation and subsequent adoptions? Throughout the thesis I 
will take into consideration these questions and will provide a 
contribution to address them. 
 
Stemming from Ambrosio’s theoretical arguments, Rachel 
Vanderhill provides new empirical evidence from additional 
case studies. According to her, autocrats do learn from each 
other to find better strategies to stay in power, and she identifies 
three ways by which learning takes shape: demonstration effects, 
purposive and collaborative action by external ‘change agents’, 
and pressure by external actors to maintain authoritarian 
regimes. For the sake of the argument of this thesis the first type 
of learning, which is informal and indirect, is the most important 
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one. As a matter of fact, according to Vanderhill  ‘diffusion 
involves elites learning from the successes and failures of other 
countries […] illiberal elites may decide not to adopt certain 
policies because of the negative consequences of these actions in 
other states. (2012:2). 
 
Subsequently, on the concept of learning among authoritarian 
regimes, there is a growing subsector of study that addresses 
some specific policy sectors (Koesel and Bunce 2013, Del Sordi 
2014, Heydemann and Leenders 2014, Joshua 2015, Bank and 
Edel 2015). For example, there are two pioneering studies that 
delve in learning practices in the field of protest management 
and constitutional reforms carried out by researchers at GIGA 
(Joshua 2015, Bank and Edel 2015). Both of the articles rely on the 
concept of learning as it has been theorized by Levy (1994) in a 
seminal article concerning foreign policy. Levy asserts that 
learning is “a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in 
one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or 
procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of 
experience” (Levy 1994: 283). Josua’s paper aims to better-
theorize learning from mistakes, which has been barely 
conceptualized by former studies, whereas Bank and Edel’s 
research provided new evidence on how learning process 
affected later riser countries in the Arab Spring. My research will 
extensively rely on this research and will provide a new 
contribution for addressing an unexplored topic of learning: 
electoral frauds and malpractices.  
 
As it appears, there is very little research on learning 
mechanisms on authoritarian regimes. One of the reasons 
concerns the facts that learning is a very difficult phenomenon to 
observe and to infer. As a matter of fact, Bennett and Howlett 
wrote that the concept of learning is ‘overtheorized and 
underapplied’ (Bennett and Howlett 1992:288). Scholars in this 
sector encountered plenty of methodological challenges and 
conundrums. However, and I am confident that there is a need 
to continue working on this fascinating and relevant topic, 
drawing as much as possible from the theoretical outcomes 
already existing and on an extensively empirical analysis.  
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The Authoritarian Regional Dimension 
To conclude the literature review I must include a review of 
studies dealing with the post-Soviet region in order to 
understand how they interpret authoritarian regimes’ 
development in the region. There is a huge strand of literature 
that considers Russia’s interventionism as a reason for the 
“betrayed democratization” (Kramer, 2008; Ambrosio 2009; 
Burnell, 2010; Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Baracani 2010; Babayan, 
2015; Jackson 2010; Tolstrup, 2009; Hedenskog and Larsson, 
2006) and some other conceived Russia as playing the black 
knight’s role in maintaining authoritarian regimes in its 
surroundings (Levitsky and Way 2010, Vanderhill 2012, Tolstrup 
2014). Others focus more on indirect forms of influence, such as 
soft power aimed to restore Russia’s image and values across 
borders (Popescu, 2006; Tafuro, 2014). There is a noteworthy 
study conducted by David R. Cameron and Mitchell A. 
Orenstein that provides an original description about the 
deliberate and unintentional external influences of Russia on its 
neighbours (Cameron and Orenstein, 2012). Drawing data from 
Freedom House and Polity IV datasets, the two authors analysed 
the patterns of change in terms of civil and political rights in 
Russia and in its surrounding countries in the lasts two decades 
(1991-2010). They conclude their analysis by affirming that ‘if 
one is to understand the persistence of authoritarian or hybrid 
polities in the non-Baltic post-Soviet space, the reluctance of 
most leaders in those states to strengthen the democratic 
elements in their polities, and the great difficulty experienced by 
the few who did try to strengthen those elements, one must 
examine the exercise and impact of Russian leverage in its near 
abroad.’ (Cameron, Orenstein; 2012:40). In this article they 
highlight two important elements, the first one is that in the last 
decade Russia experienced the largest erosion in political rights, 
civil liberties and democracy of any of the post-soviet countries; 
the second one is that all the other countries also witnessed a 
similar path (except for a short period of time in the aftermath of 
the Coloured Revolutions). Some experienced shifts that brought 
them very close to Russia’s level of civil and political rights; this 
is particularly evident in countries such as Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Cameron and Orenstein did not dare to find a direct 
causality with this trend, however they suggest that ‘one cannot 
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conclude on the basis of these patterns that Russia caused or 
contributed to the erosion of rights, liberties, and democracy in 
the other countries” […]; however, Russia “may have influenced 
that erosion, if not through direct intervention, as in Belarus in 
1994–1996, through its legitimation, by its own practice, of 
authoritarian politics and the leverage afforded by the 
favourable asymmetry of power and its many linkages with the 
other states.’ (Cameron, Orenstein; 2012:24). 
 
However, those studies do not really elaborate a real framework 
for analysing external-internal interactions, even at a general 
level. In particular, “empirical tests of the effects of international 
factors have treated domestic politics as a black box that might 
be shoved this way or that by neighbours, sanctions, or 
whatever” (Geddes, 2009: 290). Moreover, they mainly focus on 
Russia vis à vis neighbourhoods, overlooking other forms of 
socialisation among other countries. I consider this to be a big 
gap that academic research needs to attempt to fill. As a matter 
of fact, socialisation may be horizontal rather than vertical. Some 
studies already acknowledged it in particular for what concerns 
the diffusion of electoral revolutions. This is the case with the 
already mentioned Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in 
Postcommunist Countries, by Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik 
(2011). In this monograph the authors analyse the post-soviet 
countries where domestic actors challenged the authoritarian 
regimes. They focus in particular on the performances of 
opposition parties, and how they use transnational networks to 
cooperate. These parties, they stress, may interact within 
different contexts of authoritarian regimes and create an 
innovative approach to defeat the incumbent in “democratizing 
elections”. Overall, this book provides a very good framework 
for analysing international networks and activism, and it fills a 
gap that the literature had not addressed up until then. 
However, it has not such a great value with regard to elite 
socialisation, and it does not include a real framework of 
international forces (such as Western Linkage and Western 
Leverage).  
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Conclusion 
The three different streams of academic research 
addressed in this literature review have seldom been combined 
in a single study. In other words, there have not been 
monographs or any form of systematic research on the 
intertwined topic so far. However, overall, this multi-sectorial 
literature review also highlighted that there has been a growing 
interest in studying nondemocratic regimes, both from an 
institutional and from a diffusional point of view. The 
international academic community is now acquainted with the 
concepts of authoritarian cooperation, diffusion and learning. 
There is also a broader understanding about the different types 
of frauds and electoral malpractices, and how nondemocratic 
regimes use elections despite the risks they hold, which might 
have counterproductive outcomes for the rulers. The elections 
and their management and mismanagement are at the core of 
the regimes types’ analyses. Scholars are becoming more and 
more acquainted with the idea that even if elections are formally 
set up, this might not lead toward a real democratization. 
Therefore, nowadays there is a broader acceptance of the end of 
the transition paradigm and the recognitions of the durability 
and sustainability of hybrid regimes. In addition, scholars are 
analysing how democratic institutions are used to 
nondemocratic ends. The new institutionalism in the study of 
nondemocratic regimes provided important contributions to 
understand how rulers could manage the establishment of 
democratic and representative institutions without fully 
becoming democratic. Yet, there are also those scholars who 
criticise the ‘institutional turn’ in the study of nondemocratic 
regimes, insofar there are important issues that are taken for 
granted, and there is a blind confidence that authoritarian 
incumbents could easily bend the institutions to their will.  
 
Based on this important research production, the literature 
review identifies some spots for future researches, in particular 
for those that aim to adopt an interdisciplinary approach. As the 
review on diffusion demonstrated, there is still stickiness to refer 
to democratization’s concept to study authoritarian regimes, and 
too few attempt to assess the role of diffusion mechanisms in 
electoral frauds’ analysis. I claim it is important to include such 
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analysis in a broader understanding of cost and benefits for non-
democracies to proliferate and cooperate. Moreover, this 
approach will also address another gap in the literature 
concerning electoral malpractices, which for the time being has 
been more focused on investigating singular malpractices and 
less interested in providing systematic studies that analyse the 
diffusion of frauds in comparative perspective. Even fewer are 
the analyses that take into consideration the international 
dimension for what concern frauds and malpractices. Therefore, 
there is a need for further academic research on many topics 
related to electoral mismanagement in nondemocratic regimes. 
This thesis, with all the shortcomings and weaknesses typical for 
a pioneering study, will address this gap in the literature with an 
in-depth and comprehensive analysis over frauds and electoral 
malpractices in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Frauds and 
malpractices will be compared throughout the South Caucasus 
and I will analyse how and why they change, evolve or not, 
taking into consideration the cost and benefits coming from the 
international context, as well as international socialisation 
practices.  
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Chapter 2:  
Change, Context and Learning: a Framework for 
Analysis. 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to assess the developments of frauds and 
electoral malpractices, , it is necessary to clearly identify what I 
use as basic concepts and how I am going to build from them my 
theoretical framework. As the title of this chapter reveals, there 
are at least three basic concepts from which I will stem to delve 
the topic of this research: they are ‘change’, ‘context’ and 
‘learning’. As I am going to elucidate, all these concepts entail 
others in subgroups relationships. Misunderstandings or 
misinterpretations are one of the most common problems in 
theoretical argumentations; as Gallie’s landmark article claims, 
all concepts might be ‘essentially contestable’ (Gallie 1956) thus, 
for each of these words I will specify the conceptualisation that 
underpins my understanding. Although this won’t help 
avoiding contestability, it would help the reader to discern my 
usage. 
 
I am confident that some notions of political theory might serve 
to this purpose and they could support a better characterization 
of concepts. That is why I am going to refer to some of those 
theories, which developed in the aftermath of the ‘Linguistic 
Turn’.6 As a matter of fact, both change context and learning are 
complex political concepts that hold a cluster of concepts in their 
inside. I am going to use Freeden’s approach (1996) to the study 
of political ideology, as I argue it could be of some help in order 
to clarify the specification of each concept. Freeden speaks about 
the morphology of political concepts as a useful approach to 																																																								
6 The Linguistic Turn relocated the investigation of political concept to 
the study of language in the social world (cf. Rorty 1967, Thompson 
1984).  
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properly identify what are the core and peripheral units of a 
political concept. He uses it to analyse political ideologies, which 
are morphological arrangements of political thinking in a society 
(cf. Freeden 2005: 124). Concepts thus are not isolated but they 
are intertwined with other, which charge them with different 
meanings and values. Thanks to this approach it is possible to 
trace a clear picture of what I mean with ‘change’, ‘context’ and 
‘diffusion’. In the next paragraph, before presenting the 
theoretical framework, I will present the morphological map of 
each concept.  
 
Change 
 
The very first concept that underpins the argument of the 
thesis is ‘change’. It entails an act or process through which 
something becomes different: (see Oxford Dictionary). Applied 
to political issues, it concerns institutions, borders, practices, 
actors and all different factors that constitute public affairs. Most 
of the studies concerning change deal with institutions, which 
are seen as durable and less likely to change.  
Different Types of Change 
The literature analysed institutional change mainly from 
three different standpoints. The first explanation comes from 
functionalist’ approach, which follows the evolutionary 
(paradigmatic) paths. Indeed, those institutions that ‘best suit the 
underlying structural changes survive through the operation of 
some kind of selective mechanism, and institutions that do not 
follow this functionalist logic are weeded out by the competition 
from more successful institutional orders’ (Rothstein 2011:222). 
Secondly, change can be triggered by ‘exogenous shocks’, which 
are unpredictable and unforeseen; Wars, economic crises, 
climate catastrophes are like ‘black swan’ (Taleb, 2007) that 
could radically change institutions in a country. Finally, there are 
those authors who look at institutional change as driven by 
agents with interests and purposes. Yet, this interpretation has 
been hardly criticised by other scholars, as ‘the outcome of such 
strategic design may not always be in line with the agents' 
intentions because outcomes from institutional changes are hard 
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to predict, especially if there are simultaneous changes of other 
institutions outside the control of the designing agents’ 
(Rothstein 2011:225, cf. Pepinsky 2014).  
 
The concept of change adopted in this thesis stems from the 
latter conceptualisation, which posits the focus of change on 
actors with defined interests and goals. In this case, I rely on the 
assumption that rulers want to preserve their power and win the 
elections. In order to do so, they must take into consideration the 
portfolio of different strategies with costs and benefits for each 
choice. Changing strategy is a possible optimum choice in case 
there are constraints to use former strategies.  
 
However, this study stands back from the claims of such 
conceptualisation of change in two ways. First of all because this 
study did not assess how change affected the institutional 
outcome, but rather aims to assess the presence of a changing 
process itself. Only then, in case of positive results it will be 
possible to understand the patterns of change. As pointed out in 
the literature review, there is a lack for what concern 
diachronically analyses in the study of electoral malpractices. 
Secondly, is it true that change in this thesis is seen as agent-
driven, but I assume that the agent wants to deprive political 
institutions of their functions rather than change their structures. 
In other words, institutions are considered as durable and stable, 
what changes is their basic attributes, which eventually modify 
their meaningfulness rather than their structures. For example, 
heavily rigged parliamentary elections won’t modify the 
structure of the institution; rather it changes the meaning and the 
proper functioning of the institution. Of course, the institution 
itself might subsequently be formally modified and loose some 
of its attributes. However, this is not the focus of the thesis.  
Change and Evolution 
I consider it to be important to reflect on the concept of evolution 
that is really linked with the concept of change. Although it 
might be easy to understand the concept of evolution with 
positive connotations, I rather conceive it as a passage from a 
simpler to a more complex form of something. Stemming from 
the basic definition of evolution as ‘the gradual development of 
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something’ (see Oxford Dictionary), I claim that the focus of such 
analysis is rather similar to Thelene’s study of vocational 
trainings in Germany, Japan, Britain and United States (2004). In 
particular, I share her claim about the concept of evolution that 
relies both on structuralist and agent theories: ‘these analyses all 
highlight the need to situate the interpretation of specific choice 
points within a broader temporal framework that takes account 
of the feedback effects that have defined the conditions with 
which specific policy and institutional choices are being made. 
They highlight the way that policies initiated at one point affect 
which actors are around to fight the next battle, how they define 
their interests, and how and with whom they are likely to ally 
themselves subsequently’ (Thelene 2004, 288-89). In other words, 
Thelene claims that both views are historical. 
 
Thelene’s arguments allow for a better understanding of the 
factors affecting change. Her main goal is to set the experiences 
of some countries into a theoretical framework that would shed 
light on the causal mechanisms at work across a number of 
cases. In particular, she posits her attention on the context in 
which change takes place: ‘it is not sufficient to view institutions 
as frozen residue of critical junctures, or even as “locked in” in 
the straightforward sense that path dependence arguments 
adapted from the economics literature often suggest.’ (Thelene 
2004:8). But, according to her, institutional change also involves 
‘active political renegotiation and heavy doses of institutional 
adaptation, in order to bring institutions inherited from the past 
into line with changes in the social and political context. 
(Thelene 2004:8)’. According to Herrigel (2006), Thelene’s actors 
have different conceptions of the way things should be arranged, 
thus, ‘contestation among agents with differing politics can 
affect the spectrum of possibilities for institutional 
transformation and the direction that transformation takes’ 
(Herrigel 2006). In turn, the structuralist perspective helps define 
the resources available to actors. Context is an important factor 
that constrains the agent in his portfolio of choice. In addition, 
context can change altering the terrain on which the institution 
exists and the pressures that generate agent incentives. For 
example, as I mentioned in the literature review, historical 
context is an important factor in the constitution of the 
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international normative environment that affects governments’ 
behaviors; given that rules and norms gradually shape the 
environment, it is not possible to understand what types of 
pressure are currently being exerted on political actors.  
 
To summarize, I consider change as determined by both agents’ 
preferences and contextual constraints. It might entail evolution 
insofar as it stems from a simpler to a more complex form of 
something. Looking at informal practices, I am not assuming 
that they eventually have modification and durable effects over 
institutions. However, it is a possibility. 
 
Context 
At this point, I consider it necessary to investigate around 
the concept that affects both change and diffusion: the notion of 
context. There is nowadays a shared understanding that context 
matters and it has many implications for the study of political 
phenomena. More specifically the academic literature identifies 
three main explanations on how context matters. Franzese (2009) 
recaps them as: multicausality, context conditionality and 
endogeneity. Multicausality implies that ‘the outcomes we seek to 
explain, understand, or predict have multiple causes, so the 
values of the many potential causes in any given context affect 
the outcomes’ (2009:3). Context-conditionality concerns that the 
effects of each cause on outcomes tend to vary across contexts, 
which is to say that the effects of each cause tend to depend on 
the values of one or more other potential cause(s) present in that 
context’ (ibid). Finally, endogeneity indicates that ‘many outcomes 
and many putative causes in the political world that we seek to 
understand tend, in fact, to cause each other to some degree 
rather than some factors being only causes and others being only 
effects’ (ibid). This categorization offers explanations about 
contexts mainly from a causality point of view. Yet, for the sake 
of the argument of this thesis it is necessary to better investigate 
the different modalities by which actors are affected by the 
context not merely as causality. Therefore, for what concern the 
object of my study, context is related to enhance the 
understanding of the diffusion of domestic practices through a 
	 66	
cross-countries comparative analysis and within an international 
dimension.  
 
Indeed, this thesis argues that despite the former understanding 
of electoral frauds and electoral malpractices, the international 
context matters insofar as it can affect authorities’ choice in the 
menu of electoral manipulation. In particular, context refers to 
the intervening dimension of the internal-external interactions 
among domestic and international actors, which eventually can 
trigger authorities’ choice to select some malpractices instead of 
others. The outcome would highlight how context exerts binding 
effects over elite’s decision-making and behaviour. Thus, context 
involves multiple levels with different dynamics and 
characteristics that are intertwined.  
The Theory of Context 
In order to fully grasp the complexity of context’s role in the 
development of electoral frauds and malpractices, this study 
takes into consideration some precious insights from the ‘Theory 
of Context’ by Gary Goertz (1994). In this book the author 
analyses different ways political actors interact with their 
international environment, which is multi-dimensional, and it 
also explains why the latter can affect states authorities’ 
behaviours. Context, as theorized by Goertz, has an incredible 
influence on policies and practices. In order to properly explain 
his conception of context, he relies on what he calls, quoting 
Mackie (1974), the ‘causal field’, which is the set of circumstances 
and background conditions that are important or necessary in 
explaining a political decision. Eventually, this theory provides 
sound methodological argumentations that, combined with 
process tracing analysis, explain how internal and external 
interactions occur. As a matter of fact, ‘the emphasis on context 
has important methodological implications. It results in new 
ways to integrate state and system level of analysis.’ (Goertz, 
1994: 10). According to the author there are three substantive 
contexts affecting the decision-making process of the states: 
history, international system structures and international norms. 
These contexts matter in three different and articulate ways: as a 
cause (context in conjunction with other factors can explain the 
outcomes), as barrier (context as constraint and opportunity for 
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the actors) and as changing meaning (a changing context may 
alter the meaning of concepts). In Goertz’s theorisation these 
modes of context imply that for states’ actors multiple 
relationships can exist between opportunity and willingness. In 
other words, this theory of context attempts to integrate 
environment and individual-level variable in a consistent 
framework for analysis.   
 
Goertz’s theory has another important merit, which is that it was 
among the first attempt to overcome methodological differences 
between diffusionism and rational models. The IR debates 
concerning norms diffusion gravitated around two main 
interpretations, which posited the linchpin of the diffusion 
mechanism on two different factors: environment or actors. 
Rational models are far more diffused and they focus on norm 
entrepreneurs who, motivated by principled ideas, seek to 
change international or domestic behaviour through the 
generation of new international norms (Bueno de Mesquita 1989, 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The second one considers 
environment (such as history, geography, culture) as the major 
factor affecting political actors’ actions (Most, Siverson, and Starr 
1989). Goertz’s insights were afoot in this regard; he was among 
the first to claim that “states exist in an environment of rules and 
norms that influences their calculations and their goals” (Goertz, 
1994:5). He paved the way for a later stream of literature that 
claims that actors seek to maximize their value or utility 
according to their preferences and beliefs about an expected 
outcome, while acting rationally against the definition of these 
interests (Wendt, 1999; Jackson and Nexon, 2013). This line of 
interpretation implies that rationality is a product of social 
construction (Del Sarto, 2015). Using context as an intervening 
variable, Goertz’s theory rids off the idea that structural or 
individualistic paradigms are universal panaceas. He points to 
the fact that there are situations where structures are more 
constraining and others where individual choices have a greater 
impact. 
 
From an analytical point of view, the potentialities of this 
theoretical framework for my research are twofold. First of all, it 
allows the theorisation of multiple levels of contexts, which 
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sometimes may overlap and other times might be divergent 
(Goertz 1994:3). In the South Caucasus region this overlap is 
particularly evident. First of all, from an international system 
standpoint, this area has been subject by several international 
actors, which created multiple levels for political actions. In 
particular, since the end of the Cold War, the region experienced 
a first phase of Russian weakening and the arrival of Western 
actors (1992 – 1999), with creation of interregional forms of 
cooperation (for example the European Union TACIS 
Programme 1991-2006). Subsequently, following the election of 
President Putin and the adoption of the Foreign Policy Concept 
of the Russian Federation (June 2000), the South Caucasus 
experienced renewed Russian interests, which provoked 
controversial outcomes in the three countries. As a matter of fact, 
according to the new Russian foreign policy doctrine, the CIS 
states were identified as the first priority in Russian foreign 
policy. Yet, new forms of regional integration had to be created 
as the CIS had long proved ‘its ineffectiveness and inability to 
adopt binding resolutions for its members’ (Hedensgok and 
Larsson 2007:19). Overall, Russian foreign politics has been often 
characterized by political phases (Morini 2010), and with Putin 
Russia was keener to regain a hegemonic role around the world 
(Carnaghan 2007). One of the most successful outcomes for 
Moscow was the creation of the Eurasian Union, which proved 
to be a real challenge for the European Union’s role in the region. 
Therefore, South Caucasian countries were inserted in a maze of 
intraregional and interregional initiative, which created a 
multiple set of contexts. The effects of Western Leverage were 
different in the three South Caucasian countries, depending on 
the position of each country within these multiple levels of 
context.  
 
Secondly, I am going to focus on context as a barrier for state’s 
authorities in the South Caucasus, which may hinder their 
policy’s options available. As a matter of fact, Goertz claims that 
governments live in an international environment that posits 
constraints for arbitrary behaviours. Yet, as the environment 
changes states learn about these changes and alter their goals 
and behaviour (cf. Goertz 1994:11). This understanding of 
context as a barrier differs from those who look at context as 
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cause, because it limits the choices’ portfolio. In particular, 
‘barriers are negative forces, they keep events from occurring. In 
this sense they are the opposite of a cause: A factor X is a barrier 
to another factor Y if and only if X's existence contributes to the 
non-existence of Y.’ (Goertz, 1995:21). In other words, causes 
make things happen, whereas barriers hinder the occurrence of 
things. Therefore, barriers have different traits to causes. First of 
all because they do not hold the transitive property: ‘a necessary 
condition for the occurrence of an event E is the non - occurrence 
of events that would prevent E from occurring.’ (Sober 1983: 202, 
quoted in Goertz 1994:25). Secondly, because barrier strength is 
determined multiplicatively not additively: this means that 
when a part of the barrier goes missing, the effects would entail 
multiplicative interactions with the others. Thirdly, because 
barriers are not necessary conditions; in other words, the non-
existence of the barriers is the necessary condition for the action 
to take place. Finally, barriers are linked to other causes insofar 
some counteracting cause might not work and some other yes to 
overcome the barrier: ‘Causes can exist without counter-causes, 
but certain counter-causes have no impact without their 
appropriate, original cause (Goertz, 1994:24). 
Electoral Integrity as a Barrier 
 This understanding of context is important when we have to 
take into consideration the normative dimension of the 
international system. The barrier model as theorized by Goertz 
was built to analyse how the structure of the international 
systems affects states behaviours. In this thesis I am reducing the 
scope of the analysis, thus passing from macro to micro factors – 
such as elections, and I am going to assess how this barrier is 
observable in electoral affairs. Indeed, as I presented in the 
previous chapter, the idea that elections had to respect some 
principles and some guidelines in order to be considered 
democratic and fair, produced a normative international context 
for the electoral integrity. Therefore, the concept of electoral 
integrity works as a barrier insofar as it sets the standards for the 
conduction of the elections worldwide and dismisses all other 
practices excluded from it. The gap between what is allowed and 
what is not generates tensions among members of normative 
organisation, especially within OSCE and Council of Europe 
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(CoE), which have to resort to internal conditionality (Fawn 
2013). The latter is the ability of an international organisation 
(IO) to cope with threats that recalcitrant member states posit to 
the IOs’ norms and values. Fawn looks at some peculiar case 
studies from the post-Soviet region, where ‘states have devised 
specific forms of resistance to values and practices of what they 
see as the “western” dominated IOs of the CoE and the OSCE’ 
(Fawn 2013:4).  
 
Thus, barriers are the result of power relations that can hinder or 
modify rulers’ behaviours at an international level. This 
understanding is consistent with Bertrand Badie’s interpretation 
of the international system, which is a ‘set of international 
practices that can be identified in a given time sequence, the 
interdependence of which constrains the actors involved by 
making them playing the same rules’ (Badie, 2011: 3). Following 
Goertz’s theory, barrier models consist of two principal 
components: the barrier itself and the pressure upon it generated 
from below.  Those actors who pressure for change test barriers’ 
strength by attempts. It may happen that barriers can be broken. 
According to Goertz these are rare events, but when they occur 
they are explosive, and provoke a rapid change in international 
politics. Goertz refers for example to the decolonisation process, 
the waves of democratization or nationalisation of oil in the 
seventies.  
 
In my thesis the barriers are held up by international actors who 
advocate democratic elections aligned with international 
standards. Electoral democratic principles are thus conceived as 
intangible and normative barriers for conducting elections.  The 
pressure is exercised by incumbents who want to reduce 
electoral uncertainties recurring to some type of electoral 
malpractices. In my understanding, barriers are broken or 
eluded when there is a diffusion effect of some methods of 
frauds or electoral malpractices. As this study is going to 
demonstrate there have been some occasions where despite 
international condemnation a method of fraud spread around 
the region and changed the dynamics of electoral manipulation.  
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The willingness to destroy or to avoid electoral integrity 
constraints led domestic actors to innovate and to reiterate bids 
in electoral mismanagement in order to attain their goals. 
Obviously, these actions entail some risks as it could happen that 
the international actors react to the attempt and decide to punish 
the perpetrators. For example, the European Union lifted 
economic sanctions on some Belarus high-officials in the 
aftermath of a rigged election in 2004. However, for state 
authorities in nondemocratic regimes every attempt provides 
information concerning the strength of the barrier and about the 
consequences that they could encounter if it violates the 
normative principles. This information could then be used by 
other actors who in turn challenge the barrier. Therefore, there is 
an additional diffusion of information regarding IO’s reaction to 
the use of electoral malpractices, which in turn provide 
important data for the cost-benefits analysis that incumbents do 
when they decide how to rig the election. My focus is to 
understand not how this information spreads, but rather how 
other state’s authorities use this information. In the coming 
paragraph I am going to introduce the last key concept of my 
theoretical framework: learning.  
 
Learning 
Political science literature posits learning within 
socialisation effects as one of the type of regime’s diffusion and 
anchoring mechanisms (cf. Vanderhill 2012, Morlino 2013). 
Scholars have successfully unpacked different typologies of 
policy diffusion but they are still limping along to grasp 
empirical evidence, in particular for learning mechanisms. The 
latter implies, for policy makers, the presence of an example, a 
model to follow. In democratisation theories learning has been 
identified as one factors of policy influence that implies ‘the 
acceptance of new rules, institutions, and policy choices by state 
and societal actors in transitional states, not as a result of 
external incentives or socialisation, but through sheer emulation 
of successful external model’ (Morlino 2013:145). However, it is 
not possible to entirely transfer the example’s role directly from 
democratisation theories, which borders on paradigmatic 
meaning, into a model for nondemocratic practices. Firstly, 
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scholars are still debating regarding the existence of alternative 
regimes models, such as the Russian alternative model of 
‘sovereign democracy’. Secondly, I am referring to practices 
rather than institutional arrangements. In particular, for what 
concerns the field of informal practices such as frauds in hybrid 
or authoritarian regimes, there might be successful examples, 
but they won’t be the only source of learning. Indeed, I shall take 
into account other types of examples too.  
Readopting Levy’s theorisation 
Following the recent academic developments on authoritarian 
learning (Bank and Edel 2015, Josua 2015), scholars define 
learning according to Levy’s interpretation, which is “a change 
of beliefs, skills, or procedures based on the observation and 
interpretation of experience” (Levy 1994: 296). Speaking about 
political learning implies that political elites look elsewhere in 
order to find examples for policy change. Levy theorizes 
learning mainly from a historical perspective, but more recently 
new research has adapted it to synchronic learning. Levy claims 
that political learning is composed by two phases: ‘[first] the 
observation and interpretation of experience lead to a change in 
individual beliefs, and [second], belief change influences 
subsequent behaviours’ (Levy 1994: 291). Yet, it might happen 
that sometimes learning may not take place or does not lead to 
policy change. There are two main factors that may hinder 
learning mechanisms: the first one is that learning sometimes 
does not occur immediately because ruling elites are not open or 
aware enough (Bank and Edel 2015:7). Policy makers may be 
more or less sensitive to the hints coming from others: sharing a 
common language, history or geographical proximity are 
facilitating factors for learning mechanisms (Gilardi 2010, Bank 
and Edel 2015). Secondly, incumbents might be limited by 
institutional and power settings in one of more contextual levels, 
such as domestic polity, intra-elites level and international 
sphere levels. In other words, there might be some structural 
constraints that do not guarantee change (Levy 1994, Bank and 
Edel 2015).  
 
Before passing to the different types of learning mechanism, I 
would like to briefly present the different typologies of learning 
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mechanisms. Within the broad sectors of IR studies it is possible 
to find concepts such as imitation or adaptation, which also 
shares some similarities with learning mechanisms. The first one, 
imitation, is simply copying/pasting other government’s policies 
without considering policies’ effects and political outcomes (cf. 
Shipan and Volden 2008, Gilardi 2010). Some studies consider 
only the effect of policy itself as a driver for policy learning and 
do not regard political outcomes. Yet, recent studies demonstrate 
that given the fact every policy has a ‘political’ weight, policy-
makers do look to the political effects of the implemented policy 
(Gilardi 2010). The second concept that is close to learning is the 
concept of adaption. The latter, despite the fact it entails changes 
from environmental modification, refers to innovating and 
resilient measures undertaken by policy makers (see 
Heydemann and Leenders 2013), yet this concept lacks a 
differentiation between learning and learning-induced policy 
change.  
Characterizing Learning 
For what concerns the different types of learning mechanisms, I 
will differentiate between learning from the past/present and 
learning from success/failures. In both cases policymakers may 
look both within their own country’s experience and from 
abroad. As I mentioned already, Levy’s learning 
conceptualisation is focused on learning from past. According to 
Levy, past success contributes to policy continuity whereas 
failure leads to policy change. Subsequently, scholars started to 
adapt Levy’s insights also to other types of learning. Indeed, 
Levy’s definition ‘leaves the doors open for a source of learning 
such as the experiences of other states’ (Josua, 2015:4). In the case 
of learning from abroad, it is important to distinguish between 
learning from success (positive learning) and learning from 
mistakes (negative learning) (Koesel and Bunce 2013, Del Sordi 
2014, Josua 2015). The distinction between positive and negative 
learning drives the dichotomy of two different learning’s effects 
and policy adoption choices: emulation and pre-emptive actions. 
The first one is related to the emulation of other experiences with 
contextual assessment of the policy transfer. The latter relates to 
efforts to avoid the diffusion of grievances and protests or 
	 74	
information and ideas or values and norms that are in contrast 
with the current state of affairs within a regime. 
 
Learning from success has received greater attention from the 
scholarship and it has often been included in policy transfer 
studies (Bennett and Howlett 1992, Volden 2006, Shipan and 
Volden 2008). More specifically, for what concerns my field of 
study, the literature refers to the works of Rose (1991), Dolowitz 
and Marsh (2000), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005); all of 
these authors have a normative conceptualization of the learning 
process, as a way for policy makers to improve domestic 
conditions. For the sake of the argument of this research I am 
using the concept of ‘improving domestic conditions’ in 
‘improving the chances of being re-elected’. Recently, in the 
literature on nondemocratic regimes, some research highlighted 
the role of negative examples in shaping authoritarian 
incumbent’s strategies (Heydemann and Leenders 2014, Bank 
and Edel 2015, Josua 2015, Weyland 2016). Stemming from the 
Levy’s argument that ‘people learn more from failure than from 
success’ (Levy, 1994:304), this stream in the literature aims to 
explain how learning from the negative examples explains 
authoritarian resilience. These studies particularly focused on 
the Arab Spring events and showed how protests in later riser 
countries were coped with more efficacies due to rulers’ learning 
experiences. The later raiser countries could draw important 
lessons from earlier riser regimes looking at their policies’ 
failures. Morocco and Jordan for example were able to better 
respond to protests, avoiding the same mistakes made by rulers 
in Tunisia or Egypt.  
 
Learning processes might be very challenging to observe and 
study. As a matter of fact, what Bennett and Howlett wrote more 
than twenty years ago could be retained valid even for today 
‘learning is overtheorized and underapplied’ (Bennett and 
Howlett 1992:288). More recently, Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 
claimed that notwithstanding ‘decades of study, systematic 
evidence that governments learn from one another has been 
limited’ (2008, 319). Especially, direct interactions among elites 
are hard to prove for empirical studies in contemporary 
nondemocratic regimes (Tolstrup 2015). However, a recent 
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study, which analysed in depth elites’ learning to cope with 1848 
revolutionary movement (Weyland 2016), was able to draw 
important empirical material from a rich historical 
documentation. The article’s main argument is that learning can 
take place and it is particularly useful in order to mitigate 
cognitive distortions (such as cognitive shortcut that may lead to 
simple mimicry) that could be counterproductive for incumbent 
elites. Therefore, as the growing literature on authoritarian 
learning suggests, there are rooms for further investigating this 
phenomenon, which is considered to be determinant in 
nondemocratic regimes’ survival.  
 
To sum up, in this research I am relying on Levy’s concept of 
learning, which has been further expanded by new research on 
authoritarian learning, and it now includes theorisations 
concerning learning from others and learning from mistakes. 
The analysis of learning processes will be carried out through 
the most updated qualitative tools to infer the presence of 
learning. The outcome is then verified with the support of 
targeted interviews.  
 
The Theoretical Framework 
The concepts presented above are intertwined together in 
a theoretical framework that analyses the development of 
electoral management and frauds in the selected case studies. In 
order to do so, I am going to retrace the evolution of the electoral 
management and frauds considering the effect of the Western 
linkage and leverage in the process of reforms. Leverage, which 
is determined by the international context, could have been 
higher or lower according to the evolution of geo-political 
situations that occurred all along the decades. The inclusion of 
the Leverage provides a contextual analysis of each election, 
where regime strength and international pressure will be take 
into consideration.  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the international system 
crystallised a huge set of good practices for what concern 
election the process, which produced new constraints in 
governments’ behaviours in all of the countries around the 
	 76	
world. The sources of the electoral integrity derive primarily 
from resolutions and treaties passed by the UN General 
Assembly, the UN Security Council and UN human rights 
bodies, supplemented by agreement reaching within regional 
intergovernmental bodies such as the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (Norris 2015:4). Yet, this is a quite 
recent phenomenon, which developed mainly from UN 
Peacekeeping missions during the 1980s (Tuccindardi ed. 2014), 
which eventually lead to a homogeneous set of practices.  
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War therefore, elections, became 
unavoidable in almost every country around the world.7 Ideally, 
for those who hold power, the best solution would be to 
establish a monarchy or a full hegemonic autocracy (Linz 1975), 
which suffer less from informational and institutional 
uncertainties (cf. Schedler 2013). However, in the new 
international system the legitimacy costs to maintain those 
regimes increased impressively (Huntington 1991, Waterbury 
1999). There are IR studies, related to rational-choices analysis, 
which analysed the peremptory of the elections in the current 
international system (Schedler 2006, Levitsky and Way 2011, 
Zakaria, 1997) and on the opportunity to hold election in order 
to receiving aid or recognition from international institutions 
(Bunce and Wolchik 2011). In other words, the general 
acceptance and the diffusion of new normative values as well as 
self-determinations stances created new social and international 
expectation for rulers to behave accordingly. As Goertz 
indicates, ‘barrier determines what is possible and what is not’ 
(1994:95). The uncertainty of the scrutiny was a founding 
principle of the new ‘democracies’ born after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Yet, the new political elites most of the time did 
not become acquainted with electoral integrity standards, and 
conceived them as barriers to their rule. Therefore, in hybrid 
regimes incumbents seek to maintain power even if it implies to 
resort to extra-legal means (Levitsky and Way 2010). 
 
The first hypothesis relates to the capacity of incumbents in 																																																								
7  There is just a bunch of regimes, which do not allow universal 
suffrage elections. 
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selected countries to overcome these barriers and find solution to 
the problem of uncertainty in allegedly democratic elections. 
Therefore, I expect that where the Western Leverage and 
Linkage became more preponderant I will witness two 
processes: on one side that formal electoral management 
improved substantially, on the other that malpractices changed 
along the years and contributed to hinder a full democratisation 
process. Vice versa, where Western Leverage and Linkage was 
lower, electoral management did not improve substantially and 
therefore there was no need to change how to rig elections. 
Thanks to the analysis of this hypothesis I will contribute to 
disentangle and unpack the interacting mechanisms among 
international variables and electoral malpractices development, 
which is one of the most important gap in electoral studies. 
Subsequently, in a second phase, I include ‘learning’ as an 
additional element in the analysis. Therefore, I am going to 
verify if the changes in methods of electoral frauds have been 
determined by a learning process. Thanks to this analysis, I 
further explore the international dimension from a secondary, 
but not less important, perspective. The recent literature on 
authoritarian regimes resilience put under the spotlight the 
cooperative and socialisation sides of non-democracies. Despite 
this fact, in the South Caucasus, regional cooperation is very 
limited, indirect forms of socialisation occur and may affect the 
electoral process. As a matter of fact, reframing Hemingway’s 
statement ‘no man is an island’ – and neither are incumbents. I 
claim that incumbents, willing or not, learn from the past or 
others’ experiences to rig elections. The focus on learning 
provides additional elements to understand how and why some 
methods of fraud were introduced, changed or disappeared.  
Methodological Implications 
From a methodological standpoint, in the first phase I am going 
to carry out a qualitative diachronic and synchronic analysis of 
the case studies. In order to conduct such an analysis I rely on 
several primary sources such as electoral observation reports, 
newspaper articles and interviews, as well as on secondary 
literature about elections in post-Soviet countries. In particular I 
am relying on the election observation reports provided by the 
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Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights by the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE/ODIHR), which are a ‘widely respected source’ (Norris 
2015:29) for many evaluations, academic analysis and data sets 
such as Free and Fair Election and Index of Electoral 
Malpractices (IEM). As a matter of facts, OSCE/ODIHR reports 
developed a relatively consistent lexicon to describe election 
quality, facilitating comparison cross-nationally and over time 
(Herron 2009). Nevertheless, sometimes it can happen that OSCE 
findings were in contrast with the assessment of another 
international actor that monitored the election. As it is well 
detailed in Chapter 3, in the aftermath of the 2013 Azerbaijani 
presidential elections the OSCE/ODIHR mission reported many 
irregularities, which eventually did not fulfil with international 
standards. In contrast, the election observation mission sent by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reported 
that the electoral process was ‘free and fair’. In order to 
overcome this conundrum I am relying on the analysis by 
Daxecker and Scheider who assess the quality of election 
monitoring agencies. So far, OSCE/ODIHR observation missions 
proved to be among the high-quality organisations (Daxecker 
and Scheider 2014).  
 
For what concerns the second part, I am relying on the recent 
theorisation on authoritarian learning mentioned already, which 
expanded Levy’s definition to include learning from others and 
from negative examples. In the case study’s analysis, I will adopt 
Bank and Edel’s approach (2015), which focuses on the practices 
concerned and then retraces the causal chain to evaluate whether 
it is an example of learning mechanism or not. In order to do so, 
I am going to carry out a cross-temporal and cross-national 
comparison of the frauds and malpractices in the three countries. 
This process will allow me to observe similarities and 
divergences in frauds and malpractices development, and it will 
constitute the pool for further observations. Secondly, stemming 
from the patterns identified in the first phase I am going to look 
for learning processes among countries, and I will assess what 
type of learning mechanisms they entail. Thanks to this double 
comparison I am able to verify whether the learning practices 
took place.  
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I carried out more than forty interviews with electoral 
stakeholders from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (electoral 
experts, members of electoral management bodies, 
parliamentarians, members of NGOs, journalists, former 
members of government, scholars). These interviews provided 
an in-depth understanding of electoral affairs, including frauds 
and electoral malpractices. The information was gathered 
through in-person interviews that were carried out during my 
field research phase in South Caucasus in the spring of 2015. 
Some other interviews were conducted by Skype or in other 
places (in particular those with interlocutors from Azerbaijan, as 
I was not able to get to the country to conduct these type of 
interviews). Given the confidentiality of the information received 
and the delicateness of the topic, most of the time the 
interviewed asked for anonymity. When possible, names are 
displayed in the thesis.  
The Case Studies 
 
The three South Caucasian countries offer disparate outcomes in 
terms of the regime types, but none of these countries attained a 
full democratisation process so far. Indeed, ten years after the 
independence from the USSR an International IDEA report 
claimed that ‘while the political situations and dynamics in the 
three countries are very different, the studies reveal many 
common challenges for reformers seeking to entrench well-
organised, transparent and sustainable election processes’ (IDEA 
2004b:5). Still, more than twenty years after independence the 
regimes’ arrangements in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
could be labelled as hybrids (Nodia and Stefes 2015). During this 
period of times some of these countries experienced more 
democratic cycles (in particular Georgia) and some other more 
authoritarian, without experiencing a real democratization.  
The literature extensively dealt with transition and 
democratization from Communist rule for what concern Russia 
and East Europe, while it overlooked the South Caucasian 
countries. As a matter of fact, most of the scholarship regarding 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia addresses issues such as 
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nationalism, inter-ethnic conflicts, security-building and conflict 
resolution, and the geopolitics of oil and gas (for example 
Lapidus, Zaslavksy and Goldman 1992, Smith et al. 1998, 
Tishkov 1997, Beissinger 2002). Only recently there is a growing 
interest in addressing topics such as democracy, civil society, 
media and justice from a regional perspective (Nodia and Stefes 
2015, Erler and Jobelius 2011, Koryakov and Sisk 2003). 
 
The selection of cases study is based on four mains criteria. First, 
I selected the Southern Caucasian countries for their 
geographical and political proximity, which is a key factor 
regarding learning mechanisms (Bank and Edel 2015): proximity 
doesn’t refer just to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which 
have shared borders, but it refers to many other post-soviet 
countries from whom they share political and historical 
proximity, which affect the way elections were and are 
organized (Herron 2009, Bader 2012, Bader 2014). Secondly, all 
these countries experienced several political episodes, which 
affected the way incumbents understood and reacted to them 
(from highly manipulated election till the perils of ‘revolutionary 
virus’). Thirdly, I selected those countries because this part of the 
post-soviet world has been hardly overlooked by electoral 
studies (Tucker 2002, Ergun 2009, Nodia and Stephes 2015). 
Finally, I consider the conformation of the South Caucasus 
particularly interesting because there are three different nuances 
of non-democratic regimes, which allows for a better comparison 
of how domestic and international factors interact with the 
evolution of electoral management and electoral malpractices. 
Georgia is a country experiencing high-levels of Western 
leverage, whereas Armenia medium-levels of Western leverage8 
and Azerbaijan a low-level of Western leverage.  																																																								
8 I contest Levitsky and Way assessment of Armenia as a country with 
high-level of Western Leverage (Levitsky and Way 2010). This claim 
can be supported by many factors: firstly, from several interviews I 
conducted in Armenia with political experts and MPs, where I 
gathered anecdotal evidences that Western leverage has been more 
controversial in respect with Georgia because of security concerns 
regarding the situation in Nagorno Karabach; Yerevan has been always 
aware that it was not possible to fully abandon Russia for the West 
(according to Levitsky and Way leverage was at its maximum effect 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I presented how some concepts are defined and 
applied to this sector of study. For each concept, through a 
morphological approach, I specified and clarified what is their 
use and how they are interconnected. I hope that with this 
explanation the reader would be more acquainted with the 
slippery meanings that abstract concepts may hold. In this 
theoretical framework ‘change’, ‘context’ and ‘learning’ are 
intertwined together in order to explain how electoral 
management and malpractices developed during the last 
decades in South Caucasus. The theoretical framework may be 
used even for other cross-national and cross-temporal analysis 
around other regions of the world. 
 
In the next chapter I am going to delve into the Western 
Leverage and Western Linkage in the region. Given the fact that 
the West includes different actors, I am going to disentangle it 
into the main international players that had an active role in the 
region. Finally, I am going to present the role of Russia, in order 
to assess if played the role of Black Knight in the three South 
Caucasian countries.  
																																																																																																																									
when was used along with linkage for EU membership accession 
(Levitsky and Way 2010). Secondly, by looking at some proxy variables 
in the Caucasus Barometer: at the question ‘Our way of life needs to be 
protected against European influences?’ those who answered ‘yes’ 
were 50% of Georgians, 53% of Armenians and 63 of Azeri (source 
Caucasus Barometer 2009); at the second question Support of country's 
membership in EU? Those who answered positively were 65% in 
Georgia, 40% in Armenia and 34 in Azerbaijan (Source Caucasus 
Barometer 2013). Finally, looking at United States foreign assistance to 
South Caucasus from 1992 to 2014 it is clearly reported that Georgia 
received $ 3,365.73, Armenia $ 1,951.83, and Azerbaijan $ 975.75 
(millions of dollars). 
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Chapter 3:  
 Multiple External Influences in the Region 
 
Introduction 
With the end of the Cold war, the Western liberal system became 
the ultimate form of government that set the standards to 
evaluate the regimes’ qualities around the world (Fukuyama 
1992). Equipped with both ideological justification and 
geopolitical domination of the international system two of the 
mains Western international actors, such as the United States 
and the European Union undertook several programmes in 
order to spread liberal democratic values around the world. 
Authoritarian regimes suffered from this pressure and they had 
to introduce in their polities democratic institutions, multi-party 
elections and division of powers. The post-Soviet space was a 
particularly interesting area where the West could insinuate in, 
exploiting Russian weaknesses in the aftermath of USSR’s fall. 
Overall, Western activism in the region took different forms and 
sometimes had different goals.  
The West’s involvement in the region can be classified according 
to the Levitsky and Way dimensions of Western Linkage and 
Leverage. Indeed, the fall of the Iron Curtain opened up new 
trade routes that led to new markets. Since then, Western 
companies started to gain dominant positions in Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in less then fifteen years the EU 
became the first trade partner for all the three South Caucasian 
countries (Boonstra 2015). At the same time, since the early 
nineties, it was possible to observe, at international level, a trend 
concerning advanced universal guidelines on democratic 
development that affected the South Caucasian countries in the 
processes of shaping governance reforms (Koryakov and Sisk 
2003). South Caucasian countries, so as all post-Communist 
countries, were understood as in transition toward democracies; 
as Nodia claims it was ‘the universality of the modern 
democratic project that creates a conceptual space in which it 
becomes sensible--and indeed necessary--to compare different 
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attempts to implement this project.’ (Nodia 1996:17). Even if this 
conceptualisation proved to underestimate the real 
consequences of transition from Communism (Nodia 1996, 
Fairbanks 2001), Western actors continued through the nineties 
to look at those regimes as incomplete democracies (Collier and 
Levitsky 1997) and subsequently they looked at Coloured 
Revolutions has final democratic breakthrough (McFaul 2005) in 
a protracted path toward democratization.  Therefore, stemming 
from the early 1990s, former Soviet states became the object of 
considerable attention and resources from Western 
governments, IOs, and NGOs (Levitsky and Way 2010) aimed to 
foster democratic reforms and genuine elections, according to 
the electoral integrity standards.  
In this chapter I am going to retrace Western external actors’ 
involvements in the region in order to analyse Western Linkage 
and the Western Leverage through the last 25 years. In order to 
properly quantify the Western leverage and linkage I rely on 
Levitsky and Way methodology and measurement. Among the 
three South Caucasian countries, Levitsky and Way provide 
with a diachronic analysis of Armenia and Georgia (see pages 
207-213 for Armenia and 220-228 for Georgia in Levitsky and 
Way 2010) analysing both external influences and regime 
organizational capacity. For what concern Azerbaijan, which 
was not included in the book, I adopted their methodology, 
which is detailed in appendixes II and III at the end of the book, 
and that are reported at the end of the thesis in annexes I and II. 
Their methodology proved to be functioning very well for 
Azerbaijan9. Subsequently, stemming from these assessments - 
for analytical porpoises, I identified some major turning points 
in these countries, which affected the overall conduction of 
elections.  
As I am going to describe, Western interests did not always 
coincided and sometimes differed even in judging electoral 
conducts. This has become particularly observable in the last 																																																								
9 I had the opportunity to test the veracity of my personal assessment 
during the presentation of a part of the thesis at the conference 
organized by the Italian Standing Group of International Relations in 
Trento on the 24 of June 2016. 
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decade. In fact, I argue that the historical debate regarding the 
trade-off between security and freedom has become relevant in 
the South Caucasus light of 9/11 aftermaths, of developments in 
Color Revolutions countries as well as the return of the Russian 
activism in its neighborhood.  
 Levitsky and Way (2010) claim that such divergences among 
Western actors can hinder democratisation pressures. In 
addition, I am going to provide an assessment of the Russian 
role as black knight in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which 
could be another hindering factor for Western goals. Therefore, I 
believe it is important to disentangle external pressure in order 
to fully understand the impact of international actors in in the 
region, so as subsequently I will delve into each country without 
overlooking the environment (context) in which they are 
inserted in.  
The United States 
The extinction of the communist threat opened an incredible 
opportunity to restructure world politics. Diamond wrote ‘[t]he 
Bush administration envisions a new world order’ in which 
‘nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and 
justice’ (Diamond 1992:25). The challenges were enormous and a 
United States official used the metaphor ‘making eggs out of an 
omelette’ (Barry 1992: 288) to describe the difficult situation in 
post-Soviet countries in the aftermath of the 1989 events. The 
United States intervened in the USSR mainly through two 
programmes, the first one, the SEED, was launched already in 
1989 and targeted East European Countries, it aimed to support 
democracy, open markets and political parties. Funds allocated 
to this programme were $ 938 million, among which $200 
channelled into the multi-lateral currency stabilization fund 
created for Poland (Wolf-Rodda 1993). Subsequently, in 1992, the 
United States Congress approved the Freedom Support act for 
supporting former USSR countries (with the exception of 
Azerbaijan). 10  The plan aimed to create free markets and 																																																								
10 Section 907 explains why Azerbaijan was not included: ‘United States 
assistance under this or any other Act (other than assistance under title 
V of this Act) may not be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan 
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establishing a democratic and free society by fostering: ‘(a) 
political, social and economic pluralism; (b) respect for 
internationally recognized human rights and the rule of law; (c) 
the development of institutions of democratic governance, 
including electoral and legislative process […]’ (Freedom 
Support Act - Public Law 102-511, 1992:3325). The act, with 
around $ 15 billion funds in assistance delivered to twelve 
former Soviet countries over twenty years (Gordon et al. 2012), 
became the cornerstone for U.S. programme toward that area 
(Rosenblum 2011).  
In particular, for what concern the South Caucasian countries, 
the United States sought to foster its ties with Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan to help them ending their dependence on Russia 
for trade, security, and other relations (Nichol 2014). The 
Freedom Support act included Georgia and Armenia but not 
Azerbaijan, which was targeted with bilateral and private 
investment once Washington acknowledge the presence of 
positive developments by Azeri government ‘to cease all 
blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and 
Nagorno Karabakh’ (Freedom Support Act - Public Law 102-511, 
1992:3357). Overall, United States foreign assistance to South 
Caucasus from 1992 to 2014 has reached almost $ 7 billion 
(figure 1). 
Despite financial efforts, there have been critics that blamed the 
United States for a low-level policy priorities and incoherence 
toward the three South Caucasian countries (Macfarlane 2009, 
Giragosian 2011), as the overall U.S. priorities for the South 
Caucasus remained difficult to define (Boonstra 2015). However, 
American influence in the South Caucasus expanded 
proportionally to the reduction of Russian weight and influence 
(Aydin 1999), which was confronting with many challenges and 
difficulties in reorienting its role in the region (Çelikpala 2009).  																																																																																																																									
until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the 
Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all 
blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh’ (Freedom Support Act - Public Law 102-511, 
1992:3357) 
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 Figure 1: source Nichol 2014 
Multiple Goals for U.S. Engagement 
The lynchpins of U.S. involvement in the South Caucasus were 
driven by four main objectives: reducing Russian influence, 
promoting democracy and free markets and stability (Cohen 
1997, Aydin 1999). These lynchpins took the forms of different 
U.S. engagements. On the stability side, Washington participated 
since the beginning in the Minsk Group, the initiative aimed to 
negotiate the peace process for the Nagorno Karaback region. 
This group has been successful in assuring a long-standing 
ceasefire but it was not capable of solving the conflict, which 
eventually frozen for decades. For what concerns free markets, 
the South Caucasian countries represented an insignificant share 
for American import/export activities (Boonstra 2015), yet the 
Caspian Basin energy resources are strategic for at least two 
reasons: to have margins in oil supplies’ prices and to reduce 
Western dependence on Russian reserves (cf. Macfarlan 2009). In 
particular, since the mid-nineties a group of major American 
energy companies started to lobby the administration to support 
their commercial ventures both in production and in transport in 
the region (Macfarlane 2009). Eventually, Washington was able 
to build stronger connections with Baku. For what concerns 
democracy promotion, Washington was first in line since the fall 
of communist regimes, and it ‘quite deliberately sought to 
spread democracy through its aid programmes and through 
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such institutions as the National Endowment for Democracy, the 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and the 
International Republican Institute, as well as through non-
governmental organizations such as Freedom House’ 
(Macfarlane 2009:112). Their programmes invested all the three 
South Caucasian countries, but their efforts had more effects in 
Georgia, which was labelled a ‘beacon of democracy’ by former 
President G. W. Bush during his visit in Tbilisi in 2005. As a 
matter of fact, since the Rose Revolution, Georgia became the 
lynchpin for U.S. democracy promotion goals and Washington 
was also inclined to integrate Georgia into NATO’s structure. 
Yet, European members were recalcitrant as they were 
concerned about a possible Russian backlash.  
The Four Phases of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Region 
According to MacFarlane (2009) the U.S. policy toward the 
region can be divided in four main periods. The first one relates 
to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan during their first years as 
independent countries. The United States immediately 
recognized and established relationships with all the three 
young states (the latest, Georgia, was recognized in 1992). 
Among the first interventions it is worth noting to mention the 
U.S. role in the Minsk Group in order to provide with an agreed 
solution to the Nagorno Karaback crisis, even if eventually ‘US 
acquiesced in the successful effort of Russian Defence Minister 
Pavel Grachev to negotiate a cease-fire in 1994 once the 
Karabakh Armenians had won their war’ (MacFarlane 2009:113). 
MacFarlane claims that United States did not want to fully 
engage in the region as stability provider, therefore they 
supported Yeltsin’s role as peacekeeper in some key hot spot 
around the South Caucasus. Washington decision finds its raison 
d’etre for Clinton administration reluctance to take direct role in 
too many conflicts scenario (they were already committed in 
Somalia, Lebanon and former Yugoslavia).  
The second phase begins in the mid-nineties, from the outset of 
the Clinton’s second term. During these years the United States’ 
outlook toward the region was characterized by the recognition 
of some form of stability (new-old leaders assured a sort of 
regime consolidation in the three South Caucasian countries), by 
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continuative democratizing pressure (more on Georgian and 
Armenia) and by the acknowledgement of oil and gas resources 
of the Caspian basin (in Azerbaijan). Furthermore, the Clinton 
administration recognised that Russia was not a reliable partner 
guaranteeing stability in the region and therefore the United 
States started to consider a possible NATO expansion in the 
South Caucasus. This, along with the situation in Kosovo, 
created tension with Russia. However, the U.S. did not contest 
Russia’s dominant position in some of the frozen conflict in the 
South Caucasus (such as South Ossetia or Abkhazia).  
The third phase started in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in New York and Washington, as until then George W. 
Bush continued to pursue the same policies goals in the region. 
Since 2001 the U.S. reduced partially their interest in the South 
Caucasus and they started to rely on other partners more active 
in the region, such as the European Union (cf. Boonstra 2015). 
The reason for this change has to be found in the limited role 
(Giragosian 2011) that the three South Caucasian countries could 
provide to the new American grand strategy aimed to fight 
international terrorism. However, in Georgia the Shevardnadze 
regime was on the brink to collapse (see the chapter on Georgia), 
and thus good opportunities for regime change. Therefore in 
August the former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker travelled 
to Georgia, where he pledged for a further democratization of 
the country. His message was particularly important since it was 
pronounced just few months before the parliamentary election. 
Therefore, as soon as Mikhail Saakashvili took power through 
the Rose Revolution, the United States granted him with a 
special endorsement, as he would represent an important 
success for the democratizing agenda of the Bush. Meanwhile 
Russia was recovering its hegemonic role in the region, and 
Moscow was ‘conscious of American overstretch […] 
increasingly openly claimed a sphere of special interest in the 
region (MacFarlane 2009:117). This renowned role for Russia, 
labelled as a new version of the Monroe Doctrine (Skak 2011) 
was accompanied by a staunch stance on the unacceptability of 
possible NATO expansions in the post-Soviet space. Washington 
and Georgia, its closest ally in the South Caucasus, probably 
overlooked Russia’s strategic shift (Krastev 2009), which became 
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evident with the short but intensive Georgia – Russia war in 
August 2008. The conflict had strong repercussions on the 
credibility of United States commitments in the South Caucasus 
and shed lights on the new regional power structure.  
The 2008 war between Georgia and Russia opened the fourth 
phase, which is characterized by a staunch Russian return as 
game setter in the region. Since then, the United States’ foreign 
policy toward the South Caucasus ‘necessitated a fundamental 
rethinking’ (MacFarlan 2009:120). Eventually, with the election 
of Barack Obama to the White House, American foreign policy 
objectives shifted from unilateralism to a more concerted 
multilateral approach (Giragosian 2011), which lead to a more 
articulate agenda for the region to be adopted with the European 
Union. The United States invited the EU to take a bigger role in 
the region, while the United States would have started to be 
more assertive toward the local authorities’ requests (Giragosian 
2011). 
 To sum up, the United States involvement in the region has 
been driven by different goals, which were determined by 
different assessment of democracy versus stability nexus. 
Democracy promotion (part of the Leverage) was stronger and 
more continuative in Georgia and less in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, whereas in terms of trade and economic interest 
Azerbaijan was top of the three. Overall, the main tenet was to 
acquire more influence in the region so as to push back Russian 
domination. In the long run, this result has not been achieved.  
The European Union 
United States was not the only external player interested in the 
region in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. Other 
international actors, such as the European Union (EU), took part 
in what constituted a big effort to promote new democratic 
frameworks in the countries. The EU is a younger actor in terms 
of its role as a democratic promoter. It was since 1992 that ‘the 
development and consolidation of democracy’ became one of the 
objectives of its Common and Security Foreign Policy (Baracani 
2010). The EU’s main instruments for democracy promotion are 
institutional links, economic assistance and trade concession. 
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The effectiveness of these tools depends on the possibility of full 
integration within the Union. As a matter of fact, the integration 
into the European Union has been considered as one key factors 
producing successful outcomes of transition process from 
authoritarian to democratic systems in post-Soviet space 
(Cameron 2007, Vachudova 2010). All these instruments 
constitute part of the EU linkage, which goes hand in hand with 
leverage. European Leverage is characterized by a powerful EU 
instrument that affects bilateral relations between EU and a third 
country: conditionality. The latter ‘tries to manipulate the cost–
benefit calculations of target actors through creating positive and 
negative incentives’ (Borzel and Risse 2012:7) and proved to be 
really effective in norms transfer (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004). This instrument was included already in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992); Article J.2: 2 affirms ‘[t]he objectives of 
the common foreign and security policy shall be: [ ] - to develop 
and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’, thus it creates 
binding requirements for any kind of relations with third 
countries.  
The Great Absent 
During the nineties, the main umbrella structure, which allowed 
for funding and granting different types of projects, was TACIS 
(Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States) that was launched in 1991 by the European Commission. 
Within this framework, TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-
Caucasus-Asia) and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport 
to Europe) were initiated under the TACIS programme. Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan fully benefited from this programme, 
which bestowed €333 million between 1992 and 2004, for 
national projects. Among the initiative sponsored by TACIS 
there were training of judges, the reform of central and local 
government administrations, institutional building of 
Parliament, and the training of civil servants. Overall TACIS’ 
projects ‘contributed to the macroeconomic reform processes 
and the sectorial reform policies in transitional states’ 
(Dekanozishvili 2004:6) and ‘contributed to the transition 
towards a market economy and the building of democratic 
institutions through legal and regulatory reforms, thereby 
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harmonizing their legislation with the EU’s legal acts’ 
(Açikmeşein 2009:169). Beside these initiatives, the EU also 
undertook a humanitarian assistance programme to Armenia 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to contrast some harsh situations of 
misery and destitution, which arisen during the independence 
and transition process (IDEA 2003). The targets of aid were 
disadvantaged groups, in particular refugees, internally 
displaced persons and victims of conflict. Thanks to these 
programme, the EU began to act and being perceived as a 
‘structural stabilizer’ (Açikmeşein 2009) in the South Caucasus.  
However, the European Union was accused of being a great 
absent in the early nineties and to have delayed its involvement 
in respect to other regions around the world (Halbac 2011, 
Alieva 2006). Moreover, its cooperation programmes established 
during the Soviet era were not updated until 1999, when the 
Partnership Cooperation Agreements entered into force. The EU 
approach to the region suffered from relevant shortcomings, 
such as the EU ‘did not differentiate between the states’ 
population size, […] did not take into account the most 
favourable conditions for the support of institution building […] 
unlike the US, which rendered direct aid to the civil society and 
institution building’ (Alieva 2006:3). Nevertheless, the appeal of 
EU programmes over Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
remained high and thanks to a deep restructure of the EU – 
South Caucasus relations the EU became step by step the most 
active actor in its neighbourhood (Manoli 2009, Boonstra 2015). 
Since the mid-nineties the EU and South Caucasian officials 
negotiated the new framework of EU-South Caucasus 
relationships. The discussion concerned the main tenets for the 
New Neighbouring project. According to former European 
Commission President Romano Prodi, the New Neighbourhood 
project was aimed at opening the markets of the European 
Union with its 500 million population to the countries of the 
South Caucasus, to attract European investments to the South 
Caucasus and promote social and cultural integration of these 
counties with Europe’ (quoted in Badalov and Mehdi 2005:158). 
However, alongside these agreements, in the field of 
development cooperation the EU set up some specific aid and 
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assistance programmes toward the region. Indeed, the EU 
entered the region assuming a ‘background role of addressing 
the issues of the region from a transformative perspective in 
democratic and socio-economic terms’ (Açikmeşe 2004:177). The 
signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) 
with the three South Caucasian countries on 22 June 1999 
‘represented a qualitative breakthrough in EU-Caucasus 
relations’ (Demirag 2005:96), set the basis for enhanced 
cooperation in several sectors, including social, industrial and 
cultural. PCAs were individually signed with each state in the 
region, and among other things they envisioned the creation of 
Cooperation Councils, Cooperation Committees and 
Parliamentary Cooperation Committees as institutionalised 
mechanisms of bilateral relations with the EU. 
The New Neighbourhood  
The terrorist attacks in September 2001 changed the agenda for 
the EU engagement in the region. Emblematically, in March 
2003, the European Commission published its Communication 
‘Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for relations 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, which devised the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in order to promote stability, 
security and development in the EU’s periphery, did not include 
the three South Caucasian countries. Yet, they were included in 
another document, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, which 
casted the South Caucasus among other different regions in the 
world (and no more conceived as ‘neighbour’). However, in this 
context, the Swedish presidency of the European Council, 
wanted the South Caucasus to become one of the top priorities 
for the EU (Açikmeşein 2009). As a direct consequence, in July 
2003 the expert Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie, was appointed 
a EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, in an 
attempt to foster EU political involvement in the region. 
There were two other important factors that played an important 
role in bringing back to the top the region in the EU agenda. The 
first one was the Rose Revolution in Georgia (Popescu 2011), 
which ‘appeared to be the best test for the EU to demonstrate its 
commitment to the declared values and principles’ (Alieva 
2006:4). Secondly, with the accession of some Eastern European 
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countries during the 2004-2007 enlargement, the South Caucasus 
became a closer neighbor for the EU (Açikmeşein 2009). As a 
matter of fact, in June 2004, the European Council decided to 
include Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Although ENP lacked one of the 
stronger impulses for cooperation, the enlargement process, it 
still had an incentive of deeper integration in EU markets and 
societies. This decision gave an important message that the EU 
was ‘fully committed to support these countries on their route 
towards building stable societies based on democratic values’ 
(Demirag 2005:99). 
The South Caucasus benefited from the ENP as the EU started to 
provide more financial assistance than during the TACIS 
programme: for example, under the National Indicative 
Programme the EU allocated for 2007-2010 € 98 million to 
Armenia, € 92 million to Azerbaijan and € 120,4 to Georgia 
(Delcour and Duhot 2011), and in 2009 the EU became the one of 
the major investor actors in the region (Boonstra 2015). Overall, 
the impact of the ENP in the region was positive, the countries of 
the region welcomed it as the ‘EU was an attractive development 
model for the societies of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan’ 
(Popescu 2011:232). In turn the EU pushed good governance, the 
rule of law and democratization in all three countries as a core 
priority (Delcour and Duhot 2011), to be taken into consideration 
for any further steps. In Georgia, in particular, during those 
years, there were hopes about a possible integration in the EU.  
More recently the EU launched new initiatives aimed to further 
deepen cooperation with the three South Caucasian countries. 
Despite the fact that Armenia and Azerbaijan were included in 
the EU programme, their involvement in bilateral cooperation 
did not grow as rapidly as in the case of EU-Georgia relations. 
One of the main reasons is that Georgia was ‘much more willing 
to engage with the EU, whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan were 
both less interested in the way the ENP objectives were 
designed’ (Popescu 2011:323).  
Following these developments, the EU planned a further step in 
the cooperation process and in 2010 launched negotiations for a 
new framework of cooperation. This framework included 
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political cooperation and economic integration through 
Association Agreements (AA) with Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), progressive visa liberalisation and 
sectorial cooperation. The idea, in the long run, would further 
increase the trade exchange between the two regions, even if it 
for the time being it exclude the idea of a full integration into the 
EU. As a matter of fact, the EU was the first trade partner for 
each of the South Caucasian countries (figure 2), followed by 
Russia and Turkey. 
 Figure 2: Boonstra (2015), data from European Commission, DG 
Trade. 
 
The Vilnius summit in 2013 partly crowned these efforts for 
South Caucasian countries, with just Georgia signing the AA. 
Armenia decided not to sign the agreement and subsequently 
joined the Russian led Eurasian Union. As I am going to explain 
in the following paragraphs, Yerevan’s decision was emblematic 
in two ways: the first one related to the actual level of Western 
Leverage over Armenia and the second one concerned the role of 
Russia as a Black Knight11. Azerbaijan resisted signing the AA and 
re-launched the negotiations, which are still on-going, for 
another form of agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan. The 
South Caucasus, which is intertwined in a difficult interregional 
dimension, complicates the EU’s functional programmes toward 
the area. In this region, where there are multiple-levels of 
international context, ‘post-Soviet elites' preferences for closer 																																																								
11  According to Levitsky and Way (2010) a Black Knight is an 
international actor that bolsters a nondemocratic ruler in another 
country. 
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relations with the EU are often underpinned by geopolitical 
motives’ (Delcour and Wolczuk 2013:3), and the EU is just one 
actor among others. Thus, the EU was not able to fully and 
comprehensively exert its democratization pressure on the three 
countries. Moreover, as we are going to see, democracy versus 
stability logics played a role in reducing the EU democratizing 
pressure especially on Azerbaijan. 
To sum up, the role of the EU in the region increased gradually 
over the years. Despite a timid beginning the interests between 
Armenia Azerbaijan and Georgia and the EU mutually grew, as 
on one side the South Caucasian countries were keener to get 
closer to European market and aquis communitaire and on the 
other, thanks to the European Union enlargement, the South 
Caucasus became the new neighborhood. Moreover, European 
soft power proved to be more attractive for some countries, in 
particular for Georgia and sometimes for Armenia, where 
during the years political elites praised a possible accession’s 
path into EU.  
The Council of Europe and the OSCE 
With regard to the other international actors that played a 
relatively important role in shaping the political and legal 
reforms in the South Caucasus, I must mention the Council of 
Europe (especially through the Venice Commission) and the 
OSCE, which proved to be essential in particular for what 
concern technical assistance to the establishment of democratic 
institutions and elections. Despite the fact that no comparable 
process of EU external conditionality was imposed on these new 
members, the CoE and OSCE have worked with the practice of 
internal conditionality 12  (Fawn 2013). During the nineties the 
Council of Europe became very active in providing legal advice 
at the moment of drafting constitutional and electoral laws in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Meanwhile, the OSCE played 
a prominent role in good governance, in particular anti- 
corruption, anti-money laundering and combating terrorist 																																																								
12 Internal conditionality is the ability of an international organisation to 
cope with threats that recalcitrant member states posit to the IOs’ 
norms and values (see Fawn 2013).  
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financing, as well as providing with election observers for 
almost all the elections that took place in those countries since 
mid-nineties. Moreover, the OSCE provided the international 
framework to set up the Minsk Group that since 1992 has been 
working to find solutions to the Nagorno Karabakh war.  
The Role of the OSCE 
For what concerns the OSCE, which is a regional arrangement 
established under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, 
contrary to the European Union, it opened up the possibility for 
membership to South Caucasian countries since the early 
nineties. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were admitted into 
the OSCE (at that time it was still called the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe – CSCE) in 1992. With the 
transformation into a permanent organisation – OSCE – there 
was the expectation of many Western governments that post-
Soviet states would willingly adapt their national legal 
frameworks to suit OSCE funding norms (Fawn 2013), even if 
the organisation itself did not dispose of coercive or 
authoritative institutions to carry out such job.  
The OSCE adopted a tailored programme for each country in 
order to provide specific responses to each context. Moreover, 
within the OSCE member states could find a framework to 
collaborate and confront in addressing many issues (good 
governance, anti – terrorism, borders management). Moreover, 
the OSCE served as an ‘umbrella’ organisation for sub-regional 
groupings within its space (Manoli 2009). One of the best 
examples of how synergies with partner organisations are 
developed is the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), 
a partnership between the OSCE, the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), and the Regional 
Environment Centre (REC), with NATO as an associated 
partner. 
For what concerns democratization and electoral affairs, the 
OSCE was, and still is, one of the most important actors. This is 
because since the establishment of the OSCE/ODIHR it started 
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to implement election observation missions. This task became 
particularly important in the post-Soviet world, where 
governments began to set-up multi-party elections. The work 
and the findings of election observation missions were an 
assessment of the overall democratisation process of the country. 
This was particularly important for Western states, which 
conceived democratizations and democratic elections as 
unquestionable lynchpins for the post-Soviet space (Fawn 2013). 
Western countries had high expectations regarding democracy 
and elections, so that they were pressuring, via the ODIHR, third 
countries to compel. In this framework free and fair elections are 
taken as ‘an essential component of both democratization and 
security’ (Fawn 2013:60). As a matter of fact, the Copenhagen 
Document of the CSCE published on the 29th June 1990 
committed all the participating States to: free elections at regular 
intervals; the popular election of all seats in at least one chamber; 
universal and equal suffrage; the right to the establishment of 
political parties and their clear separation from the state; 
campaigning in a free and fair atmosphere; unimpeded access to 
the media; secret ballots with counting and reporting conducted 
honestly and the results reported publicly; and the due winners 
be installed and allowed to serve their full terms (cf. CSCE 1990). 
Therefore, Western leverage was channelled within an 
organization that among its members have Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus. 
Already in 1990 with the establishment of the ODIHR, the CSCE 
was able to send first observation missions to observe some local 
elections in many Eastern European post-Soviet states. Rapidly, 
the OSCE/ODIHR became one of the most important actors that 
set and subsequently checked electoral integrity in the region. In 
the South Caucasus OSCE/ODIHR observations missions 
started in the mid-nineties (the first elections were parliamentary 
election and constitutional referendum in Azerbaijan in 1995), 
and since then they provided high-quality election assessments 
for most of the elections in the region.  
The OSCE/ODIHR observation missions are an indicator of the 
Western leverage. This is particularly the case if we take into 
consideration the size of the missions. In fact, the observation 
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missions’ sizes are one of the most contested items when 
OSCE/ODIHR is negotiating the observation mission in a 
country. In the 2015 parliamentary election in Azerbaijan the 
government argued that there were too many observers for a 
small country such as Azerbaijan. 13  Eventually, the 
OSCE/ODIHR decided not to send an observation mission. In 
Georgia, throughout the nineties, when Western leverage was 
low in the region, OSCE/ODIHR observation missions were 
composed by around 150/180 observers. This is in sharp contrast 
to the great international attention over the 2003 parliamentary 
election, when more than 400 observers composed the 
OSCE/ODIHR mission. The final report of that mission confirms 
the idea that the size of the OSCE/ODIHR missions are an 
indicator of Western pressure, in the introduction it reports ‘in 
response to a strong interest of the international community, the 
OSCE/ODIHR deployed a reinforced and enlarged Election 
Observation Mission (EOM) that was formally established on 2 
September 2003’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 2003:2). The findings of 
the OSCE/ODIHR missions included in the preliminary report 
published on November the 3rd contributed to trigger the political 
turmoil that led to the Rose Revolution.  
However, many post-soviet states started to challenge the 
ODIHR standards, claiming that they did not fit to post-Soviet 
conditions even if, at the same time, they committed repeatedly 
to them according to the Western interpretations (Fawn 2013). 
First of all, it was Russia who since 2003 contested the final 
findings of the OSCE/ODIHR final report concerning 2003 
legislative elections. Subsequently, other post-Soviet 
governments objected to the OSCE/ODIHR observation 
missions’ reports. As a result, Russia and other allied states 
began to endorse each other’s elections, even if they were 
considered to have fallen short of the international standards set 
by the OSCE/ODIHR mission. 14 Moreover, since 2003, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) started to 
implement parallel observation missions that normally endorsed 																																																								
13 Authors’ interview with Azerbaijan Ambassador in Paris (June 2016) 
14  For example Putin expressed positive opinion concerning Victor 
Yanukovich’s victory in the highly contested election in 2004. 
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fraudulent elections.  
In this context, the OSCE’s operations and programme began to 
be contested, hindering its progress. In the South Caucasus, 
Armenia invited CIS observation missions since 2003 and 
Azerbaijan did the same since 2010. In both cases their final 
reports provided a different picture to the OSCE/ODIHR 
assessments. Moreover, since 2010 the Azeri government started 
to limit the OSCE presence in the country. First of all, the 
authorities decided to downgrade OSCE missions to Azerbaijan 
to the project co-ordinator level.  Subsequently, they decided to 
close it altogether as ‘the government of Azerbaijan has reported 
that there is no need for more activities of the OSCE Project Co-
ordinator in Baku’ (letter from Foreign Ministry to the head of 
office in Vienna, 3 June 2015). This decision became effective 
from 4 July 2015. Currently there is just one OSCE mission to the 
South Caucasus, in Yerevan as the OSCE mission to Georgia 
ended its mandate and it was closed in 2008.  
The Role of the Council of Europe 
With the End of the Cold War the Council of Europe was met 
with the prospect of enlarging its membership to post-Soviet 
countries. In this delicate process the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE) played an important role insofar 
as it was able to set up and develop relations with parliamentary 
institutions, even before the fall of the Soviet Union. With the 
upheaval against Communist rule, many former Soviet states 
looked at the Council of Europe as a natural dimension for their 
independence from Russia and for their efforts to establish 
democracy (cf. Bond 2012). The Council of Europe granted the 
status of applications to many post-Soviet states with ‘few if any 
conditions attached’ (Bond 2012:113). However, the same spirit 
did not relate to South Caucasian countries, where intra-national 
or inter-regional conflicts erupted in the early nineties. There, 
soon after Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia became 
independent, Council of Europe advisors and Venice 
Commissions experts took part in the drafting process of the 
different Constitutions; their opinions were fundamental in 
order to understand the quality of the Constitutional projects 
(Filippini 2005). 
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In this sense the Council of Europe is a guarantor for three main 
core concepts: democracy, human rights and rule of law. Its role 
is even more relevant for countries, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia, which do not have other regional affiliations that 
can safeguard those principles. Conversely, the Council of 
Europe has some instruments to achieve those aims, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights; the conventions on human 
rights (ECHR) to be signed and ratified by all member states; the 
possibility for the CoE to conduct monitoring activities within its 
member states, and capacity building programmes, which were 
implemented with the support of the EU in the South Caucasus. 
When Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan became eligible to 
apply, the Council of Europe demanded a long list of 
requirements (Bond 2012). The three South Caucasian countries 
had to undertake some legal reforms that prompted a period of 
comprehensive legislative reform and harmonization. By the 
time of their accession, all three countries had introduced 
‘sweeping changes’ (Zullo 2005:92) to their legal frameworks. 
This process was particularly important for Azerbaijan as thanks 
to the accession framework important reforms to its institutional 
landscape were carried out in 2002 (cf. Guliyeva 2005).  
Therefore, the Council of Europe played, and it is still playing, 
an important role in securing the continuation of political and 
legal reforms in the South Caucasus.  
Moreover, among its activities there are also devising regional 
programmes to foster cross-border cooperation and the sharing 
of expertise, as well as engaging sub-state actors and civil 
society. After the accession of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
in the organization, the Council of Europe launched specific 
programmes for the area. The first one was the Kiev Initiative 
Regional Programme: Black Sea and South Caucasus’ aimed to foster 
democratic development through culture in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine relying on the 
experiences acquired in similar programme (such as STAGE - 
Support for Transition in the Arts and Culture in Greater 
Europe). Subsequently, in 2006, the Council of Europe launched 
another initiative in the Black Seas region called the Congress of 
Local and Regional, which was a platform for co-operation 
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complementary to existing national intergovernmental co-
operation initiatives, acting in the remittance of regional and 
municipal competencies (Manoli 2009:98).  
In summary, the CoE and the OSCE have developed ideational 
and practical measures that make ‘internal political matters the 
purview of all’ (Fawn 2013:53). In other words, concepts such as 
democracy, human rights, political pluralism and the rule of law 
are no longer a domestic prerogative. Within the IOs’ 
frameworks those concepts have multiple means to making 
member-states accountable to each other (Fawn 2013). However, 
the role and prestige of international organisations in the South 
Caucasus has been undermined by several factors. The first one 
concerns the lack of progress with regard to the numerous 
attempts to resolve the protracted conflicts, including the role of 
the UN in Abkhazia and the OSCE Minsk mediator group. The 
Council of Europe cut off the Nagorno Karaback issue from its 
agenda. The second one concerns the acknowledgment of some 
failures of the democratization process in Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia that still falters. Despite all the IOs’ efforts to 
provide the best assistance to the reform process, there is still a 
big gap concerning the formal framework and its real 
implementation. Post-Soviet countries are still affected by many 
informal practices, which elude legal bindings (see for example 
Ledeneva 2006, Hale 2015). The third factor concerns the 
structural weaknesses of those organizations, which suffer from 
internal challengers (see Fawn 2013) or from competing 
assessments, which endanger the impartiality of the IO (for 
example see contrasting assessments of electoral integrity in 
Azerbaijan). Thus, Western leverage suffers from all the above-
mentioned shortcomings. Yet, both the Council of Europe and 
OSCE, remain important drivers of cooperation and providers of 
resources and expertise on the democratization process and 
electoral integrity. 
Russia: the Black Knight? 
According to Levitsky and Way (2010) democratization efforts 
can be hampered by the presence of an external actor that 
bolsters a nondemocratic ruler or hinders democratic 
developments in another country. This external actor is labelled 
	 103	
as a Black Knight. There is a literature that already addressed the 
role of Russia in its neighbourhood. For example, in the study by 
Cameron and Orenstein (2012) quoted so far, the two authors 
observed a synchronism in the development of civil and political 
rights in Russia and in its neighbourhood. Some other studies 
addressed the same issue (Ambrosio 2009, Tolstrup 2009, Bader 
et al. 2010, Jackson 2010, Vanderhill 2013, Tolstrup 2014) and 
they were able to find proof of Russia’s interventions in other 
countries’ policies in order to affect domestic politics. In this 
section I am not going to provide an overview of all the different 
facets of Russian interventionism in the region; this topic has 
been already addressed in other studies. Rather, taking into 
consideration the regional and international contexts, I am going 
to explain if and how Russia acted as a Black Knight in the 
region. 
For what concerns the topic of this thesis, it is important to focus 
on Russian efforts to prevent democratization process in the 
three South Caucasian countries. One of the main tenets of 
Russian foreign policy in its neighbourhood is bolstering 
governments and leaders that are supportive of its interests and 
are willing to establish close ties with Moscow (Kramer 2008). 
This policy is dictated by geopolitical stances rather than by 
normative preferences, at least in the South Caucasus. Many 
studies have been conducted on the effects of the Russian foreign 
policy over the South Caucasian countries, yet as far as I know 
for the time being there are none that proved that Russia directly 
promoted alternative regime’s type. Moreover, for what 
concerns electoral systems all South Caucasian countries have 
been free to choose whichever electoral formula for their 
constituencies. I did not find any study or data concerning 
Moscow’s pressure to adopt some particular provisions to craft 
electoral codes or electoral practices. These claims have been 
confirmed by many interviews I conducted with electoral 
experts, MPs and CEC members coming from all the three 
different countries. Therefore, despite the fact that Russia may 
maintain strong geo-political influences over the region, as well 
as high levels of linkage with some countries it does not provide 
an alternative for what concern the management of the election.  
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However, Moscow did affect the political scenario of the three 
South Caucasian countries bolstering, endorsing or hindering 
domestic political leaders’ activisms, in particular since the 
advent of Vladimir Putin. This practice has been already 
analysed in different post-Soviet context, such as the Russian 
involvement in Ukraine and Belarus (Ambrosio 2009) and in 
Moldova (Tolstrup 2014). According to Tolstrup (2014) Russia 
acted as a Black Knight not because of a standard practice to 
sustain authoritarian leaders as such, but rather because it bases 
its interventionist policy ‘on a rational estimation of the 
likelihood of regime breakdown and the costs associated with it’ 
(Tolstrup 2014:15). Moreover, it is important to underline that 
when a Black Knight decides to bolster a domestic leader, it does 
not imply that it will lead to success. There are a number of cases 
where this did not happen (Ukraine in 2004, Moldova in 2009) or 
other cases where simply Russian preferences were left 
unheeded (such as in Azerbaijan in 2003 when Moscow did not 
favour the dynastic succession between Alyiev father and son).  
Bewildered Years 
A complex net of strategic, ideological and economic factors has 
affected Russia’s early policies toward the South Caucasus. 
These factors intertwined in different ways that as the Russian 
foreign policy was characterized by different stages. The 
establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
played a fundamental role in Russia’s foreign policy toward its 
neighbourhood (Kramer 2008). Nevertheless, at the outset far 
from being and authoritative project, the Yeltsin administration 
was endorsing democratization processes in all the post-Soviet 
states and sought to be closer to the Western world throughout 
the nineties (Ryabov 2011). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
joined this regional framework since the very beginning. 
In the first years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia 
undertook a great effort in order to structure the new Russian 
foreign policy. Indeed, Russia had to reform its foreign and 
security policies because of the drastic decline of its military 
power and its strategic landscape map (Fedorov and Nodia 
1999). For what concerns the South Caucasus, at the beginning 
Russia had no single visions of its role in the southern periphery 
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(ibid). The result was an initial disengagement of Moscow and 
tolerance toward the domestic policies in Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia in their domestic and international, an anti-western 
policy began to increase especially in regard to those countries 
(Ryabov 2011). As a matter of fact, from the mid-1990s onwards, 
Western efforts to enlarge and sneak in the region provoked a 
growing frustration on Russia, which claimed that South 
Caucasus is a region of special interests. Therefore, since mid-
nineties onward, Russia’s approach toward the region was 
characterized by a wary and guarding position with a focus on 
damage limitation. As a matter or fact, in order to reassert its 
hegemonic position in the CIS, Russia ‘applied whatever means 
it had at its disposal to halt the further erosion of its fast-fading 
influence’ (Perovic 2005: 63). This had multiple implications, 
from obstructing any kind of legal settlement over the Caspian 
Sea (Perovic 2005) to impede solution to the conflicts in the 
region (Alieva 2006:5). However, at the end of the nineties, 
Russia and in particular Yeltsin presidency was suffering from 
many institutional and legitimacy weaknesses 15 , which had 
repercussion also on its foreign policy (Lo 2002, Nygren 2007).  
The Putin Turn 
A new form of Russian foreign policy in the region became 
evident only with President Putin, who since early 2001 
launched a new phase in relations with the three South 
Caucasian countries. Under President Putin there have been 
some attempts to establish multilateral summits to discuss more 
general Caucasian affairs. In June 2001 Putin set up several 
meetings with all the three South Caucasian presidents (first 
with the Armenian President Robert Kocharian and then with 
the Azerbaijan President Heidar Aliev and later with the 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze) to discuss security 
related regional problems and unresolved conflict issues. This 
new approach witnessed that the South Caucasus became a 																																																								
15 The problem for Yeltsin to re-establish control of the CIS region was 
the fact that a re-union was not built on even domestic consensus, that 
his administration ‘was never able to maintain a consistent position on 
either the balance of priorities or even the criteria by which they should 
be measured’ (Lo 2002: 123) 
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priority for Russia’s foreign policy (Nygren 2008). 
President Putin has always been more comfortable dealing with 
authoritarian leaders (Kramer 2008) who would support Russia’s 
interests and align their countries with the CIS and then with the 
Eurasian Union. This tendency was greatly reinforced by the 
series of popular uprisings, which were subsequently called 
‘Coloured Revolutions’, that began with the ousting of Slobodan 
Milosevic in Serbia in 2000, and were followed by the Rose 
Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 
in 2004, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. According 
to Kramer this rapid sequence of events ‘had a profound impact 
on Putin and his close aides’ (Kramer 2008:5) and abruptly 
changed the strategy toward its neighbourhood, which became 
more proactive and pre-emptive (Ambrosio 2009). In the ‘New 
Russian Doctrine’ the Coloured Revolutions were identified as 
some of the most serious threats Russia faced (Ivanov 2006). As a 
matter of fact, from that moment on ‘Russian leaders and 
organizations, to varying extents […] encouraged autocratic 
methods as an effective strategy for holding on to power’ 
(McFaul 2007: 68).  
Practically, in the South Caucasus, Russian Black Knight efforts 
aimed at achieving three main goals: first, avoiding the rise of 
political leadership that were against Russian interests in the 
region (Tolstrup 2014). Second, sustaining political elites that 
shared same vision and goals with Moscow (Boonstra 2015). 
Third, providing an alternative source for legitimacy to 
nondemocratic leaders. With regard to the first aim, Russia acted 
strongly and harshly especially when it suspected a possible 
Western expansion in the region. As a matter of fact, one of the 
interpretations of the August war in Georgia in 2008 sees 
Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the subsequent ‘Cypriutisation’ 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as an action aimed at hindering 
Georgia’s willingness to be further integrated into the Western 
international organisation’s framework (Nodia 2012); this was 
achieved by crippling Tbilisi’s ability to act as the sole authority 
within its borders (Hedenskog and Larsson 2007). The same 
logic lies behind the efforts to pressurise the Armenian elites to 
reject the EU’s association agreement and to choose the 
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integration’s path within the Eurasian Union. In this case, Russia 
took advantage of the unresolved conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over the Nagorno Karaback in order to have more 
leverage vis à vis Yerevan. Meanwhile Armenia was undertaking 
all the necessary steps to sign the Association agreement with 
the EU 16 , Moscow rekindled Yerevan’s security concerns by 
selling huge amount of weapons to Baku (RFE/RL 04/09/2013). 
The decision by President Sargysan to withdrew from the 
Association Agreement and to sign the Eurasian Union accession 
was seen as an abruptly ‘strategic U-turn’ (Giragosian 2015), 
which was fostered by a great Russian pressure (Dreyer and 
Popescu 2014). As a matter of fact, Russia exerted similar 
pressure also on the other South Caucasian countries (ibid.) but it 
was successful only in Armenia because, as Sergei Minasian has 
asserted,17 ‘Armenia's security issues - which are not addressed at 
all by the Eastern Partnership - give Moscow "major leverage" 
over Yerevan’ (quoted in RFE/RL 04/09/2013). Nonetheless, it is 
still too early to verify whether this international move will 
result in further faltering democratization process18.  
For what concerns the second method for influencing South 
Caucasian domestic politics, Russia carefully identifies and 
subsequently sustains certain political parties and leaders which 
prove to be friendly or have shared interest with Moscow. In 
order to attain this result, Moscow plays a mix of strategies that 
also include ‘soft power’. As a matter of fact, Russia has a 
number of advantages for implementing a soft power strategy in 
its neighborhood, which goes from the presence of large Russian 
minorities to a shared history, including cultural and linguistic 
proximity (Tafuro 2014). The main instruments to channel soft 
power are through the Russian media, which are active in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and to a lesser extent Georgia (Boonstra 
2015), and the Orthodox Church (Petro 2015). The main aim of 																																																								
16 The European Commission announced the ‘substantive completion’ of 
the three-year association talks with Armenia later in July, making the 
initialling of the Association Agreement at the Vilnius summit all but a 
forgone conclusion (RFE/RL 6/08/2013). 
17 Deputy head of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan. 
18 Author’s interview with a MP of an opposition party in Yerevan (May 
2015) 
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Russian soft power is to counter the spread of Western ideas, 
which could ‘infect’ post-Soviet societies. President Putin used to 
refer to religion as a safeguard against the moral crisis of the 
West; in a speech he gave he condemned the rejection of 
Christian values in western society, claiming that ‘without the 
values of Christianity and other world religions, without the 
norms of morality and ethics formed over the course of 
thousands of years, people inevitably lose their human dignity’ 
(Putin 2007). Beside soft power, there have also been episodes of 
direct Russian participation in assisting friendly governments to 
cope with protests and electoral uncertainties, as happened in 
Azerbaijan during the elections in 2003 and 2005, and in 
Armenia in 2003 and 2008 (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). 
Concerning Armenian politics, there is anecdotal evidence that 
Russia played a role also preventing the leader of the political 
party Prosperous – Gagik Tsarukian – becoming to influential. 
As a matter of fact, Tsarukian since 2013 became very active as 
opposition leader and he successfully mobilized many 
supporters around the country. In 2015 he organized several 
rallies that gathered hundreds of people to condemn a 
constitutional referendum, which would have changed the role 
of the executive, and President Serzh Sargsyan endorsed it.  In 
February Sargsyan openly accused Tsarukian of financial crimes 
and asked for his resignation. Tsarukian flew to Moscow for a 
two-day visit, where he met with Russian political leaders to 
discuss about the constitutional reforms (Armenianow 2015). 
Once he came back he unexpectedly decided that he would have 
resigned and quit politics.19  
Finally, thanks to its hegemonic position Russia created an 
alternative source of legitimacy for its neighbours. There are 
different ways in which Russia carries out this aim. For what 
concern the topic of this research, the most important one is the 
creation of an alternative international organisation consecrated 
to elections observation and assessment in post-Soviet countries: 
the CIS Election Monitoring Organisation (CIS-EMO), which has 
been sending election observers to member countries of the CIS 
since 2002. Several of these observation missions have been 																																																								
19 Author’s interview with political analyst in Yerevan (May 2015) 
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controversial, as their findings, generally positive (Daxecker and 
Schneider 2014), have often been in sharp contradiction with the 
findings of other international organisations such as the OSCE. 
Moreover, the composition of these missions is often in fact 
totally Russian and they are often accused of being subservient 
to Kremlin foreign policy (Hedenskog and Larsson 2007). 
Therefore, due to this biased CIS-EMO missions are considered 
to be a low-quality election monitoring organization (Daxecker 
and Schneider 2014). Nevertheless, they are still useful in some 
realities because through these observation missions, Russia 
‘provides authoritarian countries with a rhetorical upper-hand 
and the power to claim that their forms of government are 
equally legitimate to the conception of democracy emanating 
from the West’ (Ambrosio 2010:381). In the South Caucasus CIS-
EMO missions were invited in Armenia and Azerbaijan since 
2003, and since then they have been providing controversial 
assessments (cf. Bunce and Wolchik 2011).   
In conclusion, by providing legitimacy and political support to 
regimes with similar interests, Russia actively countered 
democratization efforts in the South Caucasus. Therefore, it is 
possible to observe a Russian Black Knight role, in particular 
since Putin’s arrival. Moscow’s efforts were mainly directed to 
hinder Western integration processes in the region and to sustain 
friendly political elites. Yet, these actions have not been 
comprehensive and systematic compared with many Western 
democratization efforts (Jackson 2010). Nevertheless, for what 
concerns electoral management, Russia contributed to endorsing 
practices which were against electoral integrity principles.  
Conclusion 
This chapter started with the idea of delving into the different 
facets of the Western leverage and linkage. As Levitsky and Way 
also underline, one of the main drivers of the democratization 
process is a consistent and aggregate pressure over third 
countries. The analysis of the different Western actors’ actions 
along the decades allows for some observations concerning the 
Western linkage and leverage in the region. First of all, the South 
Caucasus experienced Western pressure only from the nineties, 
when the region was inserted in the broader aid baskets for the 
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post-Soviet space. However, the South Caucasus was one of the 
more remote areas of the former USSR, and it experienced low 
levels of Western interest (the West was far more concerned 
about eastern Europe and the Balkans) and inconsistent aid 
programmes. For what concerns the issue of this research, only 
the Council of Europe and the OSCE were implementing 
important reforms in the governance sector. Yet, these two 
organizations alone were not able to exert a significant degree of 
leverage on the countries.  
 
Secondly, the South Caucasus became more geopolitically 
relevant during the early 2000s for three main reasons. Firstly, 
because of the spread of the Coloured Revolutions, which were 
seen as a final democratic breakthrough; this was particularly 
visible in Georgia, which became one of the success stories 
important to justify international commitment. The United States 
was particularly committed to sustaining democratic 
breakthroughs elsewhere, as President Bush claimed that Rose 
Revolution set an example for others during his visit to Tbilisi 
(BBC 10/05/2005). In the run-up of the Rose Revolution the 
West demonstrated particular unity and consistency toward 
Georgia, and it was able to exert a strong Western leverage over 
Shevardnadze. However, soon after the election of Saakashvili in 
2004, Western actors began to show competing visions and 
interests over Georgia’s role within Western security and 
regional framework (e.g. NATO), which in turn had implications 
for the effect of Western leverage as a whole. Secondly, the South 
Caucasus became more geopolitically relevant because it turned 
out to be the new EU’s neighbourhood after the integration 
process in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the EU tried to launch a 
new tailored programme toward the region, which eventually 
would make the three South Caucasian countries closer to EU 
standards. Despite this process failing to work as expected (with 
just Georgia included in the new AA framework), the EU 
managed to became the first trade partners in the region.  
 
Thirdly, the region acquired importance for the West due to new 
possibilities for exploiting natural resources in the Caspian 
basin. As expected, Western commercial interest increased in 
particular in Azerbaijan. However, it is not sufficient to produce 
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a general increase of the Western leverage, as the natural 
resources industry and trade are negatively associated with 
democratization process (Crystal 1995, Franke, Gawrich and 
Alakbarov 2009, Filetti 2012).   
 
Subsequently, for what concerns the third phase, after the 2008 
war between Russia and Georgia, Western pressure changed 
shape and structure. Integration into the European Union and 
NATO were no longer conceivable in the near future, as Moscow 
clearly demonstrated that it could take whatever means to avoid 
this possibility. After this event, Western leverage decreased 
sharply, as the United States proved to be inconsistent and 
incapable of defending the ‘beacon’ of democracy in the region. 
These developments went in conjunction with a renewed 
Russian presence in the region. On one side Moscow reaffirmed 
its leadership over the region with the new ‘Monroe doctrine’, 
on the other it proposed a new framework for regional 
integration – the Eurasian Union. Eventually, Armenia withdrew 
from the path toward the AA and joined the Eurasian Union. 
Speaking about Western Leverage and Linkage, this was one of 
the greatest setbacks for the West.  
 
Thus, Russia played a black knight role in some cases and 
especially since Putin came to power. Its role has been stronger 
in Armenia, where Moscow could play over Yerevan’s security 
problems. In the two other South Caucasian countries Russia 
had a lower impact, but it is regaining influence now thanks to 
its decisive role in frozen conflicts and its new soft-power efforts. 
Yet, one could ask the opposite question, such as ‘Why didn’t 
Russia manage to encapsulate all the three South Caucasian 
countries in its framework for regional integration?’. Despite 
being a very interesting and challenging question, I will leave 
this topic to another study.  
 
Therefore, it is possible to observe three different periodization 
with three different levels of Western pressure. The first one 
(from early nineties till early two thousands) was characterized 
by medium levels of leverage and low linkage; subsequently, 
(from early two thousand up to the August war in 2008) there 
was high leverage and linkage; finally, a third phase in which 
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Western leverage decreased while Western Linkage remained 
high. In terms of Western Pressure in each of the three South 
Caucasian countries, in Figure 3 I can provide a more detailed 
figure concerning the three different periodization. For every 
country I have signalled periods of different combinations of 
leverage and linkage concerning the main international 
developments sketched out so far. The years are just indicative 
and do not intend to be sharp reproductions of intangible 
phenomena. 
 
 Figure 3: Western Democratizing Pressure (author’s assessment on 
Levitsky and Way’s methodology) 
 
In the next chapter I am going to analyse the electoral 
management and mismanagement developments in the three 
South Caucasian countries. In order to do so, I am going to take 
into consideration the international factors that I presented in 
this chapter as main drivers for major changes.  
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Chapter 4: 
The Case of Georgia 
 
 
‘Don’t you know how these Westerners are?  
They will make a fuss [about electoral fraud] for a few days,  
and then they will calm down and life will go on as usual.’ 
– Eduard Shevardnadze, former President of Georgia 
Introduction 
The above quote from President Shevardnadze is emblematic as 
it depicts accurately the spirit of many post-Soviet leaders in 
young independent countries, such as Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, who were former officials of the USSR. Despite their 
government trying to establish new democratic institutions, 
those leaders remained sceptical about the West, which was 
perceived as an enemy, yet it was a necessary partner to 
overcome institutional and economic weaknesses.  
 
Indeed, Georgia was a new-born country that was striving for 
international recognition and for the creation of new networks 
and relations. As a matter of fact, the ‘insecurity of statehood 
within an ‘insecure neighbourhood’ (Legvold 2005:26), had 
affected the country since 1991. Moreover, Georgia’s harsh social 
and economy situation in the 1990s were at the same level as 
those of the 1950s, which inevitably influenced the choice of its 
new international partners (Jones and Kakhishvili 2013). There 
were not just economic issues at the basis of this decision. In the 
mid 1990s Georgia’s foreign policy agenda was dominated by 
territorial conflicts and tense relations with Russia over 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Tbilisi was therefore naturally 
keen to shift toward greater integration with the EU and NATO. 
In this sense, Shevardnadze’s decision to turn to the West was 
dictated by survival necessities rather than ‘a yearning for “a 
return” to Europe, so often cited by Georgian leaders’ (Jones and 
Kakhishvili 2013:16). However, as I sketched out in the previous 
chapter, the Western pressure over Georgia was not high during 
the 1990s as other important issues affected the regional 
scenario. Western countries shared the idea that somehow, once 
the communist structure of power fell, new or not-so-new states 
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would develop a pro-democratic consensus with just light 
pressure and advice from the West, in order to carry out political 
and economic reforms (Nodia and Tsevszadze 2003). Moreover, 
international actors were mostly preoccupied with finding a 
solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which Georgia was 
marginally involved.  
Shevardnadze and Low Western Leverage and Linkage 
When Shevardnadze returned to Georgia in 1992, he found a 
state that had yet to be consolidated. Georgia’s independence 
was one of the bloodiest in the former Soviet Union countries. In 
1989, in occasion of the Congress of People’s election, which 
were highly controlled by communist party officials (Slider, 
1997), an opposition movement peacefully displayed discontent; 
in the morning of the 9th April, Soviet troops violently repressed 
the sit-in in front of the government building, killing 20 
demonstrators. The political environment in Georgia became 
extremely radicalized and highly anti-Soviet, with a renewed 
chauvinistic fervour. In the specific political environment of the 
period, Gamsakhurdia was the best figure for driving the 
country out of the Soviet sphere: he was an intellectual who had 
struggled against the Sovietisation of Georgia and a human 
rights activist who had also been jailed during the USSR era. 
However, from early 1990 Georgia witnessed an escalation of 
violence among political, societal and ethnic actors. In particular, 
warlord criminal groups formed during the Soviet period played 
a major role in triggering violence in order to maintain vested 
interests and privileged positions within the country’s political 
establishment. Moreover, the nationalist outlook of 
Gamsakhurdia’s government exacerbated ethnic tensions and 
separatists’ claims in Abkhazia, Ajara and South Ossetia.  
 
Gasmakhurdia did not succeed in establishing domestic order 
and rooting out the warlords; he lacked the willingness to make 
political compromises and had an extremely polarized style of 
leadership which played a decisive role in his failure (Jawad, 
2012); moreover, some of his administration’s provisions proved 
to be counterproductive (such as the establishment of a National 
Guard, which became in turn another element of instability). The 
military coup took place on the 6th of January 1990; 
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Gamsakhurdia had to leave the country, and armed groups 
seized the power. At that time Jaba Ioselani and Tengiz Kitovani 
were the two strongest men in the country; they headed the two 
most important quasi-military organizations (respectively 
Mkhedrioni and National Guard) but they were rivals. Yet, they 
agreed to invite the former first secretary of the Georgian 
Communist Party Edward Shevardnadze back to Georgia to lead 
the new state.  
 
Upon his arrival Shevardnadze was appointed as speaker of the 
parliament, which was acting as President of the country. The 
institution and the provisions of the young Georgian state ‘were 
close to collaps[ing]’ (Jawad, 2012:144). Shevardnadze had to 
consolidate both his leadership and state institution while 
avoiding the re-kindling of the civil war and the separatist 
stances of some regions. In few years Shevardnadze was able to 
create a hybrid political regime that allowed ‘a certain space for 
civic and political freedoms but few conditions for genuine 
political competition and participation’ (Nodia and Scholtbach 
2006:12). What characterized Shevardnadze’s ruling style was 
the widespread web of patron-client relationship that became 
the central power of his presidency. According to Timm 
‘Shevardnadze has made extensive use of this kind of integration 
not solely to secure his own political power base but with the 
purpose of supporting a comprehensive state building process’ 
(Timm, 2012:170). These informal practices went hand in hand 
with formal structures in a neo-patrimonial logic. As a matter of 
fact, according to this mechanism ‘clientelism combined with 
formal state structures can be identified as the engine of neo-
patrimonial authority’ (Timm, 2012: 173). Administrative and 
political positions as well as public goods were the wares of the 
clientelist relationship; in this way clientelism acted as 
integrative capacity inasmuch the patron was performing a 
broker role for different social groups (Lemarchand, 1972). 
Thanks to these connections, Shevardnadze could launch his 
new party, the Georgian Citizens’ Union (CUG), which 
gravitated around his leadership. As a matter of fact, 
Shevardnadze was ‘the ultimate decision maker both within the 
State and within the CUG’ (Jawad, 2012:145). The party allowed 
him to maintain lively connections; it was a ‘broad church that 
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out of necessity would include most of the key players in 
Georgia’ (Weathley, 2010:359). Thus, thanks to this widespread 
party organisation, Shevardnadze was able to carry out large 
frauds and electoral malpractices while he was in power.20  
 
In terms of electoral management, as soon as the government 
was formed it started to work on electoral law. The process of 
creating a new electoral law was not organized, and during the 
working days there were not any officials with any electoral 
background or expertise that interfered with the drafting 
process. 21  In March 1992 the State Council approved a new 
electoral law. The brand new electoral system envisaged a single 
transferable vote that would ‘virtually guarantee representation 
by small parties and make it difficult for a party list headed by 
one prominent figure to take the lion’s share of seats’ (Slider 
1997:117). Over forty parties registered for this election and some 
of them gathered in a coalition. However, just few weeks before 
the election, political parties weren’t satisfied by the electoral 
law and sought to modify it. The last version, which was 
approved on August the 1st, envisaged the return to the single-
transferable vote system with a combination of single-member 
districts and proportional voting by party list (Slider 1997). In 
particular, 75 delegates were elected on the basis of the 
majoritarian system (from single mandate districts) and 150 
delegates were elected based on the proportional system (multi 
mandate districts). Regional representation was guaranteed 
since seats were allocated on a regional basis and there was not a 
national tally for each party; moreover, there just a 2% minimum 
threshold for entering the parliament (CEC Georgia 2010).  
 
The Georgian Central Electoral Commission (CEC) was 
established in 1990 for the first multiparty election, still under 
Soviet rule. It was not a standing commission, and it was 
assembled each time before an election. Only with the 1995 
Constitution did the CEC become a standing institution with 
permanent staff, but this did not improve the effectiveness and 
																																																								
20 Author’s interview with a former Georgian MP in Tbilisi (April 2015) 
21 Ibid. 
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independency of the institution. 22  Indeed, Shevardnadze’s 
clientelistic system wrapped the EMBs, which also affected the 
Georgian CEC23; in fact, the ruling party always succeeded in 
securing a decision-making majority at all levels of the election 
commission system (Usupashvili 2004). The CEC enjoyed a wide 
range of powers, including the authority to promulgate 
instructions and resolutions to clarify the law and adjudicate on 
complaints and appeals (OSCE/ODIHR 1999). The CEC was 
accused to contribute to carry out fraudulent activities during 
elections by some local NGOs.24  
 
The first parliamentary election under Shevardnadze was held in 
October 1992 with the aim of legitimizing the new government. 
At the time the electoral legislation therefore favored the 
development of small parties (Nodia and Tsevszadze 2003). As a 
result, 24 parties won seats in the Parliament. An amendment to 
the electoral law permitted the creation of a special post for 
Shevardnadze, who became chair of the parliament. In order to 
be elected in this position a candidate had to gather 5,000 
signatures and not be a member of any party. Nobody else 
eventually proposed candidatures and Shevardnadze won 
easily, with 96 per cent of the votes cast.  
 
Given the fact Georgia joined the CSCE in 1992 a small 
observation mission from the CSCE was invited to monitor the 
first election in the country. The findings of the mission report 
grave breaches of basic principles of electoral fairness and 
human right abuses especially against Gamsakhurdia’s 
supporters, including shootings, beatings and tortures against 
demonstrators (CSCE Georgia 1992). Moreover, voting 
procedures were still recalling Soviet elections’ style: ‘for voters, 
obtaining the ballots was easy, compared to filling them out. 
Upon arriving at the polling station, voters […] signed the 																																																								
22  Until 2003 political parties appointed all the CEC’s members. 
Subsequently the chairperson and five members were nominated by 
the President and elected by the Parliament, while political parties 
appointed the remaining seven. 
23 Author’s interview with Georgian CEC expert in Tbilisi (May 2015)  
24 Author’s interview with Georgian Young Lawyer Association (GYLA) 
in Tbilisi (May 2015) 
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voters’ list and received three ballots […]. One was entitled 
“Elections for the Chairman of the Parliament of the Georgian 
Republic.” Those wishing to vote for Eduard Shevardnadze were 
to circle the number “1” next to his name; those against him 
were to cross out his name. There was no separate box or space 
to mark if the answer was negative.’ (CSCE Georgia 1992:12). 
Moreover, were several reports of people voting at the same time 
in a voting booth (another leftover of the Soviet time). Therefore, 
the CSCE report concludes that the ‘October 11 vote was more a 
sort of referendum on Shevardnadze than a parliamentary 
election’ (CSCE Georgia 1992:16).  
 
Soon after the parliamentary elections, the parliament organized 
the committee to write a draft for the new Georgian 
Constitution. This process led to the adoption of a constitutional 
framework that was neither inclusive nor accountable (Roeder 
2001). At the moment of writing, one of the most important 
issues is that drafters wanted to get rid off the Soviet heritage in 
the country’s legal framework and started to look to western 
experiences in order to find possible examples. Therefore, the 
final draft was a ‘Georgian version’ of a mix (or a collage) of 
disparate western constitutions. 25  Indeed, some international 
consultant participated in the drafting of the constitution, such 
as the American Bar Association, the Council of Europe, the 
National Democratic Institute from the US and parliamentary 
experts from France, Hungary, Poland and Canada. A first 
version of this draft was submitted to the Venice Commission, 
which overall endorsed the project (Venice Commission 1994). 
Yet, according to some observers the final version of the 
Georgian constitution was then reviewed and modified by 
Shevardnadze himself, before sending it to the Parliament. 26 
Moreover, Shevardnadze threatened to call a referendum if the 
legislature did not approve the draft. Eventually the constitution 
was ratified on August 24th 1995. Meanwhile a new electoral law 
was approved, just before the upcoming parliamentary election 
to be scheduled in November 1995. The adoption of the 																																																								
25 Author’s interview with Khatuna Gogorishvili, Tbilisi (May 2015) 
26 Author’s interview with legal expert from Eurasia Partnership, Tbilisi 
(April 2015) 
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Constitution sealed the consolidation of Shevardnadze regime, 
which after three years could stabilize the country from an 
institutional point of view (Nodia and Tsevdzadze 2003) 
 
Nevertheless, western actors welcomed the adoption of the 
Constitution and of the electoral law. In fact, despite some rough 
patches, Georgian democratic developments were seen as one of 
the best records in the former USSR (Economist Intelligence Unit 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 1996). Moreover, Tbilisi was in 
the process of tightening ties with the European Union as in 
October 1995 Georgian foreign minister Irakli Menagarishvili, 
and the head of a 15-member EU delegation signed an interim 
trade agreement, which paved the way for the subsequent 
signature of the Partnership and Association Agreement with 
the EU, which contained principles concerning the respect of 
human rights and democracy. Meanwhile, Tbilisi was also 
striving to join the World Trade Organization rather than the CIS 
Custom Union. Therefore, during those years, Western pressure 
was mounting even if it was not fully consistent insofar it was 
tolerating Shevardnadze’s ruling style in light of its foreign 
policy orientations. 
 
New presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 
November 1995, and they saw an overwhelming victory by 
Shevardnadze and his party. The former was elected President 
with more than 74% of votes, the latter saw Shevardnadze’s 
supporter winning the majority of the seats (CUG plus other 
parties such as the Georgian Greens). These elections suffered 
from many shortcomings, even before the beginning of the 
electoral campaign, the electoral framework was amended 
several time creating confusion and doubts over the electoral 
process (Allison 1996). Moreover, in August 1995 there was an 
assassination attempt to President Shevardnadze, which was 
followed by a crackdown on some opposition leaders and 
groups. In addition, authorities carried out serious violations of 
the electoral integrity process arresting and sentencing 
opposition leaders for political purposes (Economist Intelligence 
Unit Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 1996). Nevertheless, 
Georgian authorities invited foreign election observation 
delegations in order to monitor the electoral process. The OSCE 
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final report attests that the conduction of the election improved 
substantially since the last scrutiny and that it was well managed 
(OSCE Georgia 1996). However, the imprisonments of 
opposition leaders following the presidential assassination 
attempts ‘did reduce the opposition voice in the pre-election 
period’ (OSCE Georgia 1996:1).  
 
After the election the Georgian electoral framework continued to 
develop. The parliament adopted the Law on Political 
Associations of Citizens (approved in 1997), which specified how 
political parties and candidates could register to stand for 
election and set the minimum age for candidacy as long as 
guaranteed freedom of association and the right to create 
political parties. In terms of fraudulent conduct, the Criminal 
Code (adopted in 1999) recognized five articles regarding 
electoral conducts27 but none of these specified any penalties for 
multiple-voting acts, which was considered an ‘important 
legislative omission’ (OSCE/ODIHR 1999:4). Overall, the 
international community endorsed these new acts, however 
there were some relevant shortcomings that could hinder the 
fairness and inclusiveness of the electoral process. In particular, 
according to OSCE/ODIHR experts ‘the law remains vague 
regarding a number of important issues, e.g. what are the 
modalities to “ensure the creation of equal conditions during the 
election campaign for all parties, election blocs and candidates 
participating in the elections” (Art.22.2.m); there are no 
provisions to guarantee that observers and proxies are allowed 
to follow precinct election results during the process of vote 
tabulation at the District Election Commission (DEC) and CEC 
levels and to ensure full transparency at this crucial stage of the 
election process’ (OSCE/ODIHR 1999:5-6).  
 																																																								
27 In relation to illegal interference with meetings and demonstrations 
(Article 164), obstructing the right of a citizen to participate in an 
election or referendum (Article 165), interference with the activities of 
election commissions (Article 166), deliberate violation of the secrecy of 
the ballot, falsification of elections, deliberate incorrect calculation of 
votes or results (Article 167), illegal interference with the creation or 
activities or a party or union by violence or threat (Article 169). 
(OSCE/ODIHR 1999:4) 
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The subsequent parliamentary elections, the third since 
Georgia’s independence, were held in 1999. The president’s 
party, the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG), won a decisive 
victory in the election on October 31st; the CUG won 85 seats, the 
main opposition grouping, the Union for Democratic Revival 
(UDR), gained 51. Despite the fact that international observers 
judged the election as a step forward toward international 
standards, the election process ‘failed to fully meet all 
commitments’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 1999:1). As a matter of 
facts, the electoral campaign was marred by some serious 
violations of electoral integrity principles, with some instances of 
intimidation and violence (such as the stabbing and shooting of 
opposition party members, and the burning of opposition 
candidate’s offices). Moreover, law enforcement officers used the 
former Soviet Administrative Code in a questionable manner in 
an attempt to limit the campaign activity of the opposition 
parties.28 Other malfeasances concerned the dominant position of 
the CUG, which could dispose of much more media coverage 
and by a privileged position to use administrative resources. 
Finally, on the Election Day, observers reported many 
irregularities, which included ballot-box stuffing, group and 
family voting, Armenian carousel29. Subsequently, other serious 																																																								
28 Several buses belonging to the Revival Party were impounded on 11 
October. The original reason given for incident was fear of 
contamination through contravention of veterinary regulations, despite 
the fact that the buses did not contain any livestock or produce. Article 
120, used to impound the buses, provided only for financial penalties 
rather than restricting movement. (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 1999:19) 
29 Armenian carousel is an electoral malpractice that consists of buses load 
of people that turn from one polling station to the next one in order to 
vote multiple times. According to some, it has been firstly introduced 
under Kocharyan’s regime (1998-2008) in Armenia. It must not be 
confused with ‘carousel voting’ that is a method of illegally influencing 
the vote of an individual. A ballot form is illegally procured and 
marked with the desirable candidate’s name or the party. The marked 
ballot is given to a voter. The voter obtains a regular ballot in the 
precinct where he/she is registered and proceeds to cast his ballot. 
Instead of casting the regular ballot, the voter casts the marked ballot 
provided illegally. The voter then returns the unmarked regular ballot 
to the person providing the marked ballot and the process is repeated 
with another voter. 
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violations of the electoral integrity principles were observed in 
the post-election phase, in particular concerning tampering of 
electoral results’ protocols.  
 
However, thanks to the electoral code reforms conducted before 
this scrutiny, the legal framework was ‘sufficient to conduct 
genuine multiparty elections if applied in a non-selective and 
transparent manner’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 1999:1). Yet, 
‘regrettably, some of the activities of the election administration 
lacked transparency and the CEC failed to achieve a broad 
consensus in its decision making’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 
1991:2). Therefore, for the first time since the first election, it is 
now possible to observe a growing gap between the legal 
framework and its implementation. Indeed, if on one side 
Shevardnadze’s administration was looking into a broader 
inclusion in the Western international organization, on the other 
side he did not want to fully transform Georgia into a working 
democratic country. In other words, Shevardnadze’s 
administration was wracked by the necessity to please the West, 
demonstrating commitment to electoral integrity principles and 
at the same time to preserve its political machine.30  
 
The same dichotomy between a sufficient formal legal 
framework and the shortcomings in its implementation was 
observed during the 2000 presidential election. The 
OSCE/ODIHR mission concluded that ‘fundamental freedoms 
were generally respected during the election campaign and 
candidates were able to express their views. However, further 
progress is necessary for Georgia to fully meet its commitments 
as a participating State of the OSCE. In particular, problems were 
identified in the following areas: the interference by State 
authorities in the election process; deficient election legislation; 
not fully representative election administration; and unreliable 
voter registers.’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 2000:1). In this election, 
which was marred also by serious frauds – in particular on the 
Election Day (ballot box stuffing) and during votes counting, 
																																																								
30 Author’s interview with former Georgian MP in Tbilisi (April and 
May 2015) 
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Shevardnadze could confirm the presidency with over 82% of 
the votes.  
 
Subsequently the legal framework ruling the election was 
amended and reformed several times, especially thanks to the 
prospect of further scrutiny in the future.31 In August 2001 the 
parliament passed a comprehensive United Electoral Code 
(UEC) in order to harmonize the legal framework of the 
elections. This adoption was seen as ‘a major and important step 
forward in securing democratic standards for elections for 
representative government in Georgia’ (Venice Commission 
2002:9). However, the UEC was subsequently and repeatedly 
amended so that ‘the text of the law is very extensive and 
complex and involves risks of serious problems arising during 
its application’ (Venice Commission 2003:3). As a matter of fact, 
according to both international and local electoral experts the 
UEC was over-regulating the scrutiny, which could lead to 
misinterpretations or inconsistent implementations32. 
The Years of High Western Pressure 
The incapacity of Shevardnadze’s administration to fully 
establish a democratic regime as well, as the accusation of being 
at the top of a corruptive system, had some consequences at the 
international level. Indeed, since early 2000s Western actors 
started to gradually take distances from Shevardnadze and, at 
the same time, increasing pressure over the regime. Before the 
beginning of the 2003 parliamentary elections’ campaign, the 
American government, through its Ambassador to Georgia 
Richard Miles and the special emissary from the Bush 
Administration James Baker (who visited the country in the 
summer 2003), called for real democratic elections and 
encouraged the inclusion of civil society groups in the electoral 
process33 and the conduction of parallel voting tabulation. These 																																																								
31 17 October 1997, 3 March 1999, 25 June 1999 and 20 July 1999 
32 Author’s interview in Tbilisi (April and May 2015) 
33 It has been estimated that by 2000 there were 3,000 registered civil 
society organizations in Georgia, with both the United States and the 
Open Society Institute. The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) funded important organizations such as ISFED, 
the Eurasia Foundation, Horizonty, the International Republican 
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provisions could challenge the government capacity to rig 
parliamentary elections (Macfarlane 2009). As a matter of fact, 
the lack of political will to fully implement the electoral legal 
framework (Usupashvili 2004) was one of the factors that 
determined the outbreak of the Rose Revolutions (Levitsky and 
Way 2010).  
 
The OSCE/ODIHR mission observed a worsening of the 
electoral management in the country and concluded that the 
election ‘fell short of a number of OSCE commitments and other 
international standards for democratic elections’ (OSCE/ODIHR 
Georgia 2003:1). Shevardnadze’s administration recurred to a 
higher amount of electoral malfeasances because he was 
suffering from many defections within its party. Since the early 
2000s, because of growing intraparty discontent, which 
provoked a split between ‘reformist’ and the rest of the party 
(Nodia and Tsevsdzadze 2003) as well as international pressure, 
some elites started to distance themselves from Shevardnadze, 
showing that his system was no more efficient and united. In 
this scenario, the electoral uncertainty increased and in order to 
cope with it authorities had to carry out far more fraudulent 
activities. However, this inaccuracy about the possible 
consequences demonstrated that Shevardnadze did not have a 
real understanding of the importance of the elections as an 
institution; rather he conceived them as ‘a sideshow’ (Bunce and 
Wolchik 2011:163). Due to this understanding Shevardnadze 
went beyond what was acceptable in terms of electoral 
malfeasances and tried to totally dismantle the barrier of the 
electoral integrity. This attempt proved to be disastrous, as by 
Georgia 2003 was included in several Western organizations and 
had signed new bilateral agreements with tutelage of democratic 
principles. Shevardnadze did not realize that the international 
structure in which Georgia was inserted had changed.   
 
The West was no longer able to tolerate a further deterioration of 
the electoral integrity in Georgia and the choice by 																																																																																																																									
Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, and through the work 
of these organizations made significant contributions to political 
change in Georgia. (Bunce and Wolchik 2011:162). 
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Shevardnadze’s administration to increase electoral 
malfeasances was firmly condemned by the international 
observers. The OSCE/ODIHR mission published a very harsh 
preliminary report over the conduction of the parliamentary 
election. The preliminary report, published the day after the 
election, begins with a laconic sentence: ‘[t]he 2 November 
parliamentary elections in Georgia fell short of a number of 
OSCE commitments and other international standards for 
democratic elections. Inaccuracies in the voter list seriously 
challenged the fundamental guarantee of universal and equal 
suffrage, and lessened voters’ confidence in the State 
administration.’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia Preliminary 2003:1). 
Moreover, the diffusion of the results of the parallel vote 
tabulation showed that the opposition party led by Mikhail 
Saakashvili – the National Movement – scored higher than 
Shevardnadze’s party, whereas the official results were claiming 
the opposite.34 These conclusions produced great consequences 
both domestically and internationally, with ‘clear signs of “state 
capture" appeared’ (Gegeshidze, 2011:32). The United States and 
the European Union became very active in pressuring the 
government because to get rid of Shevardnadze was a matter ‘of 
short-term politics’ (Bunce and Wolchik 2011:163). Georgia came 
under the spotlights of international attention and the 
government was suffering from both Western and domestic 
pressures. These events led to the dismissal of Shevardnadze 
and the system he was responsible for implementing.  
 
The Rose Revolution has been analysed from many standpoints, 
last but not least by the body of literature concerned with 
diffusionism (Beissinger 2007 Bunce and Wolchik 2011). It was 
connected by other electoral revolutions that took place from the 
late-1990s in different post-Soviet countries. For the sake of the 
argument my aim is not to provide an alternative explanation 
about those events. Rather, my concern is to focus on the 
increasing Western pressure over Georgia and the 
Shevardnadze’s administration. Of course, there are plenty of 																																																								
34 Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) assigned to the National Movement 
26,6% and to the For a New Georgia (a coalition supporting 
Shevardnadze) 18,9. Official results assigned to the National Movement 
18.08% and to the For a New Georgia 21,3 (source: Welt 2010). 
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elements that played a role in the successful outcome of that 
revolution, even included the fact that many policemen 
guarding the Parliament did not receive their salary regularly. 
Therefore, in order to find causal patterns one can always posit 
her/his attention to macro or micro factors. Yet, the scope of this 
section is not to explain regime change, rather to evaluate the 
level of Western pressure over the country. 
 
As I affirmed in the previous chapter, the Rose Revolution 
highlighted the fact that the West’s interest increased and that it 
was able to unite and coordinate the pressure over the 
government. Saakashvili had to provide signals both at the 
international and domestic levels concerning his willingness to 
democratize the country. Soon after he seized power, Saakashvili 
promised a huge set of reforms and called for new elections to 
legitimize his new role. Therefore, the expectations were very 
high; as I presented in the previous chapter, at the international 
level this election could really signal a new hope for the country 
and for this region in the post-Soviet space that was limping in 
the process of democratization.  
 
After the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili soon called for new 
extraordinary presidential elections. The Western leverage was 
very high and so were international expectations concerning the 
new political elite in the country. At the same time the 
population expected a real change. The public’s participation in 
these “new turn” elections was massive, with over 80% turnout. 
As a matter of fact, the OSCE/ODIHR mission reported that ‘In 
contrast to the 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections that 
were characterized by systematic and widespread fraud, the 
authorities generally displayed the collective political will to 
conduct a more genuine democratic election process’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 2004:1). The election was the most 
transparent since the election of President Shevardnadze in 1995, 
which ‘restored public trust in the electoral system’ (Jones 
2005:307). Saakashvili was elected president with 96% of the 
preferences and his impressive victory was largely due to the 
absence of realistic opposition candidates. In terms of frauds and 
malpractices there were a number of relatively minor problems, 
such as local government officials encouraging support for the 
	 127	
new ‘establishment’ coalition (the National Movement-United 
Democrats bloc), inadequate verification of voters, opaque 
counting processes, and some ballot stuffing (OSCE/ODIHR 
Georgia 2004a, Jones 2005). This election was not a real test for 
Saakashvil’s democratic intentions as the scrutiny was organized 
under special circumstances, which followed the revolution. 
 
The following parliamentary election scheduled for March 2004 
provided with a better idea of the electoral integrity during the 
first period of Saakashvili government. Yet, this election suffered 
mostly from the almost total absence of real opposition parties 
that could challenge the re-named National Movement (NM) – 
Democratic bloc, which were decimated or suffered from low 
level of legitimation after the Rose Revolution. Due to this factor, 
the NM gained 135 of 150 seats, changing definitively the 
political landscape in Georgia. The OSCE/ODIHR sent again a 
huge observation mission to monitor the election (more than 400 
observers). In the final report, OSCE/ODIHR’s experts discloses 
the unattended expectations ‘future elections will be more 
genuine indicators of Georgia’s commitment to democratic 
elections’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 2004b:1). The assessment was 
more based on the observation of electoral malpractices rather 
than of frauds. In particular, the OSCE/ODIHR report identified 
some key issues of concern: first, the continuing lack of a clear 
separation between State administration and political party 
structures, and the ongoing potential for the misuse of State 
administrative resources. Second, the inability to ensure the 
balanced composition of election commissions at all levels. 
Third, the interference by some local authorities in the 
functioning of a number of lower-level commissions, thereby 
lessening their independence (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 2004b:3). 
According to the anecdotal evidence that I gathered during my 
field research in Georgia, Saakashvili tried to alter and 
manipulate electoral integrity through a different mix of 
malpractices, in order to elude international criticism. 35 I am 
going to analyze in more detail this tendency in the paragraph 
concerning learning mechanisms.  
 																																																								
35 Author’s interviews with electoral experts in Tbilisi (May 2015). 
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The extraordinarily Presidential elections in January 2004 and 
Parliamentary, in March of the same year, were ruled by the 
UEC slightly amended. Even the CEC model remained 
unchanged. Yet, soon after the revolution, in early December 
2003, the interim president and speaker of the Parliament, Nino 
Burjanadze, replaced the five members appointed by President 
Shevardnadze in August and the chairperson of the CEC. The 
replacement took place even at the lower-level commissions. For 
example, in 49 districts, the District Electoral Commission (DEC) 
chairs formally resigned and a total of 339 DEC members were 
dismissed, not always voluntarily (OSCE 2004). The new CEC’s 
president Zurab Chiaberashvili was the former Executive 
Director of the International Society for Fair Elections and 
Democracy and an active observer during the 2003 elections. His 
appointment was a signal for local and international observers 
about Saakashvili’s willingness to democratize. Yet, the general 
composition of the CEC was not fair and it was unbalanced. 
Thus the conductions of the first two elections in a renowned 
political context did not sort out the expected results by 
democratic stakeholders.  
 
After these elections Saakashvili started immediately to 
implement many reforms in several sectors and changed the 
1995 Constitution. Indeed, until 2004 Georgia was a presidential 
republic in which the head of state was also the executive and 
had no right to dissolve Parliament. Saakashvili sought to 
change the system and he eventually was able to create a cabinet 
of ministers and the post of Prime Minister while at the same 
time giving the President the right to dissolve the legislature, 
and deprive the parliament of the power to amend the budget or 
to question the government’s annual report on budgetary 
obligations. It could be argued that Saakashvili created a 
‘superpresidentialist’ regime (Areshidze, 2008). International 
observer soon criticised the choice as ‘the new constitutional 
arrangements led to a greater concentration of authority in the 
hands of the President at the expense of a balance of powers’ 
(IDEA 2005:5). Moreover, Saakashvili’s administration started to 
modify the electoral legal framework in order to secure power 
(Jobelius 2011). The electoral law was amended several times in 
the intra-election period between 2004 and 2008.  In particular, 
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the parliament modified the relationship between majority and 
proportional representation six times, always in favor of the 
ruling party UNM (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008). Moreover, 
even the CEC was substantially reformed: the seven CEC 
members were professionals appointed by the parliament and 
nominated by the President. However, in 2007, following 
international advice by the Council of Europe and the Venice 
Commission the seven political parties represented in the 
parliament re-attained the possibility of having a representative 
in the CEC (parties which are represented by a faction in the 
current Parliament or received at least 4 per cent of the vote 
during the previous parliamentary elections). Thus, the new 
CEC had 13 members (professional members’ posts were 
reduced from 6 to 5). However, the members within the CEC 
were not considered at the same level and some of them were 
often excluded from the decision making process,36 creating a de 
facto subgroup in the core of the CEC. This symbolizes the fact 
that Saakashvili was particularly sensitive to Western leverage. 
Yet, he was able to find new ways to elude the guidelines 
(barriers) concerning good-management of electoral practices.  
 
Finally, the government seized its power over many media 
outlets, including Rustavi 2, which proved to be a determinant 
player in the demise of the Shevardnadze government. The 
freedom of the media decreased abruptly over the course of a 
few years and Transparency International published a report 
claiming that the Georgian media landscape was less free and 
pluralistic during the Saakashvili’s years than before the Rose 
Revolution (Transparency International Georgia 2009). 
Academic literature subsequently highlighted how Georgia was 
not actually taking the necessary steps toward democracy, but 
instead it was heading toward some forms of authoritarianism 
(Arakelian and Nodia 2005, Dolidze 2007, Levitsky and Way 
2010); according to some analysts (Fairbanks and Gugushvili 
2013, Filippini 2005, Di Quirico 2013), Russian presidential 
model would have inspired Saakashvili constitutional reform.  
 
																																																								
36 Author’s interview with a former CEC member (Tbilisi, May 2015). 
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Meanwhile Saakashvili continued to please the West through his 
discourse aimed at reassuring both the West and an his domestic 
population about his willingness to modernize and democratize 
the country (Jobelius 2011). The Bush administration granted its 
endorsement to Saakashvili and the President of the United 
States accomplished a historic visit to Tbilisi in May 2005, where 
he pronounced his discourse concerning Georgia as a “beacon of 
democracy”. For Saakashvili, this was one of his highest 
moments of his foreign policy. For the President of Georgia, 
NATO was the first foreign policy objective whereas the 
European Union was a longer-term project (Khidasheli 2010). It 
was easier for Saakashvili to combine his domestic political 
project within NATO integration, as it did not envisage any kind 
of conditionality in terms of democratic development. 37 
Moreover, since its independence Georgia had suffered from a 
constant sense of insecurity (Nodia 2005), which could have been 
overcome only through a defensive framework such as NATO. 
Whereas, the European Commission could not grant any form of 
defensive framework, and in addition it was pressuring Georgia 
for to fully implement international standards in many sectors, 
including elections. This is evident in the European Commission 
Communication of December 2008, where it was clearly affirmed 
that ‘a sufficient level of progress in terms of democracy, the rule 
of law and human rights, and in particular evidence that the 
electoral legislative framework and practice are in compliance 
with international standards, and full cooperation with the 
Council of Europe, OSCE/ODIHR and human rights bodies will 
be a precondition for starting negotiations and for deepening 
relations thereafter’ (European Commission 2008:4). Therefore, 
since the parliamentary election in 2004 the Western pressure 
was no longer united and held different objectives, which 
allowed Saakashvili to gain some margins to carry out his 
controversial reforms.  
 
However, Saakashvili’s government faced a first massive 
domestic political crisis in the fall of 2007, when part of the 
Georgian population started to manifest openly against the lack 
of representation within the state apparatus. As a matter of fact, 																																																								
37 Author’s interview with IR scholar in Tbilisi (May 2015). 
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one of the main failures of the Saakashvili administration was 
the population’s impossibility to participate in the political 
sphere, even at local level (Jawad, 2008). This triggered the 
feelings of powerless and betrayal among the population 
excluded by the Saakashvili’s political machine. The crisis was 
initiated by the arrest of a former member of the government, 
Irakli Okruashvili, on the 28th of September 2007, who had just 
announced the creation of an opposition party (Movement of 
United Georgia) few days earlier. Mr. Okruashvili was detained 
with several charges concerning his period in office as Minister 
of Defense; in response to this, many members of parliament 
passed to the opposition’s seats inflating the ranks of the 
Movement of United Georgia. This political group (as it never 
registered as political party) organized one of the largest 
demonstrations in contemporary Georgia, which ended up in 
violent clashes with police. The government declared the state of 
emergency and some opposition media were closed down. 
Saakashvili explained that he had to crack down on protests and 
adopt the state of emergency because according to him there was 
the peril of a Russian backed coup. 38  The international 
community promptly reacted with unity against the government 
crackdown on protests and media: NATO, OSCE, the EU, 
Council of Europe and Western governments all expressed 
serious concerns and called for lifting the emergency and 
reopening media outlets (Gegeshidze 2011). The day after the 
declaration of the state of emergency, Saakashvili called a snap 
presidential election for January 5, 2008. With this decision, he 
was able to calm down domestic and external pressure (New 
York Times 9/11/2007), but at the same time he did not give the 
opportunity to the opponents to fully prepare for the political 
campaign (Freedom House Georgia 2008). 
 
The extraordinary Presidential election on 5 January 2008 was a 
real test for Saakashvili’s grip on the country. The 
OSCE/ODIHR sent a huge observation mission composed by 
almost 500 observers. According to both domestic and 
international observers, this election was a great improvement 																																																								
38  ‘Georgian President Addresses Nation after Unrest in Tbilisi’, 7 
November 2007, Rustavi-2 TV, BBC Monitoring. 
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for Georgian democracy:  OSCE/ODIHR wrote that ‘this election 
represented the first genuinely competitive post-independence 
presidential election’ (OSCE/ODIHR 2008b:1). Saakashvili won 
with 53,3% of the vote, allowing the incumbent to avoid a second 
round. Yet there were some shortcomings, including the fact that 
the UEC was amended several times just few weeks before the 
elections (a practice against the electoral integrity). One of the 
most relevant modifications to the UEC concerning presidential 
elections was the abolishment of one-third turnout for second 
round to be valid. Nevertheless, according to some opposition 
candidates there were alleged malpractices therefore they 
claimed the elections to be unfair and did not accept the results 
(Freedom House 2009 – Georgia).  
 
In this political environment, the opposition parties pressurized 
the government in order to anticipate the Parliamentary 
elections, which eventually were rescheduled from November to 
May 2008. The Western leverage was still very high and the 
OSCE/ODIHR sent an observation mission with more than 550 
observers. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM assessed ‘compliance of the 
election process with OSCE commitments, other international 
standards and domestic legislation’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 
2008b:1). Yet, the IEOM ‘identified a number of problems which 
made this implementation uneven and incomplete’ (ibid). As a 
matter of fact, one of the greatest sources of criticism was the fact 
that in the run up of the scrutiny, the UNM amended the 
Constitution and was able to generate more changes in the UEC 
than in the previous elections. The Constitutional amendment 
increased the number of majoritarian MPs who would be elected 
in single-mandate constituencies from 50 to 75 and reduced the 
number of MPs elected through the proportional system from 
100 to 75. According to Areshidze, this move signaled that ‘the 
UNM was losing confidence in its performance in the 
proportional party-list vote but felt that it could lure local power 
brokers into standing in single-mandate constituencies under the 
UNM party banner’ (Areshidze, 2008:161). The UNM claimed 
that it pushed for this reform because it thought the electoral 
system was ineffective, and thus a more district representation 
was required. Yet, the Georgian constitution did not make this 
difference, all MPs are elected as national representatives and 
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legislators, not representatives of their districts (Transparency 
International Georgia 2008). The UNM and Saakashvili approach 
to electoral affairs ‘amendments to the electoral system had 
created a situation in which there was no consensus between the 
government and the opposition about the rules of political 
competition’ (Areshidze 2008:162). The election’s results were 
strongly in favor the UNM, which conquered 119 over 150 seats 
(reaching almost 60% of preferences). Again there were some 
elected members of the parliament who contested the way the 
government managed the elections and they decided to boycott 
the parliament. 
 
Soon after the election, the government had the opportunity to 
launch a huge set of reforms that radically altered the 
constitution, and which would transform the country from a 
presidential to a parliamentarian system. According to the new 
regulations, the prime minister had exclusive influence on the 
composition of the cabinet, and also on the appointment of 
regional governors. The head of government had also the right 
to countersign presidential decrees. Despite the fact that the 
international community endorsed these reforms, the reforms 
should be seen as Saakashvili’s attempt to keep the power. 
Indeed, the incumbent could not run for another term as 
President, but could run for the post of prime minister, in a 
political shuffle that recalls ‘Putinism’ (Gono 2010, Fairbanks 
and Gugushvili 2013). On 15 October 2010 the Georgian 
Parliament finally accepted the amendments to transform the 
political system. These new provisions had to enter into force in 
October 2013, after the Presidential election.  
A New Regional Equilibrium 
In this thesis I am not going to delve in the dynamics of the war 
with Russia in August 2008, since there are several other 
analyses on it (Nygren 2011, Krastev 2009, De Wall 2013, Boden 
2011, Nodia 2012). Nevertheless, for the sake of the argument it 
is important to consider some aspects. The war with Russia was 
a ‘moment of truth’ (Nodia 2012: 724) for Georgia, for the region 
(Kakachia 2009), but even for the broader international system’s 
equilibrium. First of all, what changed after the August war was 
Georgia’s perspective to be integrated into a Western security 
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structure. Secondly, it was blatant that Russia was prepared to 
use force to safeguard its interests in neighboring regions. As 
Nodia reports, ‘The August war […] constituted an open 
challenge to the most powerful bloc of countries, loosely referred 
to as the international community.’ (Nodia 2012:724 – italic added). 
Russia decided to actively stand out of the international 
community (the oligarchy for Betrand Badie – 2011), contesting its 
absolute role of international legitimacy manager. Thirdly, the 
West, and in particular the United States, did not come to defend 
Georgia when Russian troops invaded the country. Saakashvili 
believed that his allies in European capitals or Washington 
would have sustained him (De Wall 2013). In particular, his 
‘friend’ George W. Bush, whose administration eventually 
managed to avoid Russia’s troops entering Tbilisi.  
 
These developments had some repercussions on Western 
leverage and linkage, as it was clear that Georgia’s chances to 
continue its path toward NATO’s integration were effectively 
zero.39 Moreover, Saakashvili realized that his country could not 
rely anymore on the United States for the quest of security. This 
is one of the reasons why the war enhanced the profile of the 
European Union in the region (Nodia 2012), which became a key 
actor in mediating between Russia and Georgia during the war 
(Forsberg and Seppo 2011) and eventually led the monitoring 
mission (the European Union Monitoring Missions –EUMM) to 
the borders of the two breakaway regions (South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia). Moreover, in a speech by Bettina Ferrero-Waldner, 
the European Commissioner for External Relations to the 
European Parliament, after the extraordinary European Council 
that followed the August War, claimed that ‘Il est important que 
l'Union se montre prête à apporter un soutien réel à la Géorgie, 
correspondant à notre détermination politique d'approfondir 
nos relations’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2008). Less than a year after the 
conflict the European Union firmly strengthen its position in the 
country (Kakachia 2009), with the clear idea to foster deeper 
integration with the region. Thus, the Western leverage and 																																																								
39 This became evident during the NATO summit in December 2008, 
where Georgia was not offered with any type of membership 
perspective (Nygren 2011). 
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linkage changed after the August war. The United States lost its 
prominent position and the European Union gained new 
leverage in the country. 
 
From a domestic standpoint, the war helped the government in 
two ways: on the one hand to regain popular support and on the 
other to continue consolidating a strong executive. As a matter of 
fact the war with Russia was not a major source of instability for 
the government per se; taking into consideration data from 
Caucasus Barometer concerning “trust in the president” it shows 
that since 2008 the percentage of people that trusted or fully 
trusted the president was constantly rising till 2012.40 According 
to Nodia, ‘save for the separatist regions, the results of the war 
were not as dramatic as the initial shock had suggested’ (Nodia, 
2012: 723). Additionally, the invasion of Georgia by Russian 
troops reinvigorated Western support for the regime, both 
financially and politically. This huge assistance (4.5 billion 
dollars) had also mitigated the effects of the global economic 
crisis (Gegeshidze 2011, Papava 2012). Saakashvili’s grip over 
the country at the end of the 2008 was stronger than the year 
before.  
 
In the following years, Saakashvili pursued his reforming 
projects aimed to transform the presidency for a greatly 
empowered premiership and remain in charge once his second 
and final term would have expired in 2013. In order to carry out 
this reform the Constitution had to be changed. The 
amendments would endow the new post of prime minister with 
significant new powers in foreign and domestic policy and make 
him ‘a de facto chief executive’ (Grono 2010:2), at the expense of 
the president, who would retain the role of the head of state. 
According to the new regulations, the prime minister would 
have the exclusive influence on the composition of the cabinet, 
and also on the appointment of regional governors. This reform, 
was harshly criticized by opposition parties, who did not 
collaborate to the reform. But the reform was welcomed by the 																																																								
40 Figures concerning people trusting and fully trusting the president 
(total) 2008: 51%; in 2009: 48; in 2010: 56%; in 2011: 58% (data from 
Caucasus barometer).  
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Venice Commission, which stated that it ‘provide for several 
important improvements and significant steps in the right 
direction […] nevertheless it would be desirable to further 
strengthen the powers of parliament’ (Civil.ge 18/10/2010). The 
parliament passed the amendments on the 15th of October 2010, 
and entered into force upon the inauguration of the next 
president, who was scheduled for October 2013.  
 
The other reforms conducted by Saakashvili were not considered 
to be inclusive or accurate. For example, the judicial reform did 
not change both popular and experts’ perceptions about judges’ 
independence (Gegeshidze 2011, MacFarlane 2011). Other 
sources of concern came from the constrained freedom of the 
media sector, state power’s abuses and limited civil oversight of 
the government by the parliament (see MacFarlane 2011). For 
these reasons, during the years prior to the 2012 elections, 
Georgia’s political scene polarized as opposition parties did not 
recognize the 2008 parliamentary election’s results. Civic 
movements and opposition political parties organized several 
huge demonstrations in 2009 and 2011, which called for 
Saakashvili’s resignation. These times Saakashvili, aware of 
international criticism for his choice to violently repress the 2007 
demonstrations, did not recur to extreme violent measures to 
cope with the protesters.41 
 
In the run up of the parliamentary election, the Parliament 
adopted a New Election Code in 2011. This new code, despite 
addressing some of the recommendations made by the OSCE, 
the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission (see OSCE, 
Council of Europe and Venice Commission 2011), still had 
several important but unaddressed issues. One of the most 
important was the discrepancy among electoral districts in terms 
of population and the number of MPs elected, which 
dramatically altered representation percentages. For what 
concerns the CEC, the reform reduced the competencies of the 																																																								
41 For example during the 2009 demonstrations, Saakashvili preferred to 
isolate the demonstrators, which were stationing on Rustaveli Avenue 
(one of the main roads in Tbilisi). After some weeks, protests decreased 
as many citizens started blaming them for causing high problems to the 
city’s traffic circulation.   
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EMB, for example the CEC was not more responsible for 
managing voter lists, and for media and campaign finance 
monitoring (other institutions became entitled: e.g. the brand 
new Commission for Ensuring the Accuracy of the Voter Lists). 
According to both domestic and international observers42, this 
reform allowed for a better management of the elections; since 
that time the CEC became competent and professional. 
 
The 2012 parliamentary election’s political campaign was 
characterized by different elements, which contributed to hider 
Saakashvili’s project to swap the presidency to the premiership. 
First of all, there was the presence of a new opposition political 
party, Georgian Dream, founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili, a 
billionaire businessman. However, Ivanishvili was not a 
Georgian citizen (he hold a French passport) when he launched 
the party in April 2012. In fact, President Saakashvili tried to 
hinder his political project by revoking Ivanishvili’s citizenship 
in October 2011, just two weeks after he declared he would enter 
politics to oppose the Government (Agenda.ge 28/01/2014). 
This choice provoked high international pressure (Freedom 
House Georgia 2013), including from Russia, which was 
allegedly endorsing Ivanishvili (Eurasianet.org 11/10/2011). 
Eventually, Saakashvili was pressurized to sign a constitutional 
amendment in May 2012 that allowed European Union citizens 
to form political parties in the country. Thus, Ivanishvili was 
able to lead Georgian Dream at the upcoming elections.  
 
The second element that characterized the political campaign 
was the release of some videotapes concerning tortures and 
human rights abuses on some prisoners in Georgian jails just 
before the election. A national TV broadcast made the scandal 
public on September the 18th. The government reacted by calling 
for the arrest of the guards involved. Yet, a former prison officer, 
Vladimir Bedukadze, who leaked the video, claimed that the 
tortures have been ordered by the Minister of the Interior Bacho 
Akhalaia. Eventually the Minister resigned just a few weeks 
before the election. The disclosure of the videotape triggered 																																																								
42 Authors interviews with local and international experts in Tbilisi, 
Paris (May and June 2015). 
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public indignation and protests. At the international level 
Western actors harshly criticized the episodes: The EU 
immediately condemned the physical and sexual abuse of 
Georgian prison inmates and Anders Fogh Rasmussen (at the 
time secretary-general of NATO) and warned that ‘the October 
elections will test the NATO-aspirant country's democratic 
credentials’ (Eurobserver 21/09/2012). Therefore, on the eve of 
the 2012 parliamentary elections, the Western leverage returned 
to a very high level with regard to Georgia.  
 
In line with Constitutional requirements, President Saakashvili 
announced on August the 1st that Parliamentary elections would 
be held on October the 1st. The opposition coalition set up by 
Georgian Dream (GD), won the 2012 parliamentary election with 
almost 55% of the vote, acquiring 85 out of 150 seats. According 
to the new legislation, the parliament would have elected the 
new cabinet after the 2013 presidential election. Until then there 
was a ‘cohabitation’ of a parliament with GD majority and a 
President from UNM. The election was considered to be ‘an 
important step in consolidating the conduct of democratic 
elections in line with OSCE and Council of Europe 
commitments, although certain key issues remain to be 
addressed’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 2012:1). The main sources of 
concern came from episodes of intimidation and harassment of 
opposition activists, and the blurred boundaries between state 
activities and the campaign of the ruling party (cf. 
OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 2012). Moreover, vote-buying was 
reported to be used both by UNM and Georgian Bloc (for a more 
detailed analysis concerning vote-buying in Georgia see next 
session). For the first time since independence an election, 
considered in line with electoral integrity principles, provoked a 
power change. The Georgian Dream Bloc formed a new majority 
in the parliament, which elected Ivanishvili as prime minister, 
which had been the real center of the executive power since 
Constitutional reform.  
 
This outcome, which was somehow unexpected, raised both 
domestic and international expectations over the next 
Presidential election scheduled in 2013. Subsequently, at the 2013 
Presidential election, the UNM candidate lost the election and 
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eventually the GD candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili was elected. 
Overall, the election was assessed for ‘its compliance with OSCE 
commitments and other international standards for democratic 
elections as well as national legislation’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 
2013:3). From the legal framework standpoint, numerous 
amendments were made to the electoral legislation in 2013, 
which addressed the majority of OSCE/ODIHR 
recommendations (including more safeguards to reduce the 
potential for abuse of administrative resources and provisions 
for more equitable conditions for campaigning). The 
amendments were adopted by consensus in the parliament and 
also incorporated most of the recommendations made by NGOs 
(OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 2013). Moreover, the media 
environment was more open than in the previous parliamentary 
elections, and during the election campaign and the Election Day 
there were few episodes of electoral manipulation (such as vote-
buying).  
  
In less than two years Saakashvili was overwhelmed by 
opposition forces and subsequently left the country in to escape 
prosecution for the crimes committed during his presidency. 
There has been some analysis on Saakashvili’s downfall, and 
some of them look also at Western pressure as a factor that 
contributed to his fall (Fairbanks and Gugushvili 2013, Hale 
2015). As far as electoral integrity and western pressure are 
concerned, it is clear that under huge international pressure 
Saakashvili was forced to democratize the electoral process with 
reforms that could not go against the electoral integrity (such as 
the swap to parliamentary system and the improvements in the 
electoral code). Over Saakashvili’s Georgia the Western actors 
imposed strict barriers over the electoral management, which 
forced him finally to accept the results. In facts, since the August 
2008 war, Saakashvili and the UNM were not able to fully 
implement their political project (modernization without 
democratization), and they had subsequently ‘imprisoned 
themselves in a box of democratic rules’ (Fairbanks and 
Gugushvili 2013:121) from which they could not escape. Yet, as I 
am going to show in the next paragraph, Saakashvili tried to 
elude international criticism on electoral management by 
innovating and learning new ways to rig the elections.  
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Learning Episodes in Georgia 
Looking at the electoral malpractices in Georgia it is possible to 
trace the evolution of electoral mismanagement in Georgia by 
examining the main discontinuities between Shevardadze and 
Saakashvili’s approaches to electoral misconduct. Shevardnadze, 
whose style of electoral manipulation could be defined as 
elementary or brazen, focused his efforts on rigging the election 
on election day (OSCE 1999, OSCE/ODIHR 2003a, Mitchell 
2004) when malpractices were explicit, using ballot-box stuffing, 
ballot stealing, ballot burning, ‘Armenian carousels,’43 and the 
falsification of electoral registers. He involved the police and 
other administrative personnel in his schemes.  
 
In contrast, Saakashvili’s attempts at fraud and malpractice were 
more hidden, occurring throughout the campaign, rather than 
strictly on Election Day. He focused on manipulating voters, 
rather than falsifying the votes. While phenomena such as ballot-
box stuffing, ballot stealing or burning, and Armenia carousels 
decreased at the beginning of Saakashvili era, this evolution does 
not mean that the country became more democratic (Arakelian 
and Nodia 2005, Dolidze 2007, Levitsky and Way 2010). Instead, 
it signals an evolution of malpractice, likely triggered by two 
factors. Firstly, Saakashvili wanted to look like a democratising 
leader to the international community. Georgia relied 
extensively on Western international aid, and international 
donors were wagering on Saakashvili’s Rose Revolution to be 
the success story imitated in other countries (Beissinger, 2007). 																																																								
43  Armenian carousel (in Georgia and in other former Soviet Union 
countries, or voting carousel) is an electoral malpractice that consists of 
buses load of people that turn from one polling station to the next one 
in order to vote multiple times. According to some, it has been firstly 
introduced under Kocharyan’s regime (1998-2008) in Armenia. This 
practice was firstly introduced under Kocharyan’s regime and 
subsequently diffused in several other post-Soviet countries including 
Russia (in 2000) and in Ukraine (in 2004). However, similar practices 
can be found in many other contexts (Birch 2011), yet for what concerns 
the regional South Caucasian context it can be assessed that this type of 
malpractice was firstly introduced in Armenia and subsequently in 
Georgia: indeed, because of its origins, in Georgia this practice is 
known as Armenian Carousel.  
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Secondly, the revolution that brought Saakashvili to power was 
an electoral revolution, which was triggered by the discovery of 
massive fraud and electoral malpractices carried out during the 
2003 election. As such, Saakashvili stressed that he would have 
led Georgia to a full democratic consolidation and to deepen the 
integration within Western organisations (such as NATO and 
the European Union) creating high expectations regarding the 
electoral integrity, which could not be disregarded.44  
 
Saakashvili did undertake some important reforms. For example, 
to signal his commitment to democracy at the international level 
he pushed for full integration within the European Union and 
NATO. Domestically, he undertook a wide range of projects 
aimed at reducing corruption and inefficiencies. In the electoral 
sphere, he urged for the reformation of election administration 
in the country, which was seen as partisan and corrupt under 
Shevardnadze’s rule. In 2005, the government set up a new 
permanent Central Election Commission (CEC) with 
commissioners that were appointed by all the parliamentary 
parties. Yet, despite the new CEC’s modern look, there were 
informal internal dynamics which had the effect of decreasing 
the organization’s impartiality and neutrality, 45 ultimately 
keeping the electoral management body partisan and partial. In 
fact, the members within the CEC were not considered at the 
same level and some of them, those from the opposition party, 
were often excluded from the decision making process, creating 
de facto a subgroup in the core of the CEC). 
 
There are three major examples of learning and innovation in the 
Georgian case. The first concerns the media sector. Before the 
Rose Revolution there was some, albeit limited, media openness. 
Rustavi 2, the private broadcaster founded in 1994, and other 
smaller media outlets played a crucial role criticizing 
Shevardnadze’s government. Yet, soon after Saakashvili came to 
power, the freedom of the media began to falter, leaving only the 
Kavkasia channel a non-pro-government voice (Transparency 																																																								
44 Author’s interview in Tbilisi (April 2015). 
45 Author’s interview with a former member of the CEC in Tbilisi (April 
2015). 
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International Georgia 2013). By the summer of 2004, Rustavi 2 
was under the control of a different owner that was connected to 
Saakashvili. In a detailed analysis, journalist and coordinator of 
the Committee to Protect Journalists 46  Nina Ognianova 
highlighted how Saakashvili’s tactics to take control of Rustavi 2 
were extremely similar to Putin’s tactics to seize NTV control in 
the early 2000s.47 In both cases, she reported that there have been 
behind the scenes pressure, which led the owners handing over 
the broadcasts to media tycoons allied to the administrations. 
Eventually, in both cases the once pugnacious and outspoken 
broadcasts became reliably pro-government. Additional 
evidence of learning comes from the friendly relationship 
between Saakashvili and Russian President Vladimir Putin 
before the August 2008 war. The two presidents had met several 
times and at the outset of his presidency Saakashvili claimed that 
he was fascinated by Putin’s vertical vlasti (power vertical),48 of 
which the NTV takeover was one of the main pillars (Oates 2006, 
Ognianova 2008, Hale 2010,). Indeed, many domestic opposition 
leaders criticized the government’s constitutional reform as 
inspired by the Russian model (Arakelian and Nodia 2005, 
Dolidze 2007). There is thus anecdotal evidence in support of 
Ognianova’s argument, which is consistent with the presence of 
learning process.   
 
Another important element introduced by Saakashvili to 
manipulate voters was the installation of video cameras inside 
the polling station, first used in local elections in 2006. The 
decision was allegedly taken by the electoral administration and 
was aimed at curtailing fraud in polling stations. However, 
voters often felt intimidated by the presence of video cameras. In 
some cases, supporters of incumbent parties warned voters that 																																																								
46 The Committee to Protect Journalists is an independent, nonprofit 
organization that promotes press freedom worldwide. 
47 NTV was one of the first broadcast televisions that were born in post-
Soviet Russia. It was particularly critical of the Russian political 
leadership in particular during the first Chechen war (1994). It proved 
to be very effective in affecting public opinion. Before Putin’s first 
election (1999), NTV refused to cooperate with the Kremlin in order to 
build a favourable public image of Putin. 
48 Author’s interview in Tbilisi (April 2015). 
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they would be able to see how they voted.49  Eventually the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
recommended reconsidering this practice “so as not to 
compromise the secrecy of the vote or confidence in the process, 
and eliminate a potential factor for intimidation against voters” 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2006a:23). Nonetheless, this practice continued 
to take place until the 2010 municipal elections. There were no 
regulations enacted concerning the usage of the videotapes, 
which were not guaranteed for public use in the case of electoral 
disputes. This type of voter manipulation was first adopted in 
Azerbaijan for the 2003 Presidential election, and was 
subsequently introduced in Georgia (2006), Albania (2009) 
Ukraine (2012) and Russia (2012). This suggests a diffusion of a 
specific mechanism aimed at influencing voters’ choices. 
  
Another example of electoral misconduct during Saakashvili’s 
tenure is vote buying. In order to identify the impact of vote 
buying on election outcomes, this chapter analyzed all 
OSCE/ODIHR reports from Shevardnadze’s era until the most 
recent election. It found that during Shevardnadze’s tenure, this 
practice was almost insignificant, with only a few allegations of 
vote buying (see ISFED 1995, OSCE/ODIHR 1999 and 
OSCE/ODIHR 2003a). Since the 2006 municipal elections, 
however, there has been a constant growth of vote buying as a 
tool to influence the election’s outcomes (see OSCE/ODIHR 
2006a, OSCE/ODIHR 2008a, OSCE/ODIHR 2008b, 
OSCE/ODIHR 2012). This type of malpractice is very difficult to 
observance and to deterrence (Birch 2011a: 34), but is also one of 
the most expensive practices of electoral manipulation to 
conduct. During Saakashvili’s time, his party, the United 
National Movement, was the main party to be accused of vote 
buying, likely because the party had the financial capacity to 
engage in this practice. However, in Georgia, an opposition 
party with significant economic resources at its disposal, 
resorted to vote buying (OSCE/ODIHR 2012:22). Episodes of 
vote buying were limited during Shevardnadze’s time. 
Saakashvili may have been inspired to use this method of 
electoral manipulation by looking at neighboring Armenia, 																																																								
49 Author’s interview in Tbilisi (April 2015). 
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where vote buying had been a common practice since 2003. This 
practice became particularly visible during Armenia’s 2005 local 
elections. The following year, vote buying was widely used in 
Georgia to influence voters’ choices during the 2006 municipal 
election.  
 
Type of 
Malpractice 
When 
introduced 
Type of 
learning 
From where 
Reduce 
Freedom of 
Media 
(Rustavi 2) 
Since 2006 Positive 
Learning 
Russia 
Video 
Cameras 
Since 
Municipal 
Election 
2006 
Positive 
Learning 
Azerbaijan  
Vote Buying Massively 
used since 
Municipal 
election 
2006 
Positive 
Learning 
Armenia 
Pre - Election 
Day 
Malpractice 
Since 
Municipal 
Election 
2006 
Negative 
Learning 
Past (During 
Shevardnadze’s 
rule) 
Table 1: Electoral malpractices in Georgia 
 
In sum, it is possible to observe a dramatic change in the 
common practices of rigging elections in Georgia before and 
after the Rose Revolution. This change was characterized by the 
adoption of some new practices by Saakashvili, who 
significantly modified the types of malpractice in common use. It 
is possible to conclude that Saakashvili learned from a negative 
example (Shevardnadze’s management) and worked to avoid 
past mistakes. There was a noticeable shift from malpractices 
carried out on Election Day to subtler forms of manipulation 
during the pre-election period, and the adoption of electoral 
practices (such as video cameras) to affect voters’ choices on the 
election day. In doing so, Saakashvili evaded international 
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observers’ critics, yet continued to manipulate elections for his 
benefit. 
Conclusion 
Georgia is one of the cases in which Western democratizing 
pressure is stronger as such countries’ bargaining power vis à vis 
the West is lower compared to others. Indeed, since the early 
nineties Georgia suffered from a dimension of insecurity that 
determined its foreign policy orientations. The harsh struggle for 
independence from Russia and the breakaway regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia pushed Tbilisi to depend more on 
western support than the other two neighboring countries. Thus, 
Georgia began before Armenia and Azerbaijan to abide by 
international standards in many sectors, including elections. In 
1999 Georgia attained two important results: first of all, its 
electoral framework was recognized ‘sufficient to conduct 
genuine multiparty elections if applied in a non-selective and 
transparent manner’ (OSCE/ODIHR Georgia 1999:1); secondly, 
it was the first South Caucasian country admitted into the 
Council of Europe.  
 
These factors determined the creation of barriers for what 
concern the conduction of democratic elections. Western actors 
began to be particularly active in the country and they shared 
common stances concerning Shevardnadze and his 
administration. This unity was determinant in the development 
of the events that resulted in the Rose Revolution. In fact, during 
the 2003 election, Shevardnadze tried to break the context in 
which Georgia was bound by forcing the rule of the electoral 
integrity but the barrier was solid and the attempt failed. At the 
same time, domestic forces played their role determining the end 
of Shevardnadze’s rule. As Goertz claims, the attempts to break 
a barrier can be catastrophic for those who try; but at the same 
time they can provide useful information for others that want to 
break or elude the same barrier. That was the case with 
Saakashvili, who subsequently sharply modified the modalities 
and the methods to reduce the uncertainties of the electoral 
scrutiny.  
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Saakashvili exploited both the information regarding the context 
and the unconditional support of President George W. Bush. As 
a matter of fact, on one hand Saakashvili pushed Georgia’s path 
toward a deeper Western integration without fully abiding to 
democratic principles (indeed he predominantly looked for 
NATO integration). On the other, he could rely on the close 
personal relationship with president Bush, whose administration 
was in quest of a success in its democratization programme. In 
turn, this relationship ‘led the United States to disregard the 
clear retreat from democratic practice in Georgia under 
President Saakashvili’ (Macfarlane 2009:117). Nevertheless, the 
war with Russia in 2008 changed the regional context, and the 
EU increased its leverage vis à vis Tbilisi. Subsequently, NATO 
and United States aligned themselves on democratic 
conditionality and Western democratizing pressure became 
united again.  
 
However, as I presented in the paragraph concerning learning, 
Saakashvili changed substantially the methods of frauds by 
looking mostly to Georgia’s neighboring countries. His 
administration was thus able to avoid harsh international 
criticism by staying away from classic brazen methods of frauds. 
Thus, in Georgia both electoral management and electoral 
mismanagement were heavily influenced by the international 
dimension, which included both Western democratizing 
pressure and socializing mechanism. 
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Chapter 5: 
The Case of Armenia 
 
 
‘Armenia is democratically in a better situation than, say, Afghanistan’ 
- Levon Ter-Petrosyan, former President of Armenia  
Introduction 
Armenia unilaterally declared its independence on August 23rd 
1990 and subsequently this decision was sealed by a popular 
referendum, which saw a huge turnout. Almost 100% of 
population chose independence from Moscow. The country 
officially declared independence on September 23rd 1991. The 
large majority of the members of the political elite that lead the 
country out of the Soviet Union were part of the Pan-Armenian 
National Movement (PANM), which was a political party born 
in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Council 
resolution in 1988. The quarrel with Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-
Karabakh affected the political development of Armenia since its 
independence. The Autonomous Council resolution of 1988 
envisaged that this oblast under Azerbaijan control would move 
under Yerevan control. The Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict 
escalated during the last semester in 1989. Both the PANM and 
the newly formed Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) called for 
abolition of the Special Administrative Committee that 
Gorbachev established to manage the Nagorno-Karabakh. The 
two fronts were at the opposite sides: Yerevan held to their 
position that the region must become part of Armenia, and Baku 
called for the abolition of Karabakh autonomy. The Supreme 
Soviet of the Soviet Union attempted to find a solution to the 
unfolding crisis but eventually failed to bring the parts together. 
In November 1989 Moscow understood that the situation was 
getting out of control and so decided to abolish the special status 
to the region and the return Nagorno-Karabakh under full 
control of Azerbaijan. However, Yerevan reacted by not 
recognizing this decision and calling unilaterally for Nagorno-
Karabakh as part of Armenia.  
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These events had their political consequences in Armenia, which 
held a parliamentary election in 1990. This scrutiny, which has 
been considered freer and more democratic than in other 
elections after the independence (Zolyan 2011), saw the PANM 
scoring a great result. Since this moment, there has been a radical 
change in the Armenian political establishment. Indeed, a new 
generation of politicians, that shared a common concern and 
interest (the Nagorno-Karabakh issue) became the prominent 
political force in the country. And one of its leaders, Levon Ter-
Petrosyan, soon became an eminent figure in Armenia as after 
the election he became the Chairman of the Supreme Council. 
The elections showed the weakness of the Communist party that 
for the first time went to the opposition. Soon after the elections 
the situation in the country became difficult and insecure. As 
happened in Georgia, some armed militias (mainly clans and 
criminal groups) started to ravage the cities and the frontiers 
with Azerbaijan. The odds of an escalation were very high and 
Moscow warned that in case the government was not able to 
tackle the situation it would have sent troops to cope with these 
militias. Differently to what occurred in Georgia, Ter-Petrosyan 
was able to disarm and restored order in the country in few 
months, avoiding possible perils.   
 
In January 1991 Gorbachev launched a referendum to be held in 
all the Soviet Republic concerning the decision to preserve the 
USSR. However, the Armenian Supreme Soviet decided to not 
participate in this referendum; instead the republic would hold 
its own referendum in September to ask whether the people of 
Armenia wanted to acquire independence from Moscow. Soon 
after, Moscow sent military units to Armenia with the aim to 
protect Soviet defense installations in the country. Ter-Petrosyan 
reacted firmly claiming that it was a dangerous move close to ‘a 
virtual declaration of war by the Soviet Union’ (Curtis 1995:23). 
However, following the events in Russia, such as the attempted 
coup in August against Gorbachev, Ter-Petrosyan was able to 
play wisely and he could avoid an escalation of tension with 
Moscow. As a matter of fact, the biggest security concerns came 
from the conflict with Azerbaijan that had been taking place 
since 1988. The war for Nagorno Karabakh was dictating the 
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government agenda both domestically and internationally. 50 
Western pressure materialized in the country since March 1992, 
through the so-called Minsk Group of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was trying to foster 
mediation between the parts. Yet, as Thomas de Wall claims, the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict is ‘nobody’s backyard, everyone’s 
problem’ (de Wall 2011:146), which clearly underlines the low 
strategic importance in Western political agendas. This 
disinterest, which did not encourage a unified strategic vision, 
allowed the presidents of both countries ‘to resist international 
efforts to re-shape or broaden the Karabakh peace process’ (de 
Wall 2011:147). Only in 1994 could the two countries agree on a 
ceasefire, yet the hostilities were far from being settled and the 
Nagorno-Karabakh issue became one of the less frozen conflicts 
around the region. Indeed, the needs of war were at the top of 
the country’s agenda and the army became one of the main 
actors in the state-building process (Iskandaryan 2013).  
 
Armenia, at least in the first decade after its independence, 
experienced a medium leverage and medium linkage. I disagree 
with Levitsky and Way’s opinion concerning the level of 
leverage. According to the two authors, western leverage was 
high during the first decade; in fact, I found evidence and 
analysis that considered Western interest in Armenia as almost 
non-existent (Zolyan 2011). It is true that Armenia was the 
receiver of the highest amount of international aid assistance but 
donors did not act unified and did not understand local 
Armenian dynamics. 51  The main source of linkage was the 
Armenian diaspora in the West, whereas other types of ties, such 
as economic, political or technocratic, were weak. Moreover, 
Armenia, in contrast with Georgia, had a very strong state 
apparatus, which allowed it to maintain a higher control over 
the population and to suffer less from Western external pressure. 
Finally, the war with Azerbaijan allowed the political elites to 																																																								
50 According to Sergey Minasyan the influence of the Karabakh issue on 
Armenian politics and development is best illustrated by independent 
Armenia’s three presidents’ careers: Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Robert 
Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. All of them played primary roles in the 
Karabakh movement.  (Minasyan 2013). 
51 Interview with Alexander Iskandaryan in Yerevan (May 2015). 
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keep high security standards even domestically, which 
contributed to falter democratic developments. Overall, the 
Western pressure changed along the years and eventually 
lowered. In the coming paragraphs I am going to analyze the 
changes in the electoral management and in the Western 
pressure during Armenia recent history.  
Strengthening the Presidency 
In October 1991, Ter-Petrosyan ran against other six candidates 
in the first presidential election of Post-soviet Armenia. Ter-
Petrosyan political campaign was focused on a four-point 
program: the development of a market economy; 
democratization; a realistic foreign policy; and the resolution of 
the Karabakh conflict (Asturian 2001). Eventually the leader of 
the PANM won with around 83% of the votes in an election that 
is remembered as the real democratic one52 or at least whose 
results were widely accepted (Armine 2008, Zolyan 2011, 
Markarov 2016).  
 
However, full democratization was not on top of the political 
agenda for the government, which was keener to keep the 
country united against the persistent Azerbaijani challenge. As a 
matter of facts, Armenia adapted the political system from the 
1978 constitution to the short-term requirements of governance 
(Curtis 1995). The purpose was to use this system until a major 
constitutional reform that would introduce Western style 
institutions. Eventually major reforms could not be undertaken 
in the medium term, as the political class did not find an 
agreement concerning executive-legislative balance of power. 
The Constitutional Commission, which was comprised of twenty 
politicians, members of the Parliament, and lawyers, to draft a 
new constitution, was established by the parliament in 
November 1990, yet its first meeting took place only in October 
1992, when the political landscape was already affected by Ter-
Petrosyan’s rule (Markarov 2006).  
 																																																								
52 This judgment finds support also from anecdotal evidence gathered 
through different interviews conducted with electoral experts, 
academics and politicians in Yerevan (May 2015). 
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Ter-Petrosyan presidency has been analyzed as the main factor 
of democratic degradation (Fish 2001) in a similar path that 
characterized also other countries, such as Albania, Belarus and 
Russia. According to Fish ‘the crucial common condition […] 
was a constitutional system that concentrated power in the 
president or that could readily be manipulated in a way that 
facilitated such concentration of power’ (Fish 2001:69). Fish 
labels this system as ‘superpresidency’, which entangles many 
different types but they all share ‘a very large apparatus of 
presidential power that greatly exceeds other state agencies in 
size and in the resources it consumes; a president who enjoys 
power to legislate by decree; a president who de jure or de facto 
controls most of the powers of the purse; a relatively 
emasculated legislature that cannot readily repeal presidential 
decrees and that has little authority and/or meager resources for 
overseeing the executive branch (ibid.).  
 
The president exploited this standoff situation and gradually 
reinforced the executive power and his office at the expenses of 
other institutions relying on two laws adopted by the Supreme 
Soviet (the Law on the President of the Republic of Armenia and 
the Law on the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia). Ter-
Petrosyan, who was seen as a democrat in the early nineties, was 
subsequently seen as a quasi-autocrat a few years later 
(Mazmanyan 2010). Indeed, the Armenian presidency was the 
most powerful position in the government: ‘more than a 
ceremonial head of state, the president is the most active 
proposer of new legislation, the chief architect of foreign and 
military policy, and, during Armenia's prolonged state of 
national emergency, the unchallenged center of government 
power in many areas’ (Curtis 1995:59). The draft constitution 
presented by the Constitutional Commission on April 20, 1994, 
after more than one hundred meetings, recalled a semi 
presidential system, but in practice ‘it showed more signs of 
presidential dominance than an equal distribution of power with 
checks and balances’ (Markarov 2006:162). Considering the 
difficult situation with Azerbaijan, section 14 of the Constitution, 
‘provides the president with incredible power as it allows the 
president to suspend constitutional rights under rather vague 
conditions: in the event of an imminent danger threatening 
	 152	
constitutional order, and upon consultation with the president of 
the National Assembly and the prime minister, [the president] 
takes measures warranted by the situation and makes an address 
to the people on that matter’ (Azerbaijan Constitution 1994, 
article 14). The final version of the constitution was approved by 
a popular referendum that was held together with the 
parliamentary elections on July 5, 1995. 
 
During these years, Western actors did not play a big role in 
terms of pressuring efforts to foster democratic developments. 
Regional organizations in particular, such as the European 
Union and Council of Europe, were considered to be the great 
absents from the scene (Zolyan 2011). The lack of an external 
pressure went all along with the Armenian political culture, 
which allowed Ter-Petrosyan to reach his political goals without 
major challenges from the domestic side.53 Indeed, ‘Ter-Petrosyan 
is perhaps nothing but a typical manifestation of the uselessness 
of democratic ideals against the overwhelming force of the 
political culture with its irresistible tendencies toward the 
concentration of power’ (Mazmanyan 2010:194).  
 
The first parliamentary election in Armenia took place on the 5th 
July 1995. The OSCE/ODIHR sent an observation mission that 
judged this first parliamentary election as ‘free but not fair’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR 1995:2). From a legal point of view, the elections 
were firstly ruled by the Law on the Elections of the National 
Assembly Members, which established the electoral system that 
was characterized by a mix of majoritarian (150 seats) and 
proportional (40 seats) with a 5% threshold, and it also set out 
procedures for the formation of the Central Electoral 
Commission (CEC). The CEC was established as the 
independent model; 54  nevertheless, as I am going to indicate 
hereunder, genuine independence of the electoral administration 
was seriously under question (Galfayan 2014).  
 																																																								
53 Author’s interview with political analyst in Yerevan (May 2015). 
54 The independent model of electoral management is characterized by 
the fact that the EMB has and manages its own budget and it is not 
accountable to a government ministry or department (see 
aceproject.org). 
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These elections were particularly challenging for the PANM, as 
the domestic political front remained heated in 1994. Ter-
Petrosyan’s party had lost ground to the right and the left 
because of unsuccessful economic reforms that kept Armenia 
population in hardship. At that time there were some opposition 
newspapers and citizens' groups that criticized the government 
for corruption and called for the resignation of the Ter-Petrosyan 
government. These groups appealed to a large number of people 
and eventually gathered 50,000 protesters in an anti-government 
demonstration in mid- 1994. The president tolerated these 
groups, but at the same time was afraid of losing power and of 
having the constitutional draft rejected by the referendum. 
Therefore, on one side PANM formed a coalition with other 
political parties, which united in the Republican Bloc and on the 
other they organized a systematic violations of the electoral 
rules; marring the elections was the only way for the Republican 
Bloc to win the majority of seats in the parliament (cf. Bremmer 
and Welt 1997). Many opposition candidates were disqualified 
before the scrutiny, the others were denied financial backing 
(Bremmer and Welt 1997). The OSCE/ODIHR report states that 
‘observers strongly criticized the CEC, especially with regard to 
registering parties and candidates’ (OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 
1995:12). Moreover, the government set a ban against one of the 
main opposition parties, the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation, because its leadership was allegedly accused of 
assassination, drug running and corruption (OSCE/ODIHR 
Armenia 1995). The Republican block gained 88 of 190 seats. The 
second party gained just 8. Moreover, there had been many 
independent candidates that gained 72 seats. However, most of 
them, once elected they subsequently endorsed and supported 
the majoritarian party. Independent candidates are a 
characteristic of Armenia political landscape (cf. Navasardian 
2011). Overall, this first parliamentary election revealed that it 
was very hard for opposition parties to organize and compete in 
an election.  
 
The presidential election was ruled by a new electoral 
framework. Indeed, the parliament approved just before the 
election the Law of the Republic of Armenia on the Elections of 
the President of the Republic of Armenia, which ruled the 
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scrutiny and provided an improvement in comparison to the 
former legal framework (OSCE/ODHIR Armenia 1996). Yet, 
frauds and malpractices were deterred by international 
observers including: blank election protocols in circulation, with 
official stamps and seals; the presence of law enforcement 
personnel in polling stations; the failure to post election results 
in polling stations; instances of poor ballot security; and 
discrepancies between the number of signatures on the voter 
lists and the number of votes actually recorded (OSCE/ODIHR 
1996b:15). However, according to the international observers the 
‘election process in the whole of the country [was] encouraging’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 1996:7). Ter Petrosyan won the 
presidential election with 51.71% of the preferences. Of the two 
other candidates Vazgen Manukian scored 41.3% of the vote and 
the Communist leader Sergei Badalian won slightly over 6%. 
Eventually the main competitor, the well-known physicist 
Vazgen Manukian, rejected the results claiming victory. What 
followed were large demonstrations in several cities around 
Armenia; in Yerevan a group of people assaulted the parliament, 
an act that led the government to call military troops to repress 
the crowd. Many people remained wounded and one person 
was killed. The army presided over the capital for several days, 
until the demonstrations disappeared. The international 
community, including Russia, criticized the brutal repression 
and increased its pressure over the regime (Wessenlink 1997).  
 
In turn, the political situation in the country deteriorated and 
Ter-Petrosyan found himself more and more isolated within his 
circle. In order to find a way-out, Ter-Petrosyan acknowledged 
the poor electoral performance and found a scapegoat on the 
Prime Minister Hrant Bagratian, who was sacked soon after the 
election. Moreover, the President admitted in his ‘preliminary 
assessments’ of the election result the corruption in the state 
bureaucracy, and the widespread poverty facing many 
Armenians as two factors that affected voters’ preferences 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1996). Yet, disaffection among the 
political elites was growing and Ter-Petrosyan found himself in 
a lame duck position: it was openly discredited by the election, 
and unable to manage corruption scandal as well as familisitic 
policies that were alienating other elites. The last straw was Ter-
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Petrosyan’s position toward a new settlement with Azerbaijan 
over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Karabakh leadership, the 
Armenian defense ministry, the Guardians "of the Homeland, the 
interior and national security ministry, the opposition, the 
intelligentsia, most diaspora organizations, and most of the 
Armenian media expressed their opposition to the president 
settlement as it was conceived too moderate55 (Asturian 2001, 
Levitsky and Way 2010). It followed the deepest political crisis 
that Armenia experienced up until that moment, with many MPs 
defecting, resulting in Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation in favor of his 
Prime Minister Robert Kocharian (who was firmly against any 
concession to Azerbaijan) and new presidential election in 1998. 
 
Robert Kocharian won the presidency with 58,9% of the votes 
(he won after the second round against Karen Demirchyan – 
former Communist ruler, who finally accepted the result) in an 
election that, despite being an improvement on the flawed 1996 
election, it felt well under the international standards (see 
OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 1998). The scrutiny was still ruled by 
the 1996 legal framework, as the upgrading was under way; the 
parliament was working on a comprehensive electoral code and 
it was not ready for the extraordinaire election. Twelve 
candidates were accepted by the CEC as competitors. All the 
candidates were free to campaign throughout the country, yet 
there were some serious episodes of illegal campaigning and 
incidents during an opposition candidate’s rally, where there 
were clashes among the rally’s attendants. Eventually eight 
people were injured, including one member of the Central 
Electoral Commission. Moreover, during the Election Day, the 
OSCE/ODIHR mission reported instances of ballot stuffing, the 
presence of unauthorized persons at polling stations, and 
discrepancies in the counting procedure. In addiction, according 
to anecdotal evidence I collected in Armenia, this was the first 
election where Armenian Carousel was introduced.56  																																																								
55 What was being proposed was multi-ethnic autonomy for the region, 
the borders of Karabakh would be those effective in 1988, the OSCE 
would create a sort of buffer zone around the region, and an 
international peacekeeping force would be deployed, reportedly with 
an initial one-year mandate (see Asturian 2001, Walker 1998). 
56 Interview with Armenian MP in Yerevan (May 2015). 
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Kocharian ran as independent candidate with the support of 
several political leaders such as the defense minister, Vazgen 
Sarkisian, and the interior and national security minister, Serzh 
Sargsyan. These, in turn, ‘acted with the support of powerful 
local groups, which control[led] much of the country’s economic 
activity and favored the replacement of Ter-Petrosyan’ 
(Economist Intelligence Unit Armenia 1998:23). This mechanism 
of power change is well analyzed by Henry Hale, who claims 
that Armenia (among many others post-Soviet states) developed 
a sort of patrimonial politics that has its own rules of spoil-
system and accountability. In particular, according to Hale 
‘Patronalism refers to a social equilibrium in which individuals 
organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around 
the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and 
punishments, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal 
principles such as ideological belief or categorizations that 
include many people one has not actually met in person’57 (Hale 
2015:20). In Armenia this patronalism, which has been also 
labeled as Armenian Mafia (Herzig 1999) is one of the highest in 
the region and it is a key factor when to take into consideration 
power change dynamics.  
 
From an international perspective, the new President continued 
to pursue a foreign policy aimed to at looking for support from 
Russia, which was the first security provider for Armenia 
(Economist Intelligence Unit Armenia 1998); therefore, 
Kocharyan demonstrated continuity rather than change in the 
foreign policy sector (Papazian 2006). At the same time, Western 
actors were still pressuring the country to democratize. In 1996 
the European Union signed the Partnership Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) with Armenia, a framework that ruled EU-																																																								
57  According to Hale Patronalism is a more general notion than 
clientelism or patrimonialism. The new concept tends to subsume the 
latter ‘rather than deny them’ (see Hale 2015:23).  
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Armenia relationships, which entered into force in 1999. In this 
document it was envisaged and supported the idea of 
democratic development as well as the conduction of democratic 
elections. Since the signature of the PCA ‘the relations between 
the European Union and the Republic of Armenia have been 
gradually intensifying’ (European Union Friends of Armenia 
2014:5). Moreover, Armenia in late nineties was in the process of 
accession to the Council of Europe. This process entailed the 
acceptance of signing several conventions in the sector of 
democracy, justice and human rights and the developments of 
some reforms in the good governance sector (CoE Parliamentary 
Assembly Armenia 2000). Kocharyan’s administration was eager 
to show commitment toward this integration path and during 
his speech at the Council of Europe Parliament Assembly, the 
President underlined that ‘[w]ith its full accession to the Council 
of Europe, Armenia is registering a considerable degree of 
progress in democracy-building. We realize that we are still in 
the middle of this road. Meanwhile, Armenia is committed to 
full and timely observance of its post-accession obligations.’ 
(RFE/RL 2001, January 25). 
One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward 
One of the shortcomings concerning electoral management in 
Armenia was the electoral framework. Thus, soon after the 
presidential election, the National Assembly approved the new 
electoral code. This code replaced and unified the three separate 
laws governing presidential, parliamentary and local elections. 
From an EMB perspective, the Electoral Code adopted in 1999 a 
three-tier election administration — the CEC, regional electoral 
commissions (RECs) and precinct electoral commissions (PECs). 
An important improvement was that it reduced the links of the 
election administration chain: the community electoral 
commissions were abolished in order to simplify the hierarchy 
and to avoid the potentially problematic influence of community 
administrations (IDEA 2004b). The Electoral Code also 
addressed voting issues for some social categories such as 
military personnel and refugees. In Armenia, on one side, the 
military are often considered to vote by orders from the 
commanders (ibid), therefore, the Code created some provision 
to alt this practice (for example: separate polling stations in 
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barracks were opened only if the military compound was located 
in an isolated area). On the other, refugees in some areas 
represent 100% of the population, yet the Code did not include 
any provision to let them vote. Thus, in some communities it 
was not possible to establish any form of self-governance bodies. 
Subsequently this provision was amended only for local 
elections. 
 
Overall, the new Electoral Code ‘was nevertheless a welcome 
and major step towards securing the integrity of the electoral 
process in a number of ways’ (IDEA 2004b:6) as it was prepared 
by the support of the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe 
and the OSCE/ODIHR. The code addressed some of the 
recommendations made by the international organizations; for 
example, for the first time domestic observers were allowed to 
monitor elections and a brand new chapter was introduced into 
the Electoral Code on liability for violations. Yet ‘the draft Code 
was never submitted to the ODIHR for comments prior to 
adoption’ (OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 1999:3) and some 
amendments were edited and subsequently published in the 
Official Journal without a Parliamentary vote or consideration. 
Despite the fact there were many cases in post-Soviet countries 
where electoral laws had heavy Soviet traits, the Electoral code 
of 1999 was predominantly original (Bader 2012).  
 
The new Electoral Code was first used to rule the March 30th, 
1999 Parliamentary election. In this election, two prominent 
politicians such as the defense minister, Vazgen Sarkisian, and 
the People’s Party leader Karen Demirchyan, unified their efforts 
in an opposition coalition called Unity Bloc, which scored more 
than 41% of the vote. According to some analyst of the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘the alliance between Mr 
Demirchian and Mr Sarkisian suggests that they are mounting a 
campaign to oust Mr Kocharian’ (Economist Intelligence Unite 
Armenia 6/1999:18). The elections were judged by the 
OSCE/ODIHR observers as an improvement over the flawed 
elections of 1995, 1996 and 1998, yet it proved that many 
provisions of the Electoral Code missed a proper 
implementation, in particular in relation to the following issues: 
the composition of election commissions at all levels, the status 
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of commission members, the continuity of the work of the 
commissions, and the appointment of technical staff to the 
Central and Regional Election Commissions; the lack of 
transparency in a number of election procedures; the presence of 
unauthorized persons in election commission premises during 
electoral procedures; the complexity of election procedures; the 
vague provisions regarding the filing of complaints and 
resolution of disputes; and the inadequate protection of due 
process of law (OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 1999:3). Nevertheless, it 
was the most regular election since 1995, and proved that 
Armenia was fulfilling its commitments toward international 
standards.  
 
The traumatic event of the 27th October, 1999, when the 
incumbent prime minister Vazgen Sarkisian and the speaker of 
the National Assembly, Karen Demirchyan, along with other top 
government and parliamentary officials were killed in a terrorist 
attack, had a strong impact on Kocharyan’s presidency, as well 
as on the country itself (Economist Intelligence Unit Armenia 
12/1999). According to some analysts ‘the parliament shooting 
marked the end of Armenia's development as an emerging 
democracy with balanced political and social institutions, and 
the beginning of its slide into a semi-authoritarian state 
dominated by a powerful president’ (RFE/RL Armenia 13/01/ 
2009:2). As a matter of fact, this terrorist attack stopped the 
growing inter-institutional balances among the executive power 
and the legislative power in favor of the former. Despite this, 
Kocharian was never charged either as the instigator or the 
inspirational for the killings, and he came out as the winner of 
this confrontation as in the aftermath of the attack he succeeded 
to split the majority and ‘since then, the dominance of the 
presidency has not been strongly challenged again’ (Mazmanyan 
2010:198). Therefore, it could be argued that the Kocharyan 
presidency benefited a lot from this event, which altered also 
Armenia’s capacity to cope with Western pressures. In fact, the 
international community following the terrorist attacks 
increased its endorsement to the Kocharyan presidency (cf. U.S. 
House of Congress Resolution 222, 1999) and was more reluctant 
to criticize the Armenian government for democracy and human 
rights abuses (cf. European Parliament EU-Armenia Committee 
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2001). These changes had some reflections in the way the 
government administered and managed the elections in the 
upcoming years. In fact, due to a lower Western pressure over 
Armenia, the regime had a greater ability to alter the electoral 
playing field. This claim is supported when we take into 
consideration the size of OSCE/ODIHR observation missions 
between Armenia and Georgia (which have similar total voter 
numbers – cf. International IDEA). In 2003 the OSCE/ODIHR 
sent for the Georgian Parliamentary election an observation 
mission with more than 400 observers, whereas for the 
Armenian Parliamentary election there were around 200 
observers (cf. OSCE/ODIHR Parliament Georgia 2003, and 
OSCE/ODIHR Parliament Armenia 2003). In 1999 the 
OSCE/ODIHR sent 170 observers to the Armenian 
parliamentary election and 189 for the Georgian parliamentary 
election. So, the gap in the 2003 elections is quite significant.  
 
The first ‘victim’ of this new situation was the Electoral Code of 
Armenia, which despite having just been approved, was 
amended several times. As a matter of fact, ‘major amendments 
were introduced in August 2002 to address the concerns that 
emerged in the wake of the 1999 parliamentary and local 
elections’ (IDEA 2004b:6) generating many concerns, in 
particular for what concerned the independence and impartiality 
of the electoral commissions58. By 2002, the new composition of 																																																								
58  Before the amendments, the Electoral Code provided a formula 
according to which three members of the electoral commissions at all 
levels were to be nominated by the government, with each party, party 
bloc or coalition that had a faction in the Parliament nominating a 
member. In addition, the top five parties or party blocs that collected 
the highest number of valid signatures, above a minimum of 30,000, to 
stand in elections to the National Assembly were also entitled to have 
commission members. One of the shortcomings of this formula was 
that usually the government nominees come from the parties that were 
already represented in the National Assembly, and the government 
would therefore be over-represented in the electoral commissions. In 
addition, verifying the validity of signatures was cumbersome, and if 
this procedure were carried out in a formalistic manner many parties 
would get on to the commissions or would be denied the chance to be 
represented on them depending on the arbitrary application of the 
provisions of the Electoral Code. The amended Electoral Code did 
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the CEC was formed by six out of nine presidential supporters or 
nominees.  
 
Subsequently, Kocharian as his predecessor did not have the 
intention to carry out further Constitutional reforms aimed to 
strengthen the role of the parliament or the Constitutional court 
(Mazmanyan 2010). In fact, since 1998 a Constitutional 
committee had been preparing Constitutional reforms in order 
to strengthen the role of the parliament. During the 1998 political 
campaign Kocharian endorsed the reform and he made the 
argument of Constitutional reforms one of his cornerstones. 
However, subsequently his administration discharged the 
package of reforms as it envisaged a reduction of presidential 
power (Markarvo 2006). Therefore, ‘it is likely that the president 
invested no sincere efforts in achieving the goals of the 
referendum, as these goals were not in his best interest’ 
(Mazmanyan 2010:196). The 2003 Constitutional referendum 
took place at the same time as the Parliamentary election and the 
referendum was not even a top priority for opposition parties, 
which were far more interested in gaining parliamentary seats. 
Thus, there was no interest in fostering the population to vote 
for the 2003 referendum concerning the Constitutional 
amendments, which eventually failed. 
 
The concentration of power concerned also the media sector. In 
fact, until 2002 there were some independent private television 
broadcasts (A1+ and Noyan Tapan) that enjoyed some freedom 
and were able to criticize the government. However, since early 
2002 the government approved and sent to Parliament a vague 
legislative proposal called the Law on Mass Information, which 
would increase state control of the media. Subsequently, in April 
2002 the government carried out an ‘attack on the press’ 
(Committee to Protect Journalist 2004), which stopped the 
activities of A+ and Noyan Tapan. As a matter of facts, due to 
controversial frequency tenders (ibid.) the two broadcasts lost 
their frequencies as the National Council on Television and 																																																																																																																									
away with this provision but still failed to propose a formula that 
would ensure a more balanced composition of the electoral 
commissions. (IDEA 2004b:6). 
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Radio refused to reissue their licenses. This decision was a big 
blow to the freedom of press in Armenia and it was condemned 
by local and international media watchdogs (such as Freedom 
House) as well as by the Council of Europe. However, there was 
not a strong condemnation by those international actors with 
higher leverage on the country.  
 
These events occurred just before 2003 when there were multiple 
elections scheduled (Presidential, Parliamentary and 
Constitutional referendum). The first was the Presidential 
election, which took place on the 19th February and the 5th March. 
The election proved to be competitive and rigged 
simultaneously. The popular Stepan Demirchian, the son of 
assassinated Parliamentary Speaker Karen Demirchian, obtained 
enough votes to compete in the run-off election against 
Kocharian. The interlude between the first and the second round 
was marred by widespread attempts to intimidate and to hinder 
opposition participations (including administrative detentions of 
around 200 opposition supporters). As I am going to show in the 
paragraph concerning learning, the Armenian authorities 
resorted to using different methods to curtail Demirchian’s 
success. Eventually, Kocharian won in the second round with 
67% of the preferences, in an election that international observers 
judged to be not in line with international standards for 
democratic elections (OSCE/ODIHR Armenia Presidential 2003). 
The election was characterized by widespread use of methods of 
frauds including ballot box stuffing, and the electoral code was 
not implemented properly (OSCE/ODIHR Armenia Presidential 
2003). International actors condemned the conduction of the 
election, yet they did not push their leverage to the maximum. 
As Bunce and Wolchik reported, there was not a full intention by 
the United States to provoke a regime change in Armenia (Bunce 
and Wolchick 2011). An official at the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, 
clearly stated that ‘the United States was interested not in an 
electoral revolution in Armenia, but rather in an Apricot 
evolution’ (Bunce and Wolchick 2011:198). In other words, 
Washington, which was the first aid-supporter in Armenia, 
aimed for a gradual process of democratization rather than for a 
radical change as it happened in Georgia the same year.  
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Subsequently, the 2003 parliamentary election took place in a 
relative calm and quiet environment (OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 
Parliamentary 2003). The scrutiny was judged by international 
observers as ‘an improvement over the 2003 presidential election 
[…], but fell short of international standards for democratic 
elections in a number of key respects’ (OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 
Parliamentary 2003:1). The election was characterized by 
widespread irregularities, which included ballot box stuffing, the 
falsification of results and the intimidation of observers and 
proxies (OSCE/ODIHR Armenia Parliamentary 2003:2). After 
the scrutiny, the parties that supported the president (the 
Republican Party of Armenia, the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation and the Rule of Law Party) unified in a coalition and 
gained a majority of seats in the National Assembly. At the same 
time, the Constitutional referendum did not pass, as the number 
of votes in favor of the changes was lower than one-third of the 
number of registered voters. The OSCE/ODIHR mission did not 
observe the referendum process, which was observed by a small 
delegation from the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.  
Following the events in Serbia and in other post-Soviet states 
where the Colored revolutions were taking place, people started 
to gather in huge demonstrations aimed to push Kocharian to 
resign (Ishkanian 2008). International actors sustained this 
movement insofar as they formally condemned electoral 
malpractices; yet they did not further pressurize about the 
electoral outcomes. Subsequently, the government’s legitimacy 
was reinforced by a decision of the Constitutional Court, which 
was called to review the result of the Presidential Election. It 
produced a decision ‘perfectly fitting the political environment 
of the time and starkly exposing the political orientation and 
rational calculation of the Court and its members’ (Mazmanyan 
2010:207); the decision stated that ‘the evidence of duly legally 
formulated and evidentially justified electoral violation has not 
been significant enough to have materially impacted the results 
of the election’ (ibid.), thus sealing the election of Kocharian.  
 
The outcomes of both the elections provided controversial 
results that subsequently affected the political scenario in 
Armenia. On one side the political scene became ever more 
polarized between the governing forces and the opposition; on 
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the other the stability of the new governing coalition was not 
guaranteed. As a matter of fact, soon after the election, tension 
rose among the parties forming the coalition, meanwhile the 
opposition parties disrupted parliamentary procedures. 
President Kocharyan aimed to increase his own political base 
with the creation of the Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP) in 
2004, which was contrasted by the Republican Party led by the 
Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan (Markarov 2016). The two parties 
began to compete against one another, which had some effects 
during the 2007-2008 electoral cycle.  
 
The president was thus finally elected two months after the 
election. This was the last term for Kocharian, as the constitution 
allows for a maximum of two presidential terms; the president 
himself affirmed soon after his 2003 reelection that he would not 
be seeking to alter the constitution in order to obtain a third term 
(Hale 2015). It was the perfect time to reskill the constitutional 
amendments that were covered up in the 2003 referendum. This 
time the authority conducted the political campaign, they cut off 
any possible dissident voices (with unbalanced media coverage 
for the opposition party); they also failed to invite the 
OSCE/ODIHR observers, claiming that ‘the needs assessment 
report is unfairly critical towards the government and intends to 
create a misperception of the referendum campaign, and that the 
OSCE/ODHIR did not give a positive follow-up to the 
Armenian authorities’ invitation to monitor the 2003 
Referendum’ (Council Of Europe Armenia Referendum 2005:3). 
The official results of the referendum were as follows: the 
turnout was of 65,4% (out of 1,514,545 registered voters), out of 
which 93,2% had voted in favor of the constitutional 
amendments and 5,4% against. 
 
The amendments changed the balance of power between the 
legislative and executive branches of the government. In 
particular, the government and its prime minister became 
accountable to the National Assembly instead to the president; 
the prime minister would also be appointed by the President but 
it cannot be removed by the latter; moreover, the President 
would no longer have the authority to dissolve the parliament; 
finally, the government increased its areas of responsibilities 
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including new issues in domestic power as well as in foreign 
policy domain (Markarov 2006); This meant that whereas 
between 1995 and 2005 Armenia was a president-parliamentary 
regime, now it has a premier-presidential form of semi-
presidentialism (Markarov 2016). In terms of the electoral 
system, ninety seats were filled on the basis of a national 
proportional contest of party or bloc lists, without preferential 
voting; with a threshold of five per cent (for political parties), or 
of seven per cent (for coalition). The remaining 41 seats were 
filled by majoritarian first-past-the-post contests in single-
mandate constituencies; in the majoritarian contests, the 
candidate polling the highest number of votes was the winner 
(OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 2007). The amendments entered into 
force starting from the next parliamentary election in 2007. 
 
The international community endorsed these reforms. In 
particular, the Venice Commission affirmed that they ‘would 
constitute a good basis for ensuring the compliance of the 
Armenian Constitution with the European standards in the 
fields of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law, and would pave the way to further European integration’ 
(Venice Commission Armenia 2004:7). Meanwhile, the European 
Union was fostering its ties with Yerevan within the new 
European Neighboring Policy. In fact, in May 2005 a new Action 
Plan for Armenia was launched, which aimed to strengthen 
bilateral cooperation with the EU. Subsequently, in 2006, a 
Coordinating Committee headed by the President of Armenia 
was established to coordinate the activities of various ministries 
and governmental bodies with the EU institutions. These 
developments were very well assessed by the European Union, 
which positively acknowledged the progress made in 
implementing the ENP programme (Delcour and Duhot 2011). 
At the same time as these improvements both the United States 
and the European Union ‘warned Armenia’s government that 
the continuation of aid programmes would depend on the 
conduct of the general election’ (Economist Intelligence Unit 
Armenia 2007:8), clearly demonstrating their dissatisfaction 
about the 2003 elections.  
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The upcoming parliamentary election in 2007 was characterized 
by a rediscovered unity among majority parties. In fact, for this 
election the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) sealed a deal 
with Prosperous Party, founded in 2004 by businessman Gagik 
Tsarukyan. Analysts have understood Prosperous party’s 
appearance, on one side, as a way for Kocharian to secure a 
personal power base in the country once Serz Sargsyan would 
become president in 2008; on the other, it was understood ‘as an 
effort to ensure that Sargsyan, who was also Republican Party 
chief, did not completely dominate parliament’ (Hale 2015:357). 
Moreover, the 2007 parliamentary election was marked by the 
return on the political scene of Ter-Petrosyan, which led the 
revived PANM during the political campaign. The return of the 
former President was a shock for the political establishment; 
indeed, ‘Ter-Petrosyan still had status as the architect of the 
country’s independence […] and informal patron of an extensive 
network of people who had played major roles in his regime 
(Hale 2015:358). Ter-Petrosyan started to heavily accused both 
Kocharian and Sargysan to be state criminal and alleged their 
implications in the 1999 massacre (Azatutyun 28/10/2009).  
 
Eventually, in an election that was judged by international 
observers as an improvement and conducted largely in 
accordance with OSCE commitments and other international 
standards for democratic elections, together the RPA and 
Prosperous gained more than 48% of the votes. The electoral 
management improved substantially in several forms: the CEC 
demonstrated ongoing efforts to enhance the transparency of 
election procedures for the first time, there was a central 
computerized voter register under the authority of the police 
and the public media adhered to legal requirements concerning 
allocation of free airtime during the official campaign period (see 
OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 2007). Observers also reported few 
instances of voters apparently using fraudulent passports for 
identification, of vote buying, and of individuals voting more 
than once (ibid.). Some opposition parties tried to call for public 
demonstrations as they were not satisfied with the conduction of 
the election, however they did not encounter huge support both 
domestically and internationally (Economist Intelligence Unit 
Armenia 2007).  
	 167	
 
The former Chairman of the Central Bank, Tigran Sargsyan, was 
appointed as Prime minister of Armenia, replacing Serzh 
Sargsyan. The election proved to be important for the regime 
that could test the grip over the country before the 2008 
Presidential election, when Kocharian was planning the 
succession with his ally Serz Sargsyan. Moreover, it was a 
necessary positive step vis à vis the international community, 
which was exerting a higher leverage in the country. Thanks to 
the positive assessment of the OSCE/ODIHR mission, the U.S. 
and the EU did not stop the aid programme for the country, 
which was at stake in case of negative assessment (Economist 
Intelligence Unit Armenia 2007). This was particularly stressed 
by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, at the time President of 
the EU Council, who after the election claimed that she was 
‘very much in favor of intensifying cooperation with Armenia. 
This would breathe new life into the European Neighborhood 
Policy and the Action Plan agreed under it’ (quoted in Nichol 
2007:5) 
 
The next year, in the run-up to the presidential election, on the 
27th October Ter-Petrosyan launched his candidacy for the 
presidency. The date chosen was strategic, as the 27th October 
1999 was the day of the terrorist attack in the Parliament. Ter-
Petrosyan continued to play the blaming card against the current 
political establishment: ‘This massacre heralded the start of a 
cleaning up operation that enabled Robert Kocharian to take 
power’ said Ter-Petrosyan, who affirmed that he would have 
punished this terrorist act if he had been elected head of State. 
(The European Elections Monitor 2008). Ter-Petrosyan proved 
able to mobilize some voters and raise public attention, making 
it more difficult for to Kocharian to smoothly conduct the 
succession (Economist Intelligence Unit Armenia 2008). 
 
Eventually, Sargsyan won the election at the first round with 
52.8% of the preferences. The victory was controversial and both 
opposition candidates and international observers reported 
occurrences of frauds and malpractices. The OSCE/ODIHR 
observer mission final report stated that the 2008 presidential 
election mostly met OSCE commitments and international 
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standards in the pre-election period and during voting hours; 
however, ‘vote count demonstrated deficiencies of accountability 
and transparency, and complaints and appeals procedures were 
not fully effective’ (OSCE/ODIHR 2008:2). It is noteworthy to 
underline that during the 2007 parliamentary election, the 
authorities did not resort to using brazen methods of fraud such 
as ballot box stuffing or violent incidents and intimidations 
(which occurred only in few polling stations). Rather, this time, 
there were other episodes of electoral malpractices, which can be 
categorized as clientelist practices (vote buying, government 
officials participating in political campaign whilst performing 
official duties, blackmails). These practices are condemned but 
they represent a ‘soft’ breach of the electoral integrity (if 
circumscribed). Despite the presence of these practices, both the 
2007 and 2008 elections were considered in line with 
international standards.  
 
However, Ter-Petrosyan, who received 21.5 percent of the vote, 
called for nullification of the election. Subsequently he led 
protests in the streets that reached approximately 15,000 people 
and lasted for 12 days. The government reacted harshly, 
declaring a twenty-day state of emergency that suspended most 
civil rights and allowed the government to assume extraordinary 
powers to restore order (Bunce and Wolchik 2011), in what has 
been understood as one the most serious political crisis in nearly 
a decade (EIU Armenia 2008). The protests were brutally broken 
up by the police and troops of the Interior Ministry, in the 
clashes 8 people died and over 400 were wounded. In addition 
the regime arrested numerous opposition figures and placed 
Ter-Petrosyan under house arrest. According to some of the 
interviews I gathered to Armenian analysts, the peril of a 
revolutionary contagion was extremely high, therefore the 
authorities carried out a savage repression in order to deter a 
possible colored revolution. The international community, in 
particular the U.S. and the EU criticized the repression and 
urged for an independent investigation on the events, and the 
United States decided to cut aid for a $67 million road 
construction programme (Eurasianet, 17/06/2009).  
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The Sargsyan’s years 
Serz Sargsyan began his presidency claiming that he would 
strengthen the rule of law, reduce corruption and ensure fair 
business competition. Yet, the crisis of legitimacy that affected 
the Armenian regime worsened because of the global economic 
crisis that since 2009 started to affect the country. The regime 
had to engage in some actions that would consolidate its 
legitimacy both domestically and internationally. One of the 
tools for regaining popular and international consensus was to 
allow civic participation and to show a less coercive apparatus 
vis à vis the society. One of the results concerned the civil society 
sector. Since those years, NGOs and other civil society 
organizations started to flourish and became more active. They 
found a receptive environment, where they were able to 
successfully advocate for different issues. Particularly strong 
were those associations that were lobbying for environmental 
issues which, among other things, contributed to ameliorate the 
condition of miners, preserved waterfalls and halted the 
demolition of a public park (see Ishkanian et al 2013). Therefore, 
despite the harsh repression and the state of emergency, in the 
subsequent months, the regime allowed for some social activism 
and NGO involvement.  
 
This change ran counter to the repression drift that had been 
taking place since 2003 (see Ishkanian 2008). Moreover, in the 
years following the 2008 election, President Sargsyan took some 
surprising domestic initiatives, which contributed to relieve the 
stress of the political scene. For example, there were general 
prisoner amnesties in 2009 and 2011, when Sargsyan ordered the 
release of about 100 people imprisoned in connection with the 
2008 violence (International Crisis Group 2012). Subsequently 
the government lifted bans on public gatherings, allowing the 
opposition ANC and other civic movements to hold rallies on 
the capital’s central Freedom Square ‘an emotional location 
because of its association with that year’s post-election events’ 
(International Crisis Group 2012:3).  
 
At the same time, with the election of Sargsyan for the 
presidency, it is possible to observe a growth in Western 
leverage over Armenia. In fact, President Sargsyan demonstrated 
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to be keener to EU programme toward the region and after a 
cost–benefit analysis of the EU’s offer against the country’s 
specific regional, political and economic context, his 
administration decided to adopt EU rules and regulations 
(Delcour and Wolczuk 2015) in order to foster the cooperation 
aimed at signing an Association Agreement with the EU. There 
were three main factors that led to this change: ‘first, a stronger 
domestic demand for reform templates; second, the perceived 
legitimacy of the EU’s offer, and third, the perceived 
compatibility of EU templates for reforms with Armenia’s 
security reliance on the Russian Federation’ (Delcour and 
Wolczuk 2015:492). Within three years (2010-2013) Armenia 
adopted and implemented substantial reforms in line with the 
EU standards. Therefore, Armenia came under strict observance 
by the EU; in November 2012, the EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, Štefan Füle, 
affirmed that the AA negotiations could be finalized by 
November 2013.  
 
The parliamentary election in May 2012 was one of the biggest 
tests for the Sargsyan administration, which could demonstrate 
that Armenia was able to fulfill international commitment and 
permit legitimate democratic elections. This is one of the reasons 
that led the National Assembly to adopt the new Electoral Code 
in 2011, which was – contrary to what happened for the previous 
one – sent to the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR for a 
final assessment before the adoption. Their joint final opinion 
stated, among other things, ‘[t]here have been a number of 
positive amendments made to the law, which address previous 
Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. 
Amendments, such as the provision of a judicial remedy for all 
electoral disputes, inclusion of quotas for women in the CEC and 
CSECs, clarification on providing assistance to voters in the 
polling station, and broadening the definition for what may be 
the cause for an election to be invalidated, all improve the legal 
framework for elections.’ (OSCE/ODIHR and Venice 
Commission Armenia 2011:18). It is noteworthy to mention that 
the composition of the CEC passed from being composed by 
partisan members to fully professional memberships, in which 
the President of the Republic had a strong limitation to affect the 
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appointment of the members. Yet, despite the Electoral Code 
being in line with most of the recommendations in terms of 
electoral management, the joint opinion stressed the fact that the 
exercise of political will by all stakeholders remains the key 
challenge for the conduct of genuinely democratic elections in 
the Republic of Armenia’ (OSCE/ODIHR and Venice 
Commission Armenia 2011:19).  
 
The Parliamentary elections scheduled for the 6th May 2012, 
were conducted amidst a vibrant and largely peaceful campaign 
and were administered in an overall professional and 
transparent manner prior to the Election Day (OSCE/ODIHR 
Armenia 2012). The result of the scrutiny confirmed the trend 
that the parties in power stay in power. Sargsyan’s party, the 
Republican Party of Armenia, won 44 percent of the vote, while 
Prosperous Armenia Party, won 30 percent; in total the coalition 
supporting the government acquired almost 75% of the seats. 
Despite the generally positive commentary about the conduction 
of the election, there are some important facts that had negative 
weight on the management of the election. The most relevant are 
that, on one side a large number of PEC members withdraw 
from the commission shortly before election day; their 
replacements have not attended the second round of training, 
which resulted in poorer professionalism of the polling officials 
and more violations on election day (International IDEA 
Armenia 2014). Indeed, Arpine Galfayan from International 
IDEA wrote that ‘electoral integrity is the biggest issue faced by 
the EMB today. It is largely controlled by the ruling political 
elites, and is not an impartial and ethical institution’ 
(International IDEA Armenia 2014:104). This election was by far 
the best-managed till then, and it clearly demonstrated the fact 
that Sargsyan was fully committed to accomplish to Western 
leverage requirements.  
 
However, soon after the election the leader of the Prosperous 
Party, Gagik Tsarukian, stated that his party would not join the 
coalition of government. For some commentators this was not an 
unexpected decision, as over the past couple of years, Tsarukian 
has progressively distanced himself from the coalition. The final 
decision not to enter into coalition with the Republican Party 
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triggered speculation about a possible and serious challenge for 
the upcoming Presidential election in 2013. Rumors spread out 
about the idea that former minister of foreign affairs and 
Prosperous MP Vardan Oskanian would be the presidential 
candidate. However, soon after some sections of the media 
started to report these rumors, Oskanian’s Civilitas Foundation 
was charged with money laundering and the parliament, largely 
composed by Republican Party members, voted to strip 
Oskanian of his parliamentary immunity so that he could testify 
in the case (Freedom House Armenia 2013). The Prosperous 
Party was left without a credible candidate, and surprisingly the 
final decision was not to present a candidate for the presidential 
election or to sustain any other candidate (Armenpress.am 
12/12/2012). Despite many possible explanations having been 
given to understand this political decision (RFE/RL 17 
December 2012), Tsarukian’s choice is still not clear. Since then, 
senior party officials have repeatedly stressed that Prosperous is 
not in opposition but rather sees itself as ‘a constructive 
alternative’ (RFE/RL 27 May 2013). The 2013 Presidential 
election was characterized by the defection of another 
challenging leader: Ter-Petrosyan, who claimed that he wouldn’t 
run as candidate; the former President explained that he was too 
old to have the energy to run for another campaign. Thus the 
main opponent became Raffi Hovannisian, who was the founder 
of Heritage, a small opposition liberal party.  
 
As a result of all of this, the race to the presidency became 
smoother for Serzh Sargysan, who eventually could assure the 
election at first scrutiny with more than 59% of the preferences. 
The OSCE/ODIHR final reports stated that ‘[w]hile the Election 
Day was calm and orderly, it was marked by undue interference 
in the process, mainly by proxies representing the incumbent, 
and some serious violations were observed’ (OSCE/ODIHR 
Armenia 2013:1). In particular, the report assessed there were 
some problems with voter registration procedures and voter 
lists59 that raised concerns about the integrity of the electoral 																																																								
59 An OSCE/ODIHR EOM analysis of final results as published by the 
CEC shows a close correlation between the voter turnout and the 
number of votes for the incumbent (see OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 2013). 
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process (OSCE/ODIHR Armenia 2013). The opposition 
candidate Hovannisian claimed real victory because he claimed 
that there were high-level of frauds and started a hunger strike 
in the middle of Freedom Square. At the same time there were 
organized mass rallies by the opposition to push the President to 
resign. The Armenian authorities experienced again the perils of 
a revolution, which was even labeled as a ‘Barevolution’. The 
contentious election result was once again assessed by a decision 
of the Constitutional Court, which issued a statement 
recognizing Sargsyan’s victory. Nevertheless, the protests 
continued; the purpose of the demonstrations shifted towards 
expressing public discontent with the state of affairs in the 
country, but with lesser public participation (Economist 
Intelligence Unit Armenia 2013). The authorities, which this time 
did not order to clear the square, avoided a bloodbath. 
Eventually the demonstrations smoothly disappeared. 
Moreover, in his inaugural speech President Sargsyan 
acknowledged the fact that there were many Armenians who 
were not happy about the election and about the economic and 
societal condition in general. Therefore, one of the main 
promises was to implement economic reforms aimed to 
ameliorate the current low standards of living (Economist 
Intelligence Unit Armenia 2013).  
 
The following year Armenia was supposed to sign the 
Association Agreement with the EU. However, surprisingly 
Sargsyan decided to withdraw from the signature of the 
Association Agreement with European Union and at the same 
time he declared that Armenia would have joined the Eurasian 
Union. In fact, in the same years Putin started to exert some 
leverage over the region by selling huge amounts of weapons to 
Azerbaijan. In turn, this provoked as deep crisis in Yerevan as it 
was still relying on Russian support for its security’s 
requirements. In this new context, Armenia could not rely 
anymore on the AA with the EU, which was not guaranteeing 
any kind of security framework. Armenia thus accepted to be 
integrated in the Eurasian Union, a project that up until that time 
was not considered achievable by the Armenian political elites 
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(Giragosian 2013).60 Therefore, this choice came as a shock and it 
raised some concerns about possible repercussions in terms of 
democratic development in Armenia. As a matter of fact, some 
EU-funded projects that were aimed at enhancing democratic 
governance were suspended in the aftermath of the signature of 
the Eurasian Union.61 
 
In summary, the development of the electoral management in 
Armenia has been characterized by two mains paths: on the one 
side it is possible to assess a constant amelioration in terms of 
legal framework and a formal improvement of the EMB. On the 
other, an inconsistent improvement in the way authorities 
implemented the legal framework is also noticeable. Moreover, 
there has been an irregular Western pressure over the country, 
which rarely was able to erect valuable tools to protect the 
barrier of electoral integrity in the country. This in turn allowed 
the political elites to be able to deter many electoral challenges 
coming both from the elite and the populations. The fact that 
Armenia did not experience a Colored Revolution has been 
linked to the deeply entrenched patronal network that 
characterized Armenian politics (Hale 2015). However, I 
consider that the political elite has been successful to deter 
protests and revolutionary attempts because it drew important 
lessons to be avoided both from the past as well as from abroad. 
In the next paragraph I am going to better analyze this 
mechanism, which contributed to the retention of power.  
																																																								
60 In an interview to the Armenian prime minister Tigran Sarksian, he 
claimed that Armenia’s ‘reluctance to join the Russian-led Customs 
Union was rooted in several factors. First, the absence of common 
borders with Russia, or with Belarus and Kazakhstan, the two other 
members of the Customs Union, posed a logical impediment to such a 
move. Second, the prime minister explained that “the structure of the 
Armenian economy is very different from that of the economies of the 
Customs Union’s countries that have substantial deposits of energy 
resources and pursue a policy of supporting domestic manufacturers 
through quite high customs duties.” (Giragosian 2013:13). 
61 Author’s interview with an Armenian MP in Yerevan (May 2015). 
	 175	
Learning Episodes in Armenia 
From an electoral mismanagement standpoint, it is possible to 
trace how electoral malpractices evolved in Armenia. The 
country has a long history of fraud and malpractice, which 
affected election results since the 1996 presidential election, 
when Ter-Petrosyan won thanks to massive fraud (Bremmer and 
Welt 1997, Levitsky and Way 2010). Malpractice was 
concentrated particularly in the counting of the ballots phase. 
Observers reported serious breaches of ballot boxe integrity, and 
many episodes where the law was flagrantly disregarded “in 
clear view of international observers” (OSCE/ODIHR 1996:10). 
This practice continued under Kocharian’s presidency. After the 
1998 presidential election, the OSCE/ODIHR observers reported 
ballot box stuffing and other irregularities during vote count 
(OSCE/ODIHR 1998a). Again, after the 2003 Presidential 
election, the OSCE/ODIHR reported that the election failed to 
meet their standards, and experienced serious irregularities 
during voting and the count, including widespread ballot box 
stuffing (OSCE/ODIHR 2003c).  
 
Surprisingly, following the 2008 Presidential election, the 
OSCE’s assessment of the election was more upbeat, reporting 
that the election “mostly met OSCE commitments and 
international standards in the pre-election period and during 
voting hours” (OSCE/ODIHR 2008c:1). Yet, these improvements 
were not the result of better-managed electoral processes,62 but a 
consequence of more discrete electoral manipulation. Like the 
case of Georgia, there was a drastic shift in this period from 
fraud conducted on Election Day to the pre-election period,63 
when international and local observers’ attention is weaker. This 
shift again reflects a reduction in the use of more brazen 
techniques such as ballot stuffing and ballot stealing, in favor of 
the manipulation of voters. In other words, to rig the election, 
authorities relied less on falsifying electoral protocols, and more 
on clientelist practices and unfair propaganda. Additionally, this 
evolution marked a shift in the actors that conducted the 																																																								
62  From 2006 to 2015 Armenia’s scores in electoral process never 
improved beyond 5.50 (source: Nations in Transit). 
63 Author’s interview with IFES expert in Yerevan (May 2015). 
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malpractice. Before 2008, commissioners at polling stations were 
the main perpetrators of malpractice, whereas more recently, 
party supporters emerged as the key actors that rigged elections 
in Armenia.64  
 
Overall, these elements are evidence of innovation and learning: 
tactics to address electoral uncertainties and to prevent post-
electoral protests. In fact, it is possible to suggest that the 
evolution of malpractice in Armenia occurred because of the 
regime’s necessity to appear more legitimate, as a latecomer to 
the other electoral revolutions in the region. As posited by the 
modular phenomena thesis concerning the Colored Revolutions 
(Beissinger 2007), the examples of other countries’ attempts to 
overthrow their regimes presented Armenia with a higher risk of 
regime change, an undesired outcome for the incumbent leaders. 
Thus, in Armenia, there was a combination of local and 
international factors that forced authorities to modify electoral 
malpractices to obtain more legitimacy for the regime.  
 
There are some specific changes in the types of electoral 
malpractice common in Armenia that are worth investigating 
through the innovation and learning framework. Firstly, just as 
in Georgia, vote buying was a key factor that contributed to the 
development of electoral malpractices. Although there were very 
few episodes of vote buying in 2003 (OSCE/ODIHR 2003), this 
practice became a widespread strategy by time of the 2005 
constitutional referendum. In the 2008 presidential election 
OSCE observers received frequent complaints regarding 
“widespread vote-buying and multiple voting through the 
impersonation of voters” (OSCE/ODIHR 2008c:8), but ballot-
stuffing practices sharply decreased. 65  As was observed in 
Georgia, vote buying became a prominent strategy carried out 
by both the incumbent and the opposition. I suggest that 
Armenia, which started to use vote buying in 2003 and 
expanded the practice in 2005, could be seen as pioneering this 
practice in the region.  																																																								
64 Author’s interview with OSCE expert in Yerevan (May 2015) 
65 OSCE/ODIHR Final report records ‘An isolated case of ‘ballot 
stuffing’ was observed at polling station 23/24 (Sevan)’ (OSCE/ODIHR 
2008c:21) 
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Other important elements that have characterized Armenian 
elections since the 1990s are electoral protests (that may turn out 
violent), which have been recognized as a common trait of 
hybrid regimes (Hale 2011). While these protests never resulted 
in a revolution, they became extremely dangerous for the regime 
on many occasions, even leading the regime to call a state of 
emergency in 2008. In fact, since 2003, the regime deliberately 
sought to win the election in the first round of balloting to 
minimize the possibility of protests. Authorities looked at the 
Bulldozer Revolution, which took place in Yugoslavia in October 
2000, and became aware about the perils of a second round of 
elections. The Bulldozer Revolution emerged during the 
aftermath of the first round, when the Federal Electoral 
Committee claimed that no candidate won over 50% of the votes 
and called for a second round. In the intervening timespan, 
opposition groups were able to gather and unite their efforts to 
overthrow the incumbent.  Drawing from this example, 
authorities resorted to the widespread use of administrative 
detentions when Kocharyan was unable to win in the first round 
of the 2003 presidential election. Despite the fact that the rallies 
and demonstrations that ensued were largely peaceful, the 
second round was clouded by the administrative detentions of 
over 200 opposition supporters (OSCE/ODIHR 2003c:1). These 
acts were seen as “an obvious attempt to intimidate and disable 
the opposition before the run-off” (Human Right Watch 2004:3). 
Nonetheless, despite the fact the elections fell short of 
international standards, authorities could not assure 
Kocharyan’s victory at the first round.  
 
Likewise, during the 2008 election, the Republican Party wanted 
to avoid a second round for several reasons.66 Firstly, authorities 
feared a similar outcome as the Orange Revolution. Secondly, 
the Republican Party political establishment was apprehensive 
of Ter-Petrosyan’s return to politics. Finally, there was high 
uncertainty over Serzh Sarghysan’s succession, as Kocharan was 
unable to run for a new mandate. The Armenian authorities had 
to assure victory in the first round to avoid triggering dangerous 																																																								
66 Author’s interview with an election expert in Yerevan (May 2015). 
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protests. (Tucker 2007). Sarghysan ultimately won during the 
first round, with 53% of the votes. However, thousands of 
people still poured into the streets protesting against alleged 
irregularities. The government declared a state of emergency 
and, despite international pressure, reacted using violence and 
administrative detentions. The clashes eventually caused at least 
ten casualties and only ended when Ter-Petrosyan called for a 
stop to the demonstrations. A second round was avoided even in 
the 2013 presidential election as well, yet this time the regime 
was able to hinder67 the presence of a strong competitor far before 
the election (Nations in Transit Armenia 2014).  
 
These episodes provide evidence of two different kinds of 
electoral malpractices affecting elections. The authorities in 
Armenia learned from other countries’ experiences that a second 
round of elections could be risky, and developed tactics to limit 
protestor disruptions at polling stations. In this way, the 
Republican Party was able to secure victory in the first round, 
avoiding a risky runoff election. As a tactic, the practice of 
administrative detention had been used in Armenia since the 
mid-1990s, but the recent approach has been more brazen, with 
defendants unable to present evidence or call witnesses to testify 
on their behalf. 
 
In addition, during the 2008 election, the use of surveys and exit 
polls was altered by authorities. In unconsolidated democracies, 
exit polling can be manipulated to validate falsified election 
returns in the public mind (Kharchenko and Paniotto 2010). The 
Armenian government aimed to avoid the scenarios that had 
occurred in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, when 
independent exit polls helped to trigger protests in Maidan 
Square. Armenian authorities therefore restricted independent 
surveys and set up their own controlled system of exit polling.68 
Consequently, the Baltic Survey/Gallup shaped public opinion 
during the pre-election period through Election Day in 2008. 
Doubts still persist over the true extent of this agency’s 																																																								
67 Author’s interview in Yerevan (May 2015). 
68 Author’s interview with election expert from IFES in Yerevan (May 
2015). 
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independence, 69  which delegated the Armenian Sociological 
Association to conduct the surveys on behalf of the International 
Republican Institute (OSCE/ODIHR 2008c:8). As one analyst 
from the Open Society Institute in Armenia explains, exit polls 
were adopted as a façade.70 In fact, during the last two presidential 
elections, exit polls either closely matched official results, or 
reported figures highly skewed in favor of the incumbents. 
 
A final method of manipulation that has contributed to the 
evolution of election management in Armenia is the use of 
government-operated nongovernmental organizations 
(GONGOs) in electoral observation. GONGOs first appeared in 
the Soviet period (Podrabinek 2010), but became far more 
widespread beginning in the mid-1990s. Just as foreign non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) provided election 
assistance according to principles of electoral integrity (Fisher 
1997), authoritarian regimes established GONGOs as a 
countermeasure. In particular, the Slovak President Vladimir 
Mečiar was one of the first to set up ‘parallel’ NGO to compete 
with independent NGOs (Gershman and Allen 2006). In 2007, 
there was a boom in NGOs involved in electoral monitoring 
activities. Many of these NGOs did not have any previous 
engagement in democracy-building projects, yet they were 
granted the opportunity to be present in polling stations.71 The 
large majority of these NGOs (46 out of 52) did not subsequently 
provide a report of their monitoring activities.72  
The GONGOs’ issue produced some particularly negative effects 
on the way civil society organizations worked with electoral 
management. Firstly, they called into question the independence 
of civil society (Nation in Transit Armenia, 2008). Secondly, they 
hindered the effectiveness and fairness of voting process 																																																								
69 Author’s interview with election expert in Yerevan (OSCE) and OSI 
(May 2015). 
70 Author’s interview with election expert from OSI Armenia in Yerevan 
(May 2015). 
71 Until 2011 NGOs had simply to fulfil an accreditation request to the 
CEC whose sole selecting system consisted in checking whether NGOs’ 
statutes had the words ‘democracy and protection of human rights’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2007:17). 
72 Author’s interview with election expert at CEC Armenia (May 2015). 
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(including the unbalanced presence of partisans in polling 
stations, pressuring and controlling voters, and publicizing 
favoring reports). During the 2013 presidential election, even 
some international NGOs appeared to behave like domestic 
GONGOs. In fact, some GONGOs adopted names close to well-
known international organizations. 73  For example, when 
comparing the OSCE and the International Expert Center for 
Electoral Systems (ICES) pre-election reports, there are serious 
discrepancies, particularly concerning the quality of voter 
registers, media coverage and the authorities’ effectiveness to 
cope with fraud and malpractice. Some journalists have 
questioned the credibility of ICES and other international NGOs 
as well (RFE/RL 09/10/2013). 
 
Type of 
Malpractice 
When 
introduced 
Type of 
learning 
From where 
Vote Buying Since 
2003/5 
Negative 
Learning  
n/a 
Avoid 2nd 
Round in 
Presidential 
elections 
Since 2003 
but 
successful 
only from 
2008 
Negative 
Learning 
 
Bulldozer 
and Orange 
Revolutions 
Administrative 
Detentions 
Since 2003 Positive 
Learning 
From past 
(90s)  
Biased Exit 
Polls 
Since 2008 Negative 
Learning 
Ukraine 2004 
GONGOs Since 2007 Negative 
and 
Positive 
Learning 
Negative 
from 
activism of 
NGOs in 
electoral 
revolutions. 
Positive from 
Slovakia 
Table 2: Electoral malpractices in Armenia. 
 																																																								
73 Author’s interview with election expert with former IFES expert in 
Yerevan (May 2015) 
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In Armenia, as in Georgia, tactics for electoral manipulation have 
evolved through observation and learning. In particular, 
incumbents took bolder steps to hold on to power and changed 
tactics in the early 2000s when they suffered more from electoral 
uncertainties. In fact, on one side the diffusion of the Colored 
Revolutions and frequent local protests, and on the other the 
new ‘Europeanization’ path launched through the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union, gave 
Armenian authorities cause to worry about a possible electoral 
revolution. The fact that Armenia did not experience a Colored 
Revolution has been linked to the deeply entrenched patronal 
network that characterizes Armenian politics (Hale 2015). 
However, this chapter claims that the political elite has been 
successful in deterring protests and revolutionary attempts 
because it drew important lessons on how to better rig the 
electoral process and to avoid electoral protests. Therefore, 
learning mechanisms were employed to manage electoral 
uncertainty without eliciting international condemnation. They 
introduced new tools (surveys, vote buying), but also drew on 
past experiences (administrative detention, GONGOs) and 
experiences from abroad (Ukraine’s second round of elections). 
In doing so, they reduced the incidence of more traditional, and 
often more brazen, forms of fraud. 
Conclusion 
Armenia’s case shares some common trends with Georgia. On 
one side, it is observable a gradual adoption and implementation 
of democratic reforms and on the other a gradual change in the 
methods of frauds and electoral malpractices. Yet, there are 
many other differences. First of all, in Armenia, despite the fact 
that during the nineties Western leverage was stronger than in 
Georgia the effects of Western democratizing pressure were 
weaker. In order to explain such a variation, the domestic regime 
structure must be taken into consideration. As Levitsky and Way 
assert, the role the state organizational capacity plays is a factor 
that can hinder or reduce Western democratizing pressure. As a 
matter of fact, Armenia had a stronger state apparatus compared 
to Georgia. There are several reasons for this, last but not least 
because of its huge military apparatus, which exerted an 
important role in domestic politics. Moreover, the 1999 terrorist 
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attack at the Parliament slowed down democratic development 
for the entire Kocharyan presidency. Western actors at that 
moment reduced the pressure over the country, which was 
experiencing a difficult time. There was not an interest to 
pressurize Kocharyan presidency in terms of electoral integrity.  
 
Another element that characterizes the Armenia experience is 
Russian support. Since the early nineties, Moscow directly 
sustained Yerevan especially from a military standpoint. This 
relationship permitted Yerevan to suffer less from security 
concerns and it allowed Armenia to avoid a desperate quest for 
the inclusion into the Western security framework. However, the 
relationship with Russia was not always linear, and sometimes it 
collided with the Armenian political elites’ preferences. In the 
last years, the case of the Armenia accession to the Eurasian 
Union is very emblematic. In a first phase, the Armenian 
authorities dismissed this possibility, as it was unthinkable to 
join an economic union with countries not adjacent. At the same 
time Armenian political elites were fulfilling all the procedures 
to sign the AA/DCFTA. As I explained so far, Russia’s pressure 
was a key determinant which swung Armenian’ preferences.  
 
Therefore, the context in which the Armenian authorities 
operated was multifaceted and the barriers to the electoral 
integrity were weaker than in Georgia. This allowed the 
Armenian authorities to resort often to brazen rigging methods 
and at the same time to repress public demonstrations more 
harshly. Western leverage was effective only in certain moments, 
when it was united and when it set veritable ultimatums. As 
analyzed so far, the West was particularly demanding for the 
2007 elections.74 As a matter of fact, despite the perils concerning 
the return of Ter-Petrosyan and the spread of revolutionary 
virus, Armenian authorities managed to set up an election that 
was conducted largely in accordance with OSCE commitments 
and other international standards.  
 																																																								
74  At this election, OSCE/ODHIR sent a huge observation mission 
composed more than 450 observers, whereas for the 2003 
parliamentary election it was composed by less than 200 observers. 
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What about electoral frauds and malpractices? In Armenia, it is 
observable a smooth and gradual development of new forms of 
electoral malpractices only since early 2000, when vote-buying 
was for the first time widely used. The real breakage in terms of 
methods of frauds and malpractices occurred since the 2007 
elections, when authorities left brazen methods to rig the 
elections (such as ballot box stuffing) and anticipated fraudulent 
activities in the pre-election period. However, if we take into 
consideration the harsh repression of demonstrators after the 
2008 presidential election, we can claim that the Western 
democratizing pressure was working just for what concerns 
electoral integrity. As a matter of fact, when the regime felt 
insecure about possible revolutionary movements, it did not 
spare violent reactions.  
 
Therefore, the Armenian case displays ambivalent outcomes for 
what concern Western democratizing pressures over electoral 
management and mismanagement. This ambiguity has been 
recently reinforced by the accession to the Eurasian Union. It will 
be very interesting to analyze what kind of consequences this 
choice, which creates a new context, will have over the 
authorities’ options concerning electoral frauds and 
malpractices.  
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Chapter 6: 
The Case of Azerbaijan 
 
 
‘Democracy is not an apple you buy at the market  
and bring back home.’  
– Heyidar Aliyev, former president of Azerbaijan 
Introduction 
Azerbaijan is the most controversial case as it has several 
differences in comparison with the two other countries under 
analysis. The first one is that according to some scholars, 
Azerbaijan never experienced a democratic breakthrough and 
therefore it must be understood as stable authoritarian regime 
(Roeder 1994; Mamed-zadeh 2001). However, there are several 
others scholar who have analyzed the country’s patterns of 
development in the last two decades and deduced that 
Azerbaijan could be considered a form of hybrid regime (Susan 
Hyde and Nikolay Marinov 2009, Nodia and Stefes 2015), in 
particular for what concerns the period in between 
independence and 2005 (Ottaway 2003; Prygoda 2003; Gulyev 
2005). Indeed, there are some other scholars who underline how 
for a certain moment in Azerbaijan history there has been a sort 
of partial ‘democratizing’ breakthrough mainly because of 
Western international pressure (cf. Cornell 2001; Yunusov 2011; 
Abbasov 2011). Nevertheless, in comparison to the other two 
South Caucasian countries, Azerbaijan scores higher in the scale 
of authoritarianism (see Polity V or Freedom House).  
 
Another difference is that there is a very limited amount of 
research done on Azerbaijan political institutions, and therefore 
there are still some grey zones concerning the real extension of 
the Aliyev’s system of power. Despite the different labels that 
researchers give to the regime’s structure, ‘Azerbaijan’s politics 
has been elite-dominated, but we know very little about who 
holds power (and how) in this ex-Soviet republic’ (Guliyev 
2012). The tight network of power, described as pyramidal, is 
composed by regional ‘clans’ (Rasizade, 2004; Bunce and 
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Wolchik, 2008; Gojayev, 2010; Guliyev 2012), which have been 
hardly investigated by researcher and scholars. However, there 
is a more recent literature that is reducing the impact of such 
‘clans’ on grouping and commanding over all the different facets 
of the society (cf. Hale 2015). In addition, there are very few 
analyses about electoral developments in Azerbaijan and with 
the recently episodes about crunching on opposition 
movements, as well as the close down of media and civil society 
independent platforms, it became more difficult observing the 
inner mechanisms of the regime. 
 
From an international point of view, Azerbaijan experienced 
medium to low leverage and a high linkage with the West. As 
the other South Caucasian countries, Azerbaijan suffered from a 
general disinterest in the early nineties, yet to be under the 
international spotlight in the mid-nineties for the signature of the 
contract of the century. However, linkage did not trigger 
leverage, and the country remained overlooked by international 
democratization’s programme till the end of the century. This 
was the time when Azerbaijan entered into the Council of 
Europe, negotiated with the EU a new partnership, and when 
the domestic political elite began the process of the dynastic 
succession between the Aliyev father and son, which proved to 
be a very delicate passage. In these years, up until 2005, 
Azerbaijan suffered from international pressure, as it was one of 
its weakest moments. Subsequently, once Ilham Alyiev was able 
to consolidate his power, Azerbaijan began to take the distance 
from the West and eventually Baku decided to close down the 
OSCE office in the country and to impose strict restrictions to the 
OSCE/ODIHR mission to the 2015 parliamentary election. At 
the same time, economic linkages with the West continued to 
grow, in particular since 2005, when there was growth in the oil 
and gas production. Therefore, Azerbaijan is one of the few cases 
where there has not been a consistent development between 
linkage and leverage. In fact, the electoral integrity (but not only 
this) worsened in the last decade. Azerbaijan, thanks to its 
foreign policy preferences, as well as its economic independency, 
has been able to challenge and to elude electoral integrity 
barriers with innovative stratagems. 
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The Early Years and the Establishment of Democratic 
Institutions 
Since its independence Azerbaijan has acquired and developed 
democratic institutions, as well as a Constitution that sealed the 
founding principles of the regime. Azerbaijan’s transition from 
Soviet rule was characterized by the development of a strong 
nationalistic sentiment in reaction of the Nagorno Karabach 
issue. Since 1988, when the Soviet Regional Council of Karabach 
voted in favor of secession to Armenia, there were reviving 
sentiments against Moscow and Yerevan, which culminated in 
the massacre of the Black January in Baku and the intervention 
of Soviet troops to restore order in Azerbaijan. However, in the 
aftermath of the 1991 events in Moscow, mass demonstrations all 
around Azerbaijan forced the Soviet ruler, Ayaz Mutalibov, to 
resign from power and to dismantle the Soviet system. The 
country acquired full independence on 18th January 1991. The 
nationalist movement, which was repressed by the Soviet 
apparatus, the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF), was eventually 
included in the National Council that replaced the Soviet 
Council.  
 
The APF soon became the most important political actor in the 
country, as – at that time – it was embodying lively popular 
sentiments, such as anti-Russian and anti-Armenia stances. The 
public was eager to begin a new life as quickly as possible. The 
1992 Presidential election saw the victory of the APF leader 
Abulfaz Elchibey, in a scrutiny that has been considered as a 
fundamental turn for democratic transition (Ottaway 2003). 
Indeed, since independence a number of new political 
movements and organizations were mushrooming, and they 
contributed to the development of a multiparty system. From an 
electoral management standpoint, this first election was ruled by 
the new Law on the Election of the President of the Azerbaijan 
Republic. This law, which was approved on 26 June 1991, was 
not very different from the previous electoral laws of the Soviet 
times (Idea 2004b:42). Subsequent modifications in 1992 and 
1993 ‘were largely cosmetic and did not change its essence or its 
main content’ (ibid.).  
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Soon after Elchibey took power, he carried out sweeping policy 
changes from their very first days in office (Yunusov 2011). In 
October 1992, Azerbaijan pulled out of the CIS, and six months 
later the Russian army withdrew from the republic. Despite the 
efforts to reform the country’s foreign policy, the president and 
the APF were not ‘even remotely prepared to govern the 
country’ (Ottaway 2003:56) and the government was having a 
hard time in taking full control over many important sectors of 
the administration, the army included. As a matter of fact, the 
Communist networks were still alive and they were refraining 
the government to fully transform the regime. In addition, the 
war with Armenia over the control of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
was debilitating the country, which suffered from many defeats 
and was left with no external support. In February 1993 the 
political crisis reached its peak when the President ousted his 
official representative in Nagorno-Karabakh – Surat Huseinov, 
who in turn refused to comply and some months later marched 
with paramilitary troops toward Baku. At that moment Elchibey 
resigned and Heydar Aliyev, the former First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of Azerbaijan, became the acting President 
thanks to Soviet succession rules, which were still working in the 
country. 
 
Aliyev’s first move was to nominate Huseinov as his prime 
minister in order to avoid an armed confrontation and to 
reestablish political stability in the country. The Aliyev 
presidency was further legitimized by the election in November 
1993, where he gathered more than 98% of the votes. Since that 
election, Heydar Aliyev started to oust all the former APF 
members from positions of power and to centralize all the 
different sectors of the state under his control. The process of 
consolidating his power was accompanied on the other side by 
the establishment of democratic institutions, the creation of a 
western-inspired Constitution and the toleration of some kind of 
opposition. Indeed, Aliyev was struggling to find Western 
support ‘in order to portray himself as a democratic leader, he 
needed the existence of certain democratic institutions, such as 
opposition parties, an independent media, and civic 
organizations’ (Yusunov 2011:66).  
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Indeed, the Azerbaijani Constitution, adopted on 12 November 
1995 with a popular referendum, had been crafted following 
liberal democratic principles and it assured the separation of 
powers, a secular states and individual rights among which most 
important principles of the citizens’ electoral rights, including 
those relevant to parliamentary and presidential elections. For 
what concerns the Presidential position, a general election for a 
term of five years was envisaged, whereby no president could 
serve more than two consecutive terms. Moreover, the President 
was ultimately responsible for both domestic and international 
affairs and he could appoint and dismiss members of the cabinet 
and the prime minister as well (Shaffer 2004:29). The 
Constitution envisaged also the creation of a Constitutional 
Court and the regulations for administering at local level.  
 
All these provisions constituted the formal political system, 
which was used more as crowbar accompanying the lever of the 
presidency vis à vis domestic political opposition and external 
players (Heradstvett 2001). On the one had this was a way to 
demonstrate democratic engagement at the international level,75 
as international actors such as the European Union began to be 
more interested in the region. On the 12th June 1995, the Council 
of the European Union (EU) adopted a common position on the 
South Caucasus for the purpose of assisting Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, and Georgia with the difficulties of transitioning to a 
democratic system. This engagement opened up new 
opportunities for cooperation under the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement to be initiated in December 1995, just 
after the Parliamentary election. On the other, the adoption of 
the Constitution, which enshrined presidential power with new 
duties such as the possibility to appoint local authorities vested 
with complete and unaccountable power, paved the way for 
further antidemocratic laws (Gulaliyev 2005). 
 
The 1995 parliamentary election was the first opportunity to test 
the credibility of Aliyev’s engagement in a democratization 
project, and the international actors were particularly interested 
in the process. The regulations concerning the legislative body, 																																																								
75 Authors’ interview with a political analyst in Tbilisi (May 2015). 
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the Milli Majlis, were included in the electoral law on the 12th 
August 1995, which established that the parliament had to be 
elected every five years and it consisted of 125 members, of 
whom 100 were elected in single seats constituencies and the 
remaining 25 were allocated on the basis of a proportional 
nationwide party list system. However, according to the final 
report of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) the election ‘did not correspond to 
internationally accepted norms’ (CSCE 1995:2). The electoral 
malpractices included ballot stuffing, serious irregularities in the 
voting and vote count, arbitrary interpretation of the electoral 
law that led to the disqualification of one-third of the political 
parties and 60 percent of their candidates, and there was good 
reason to ‘suspect that election officials inflated the results to 
meet minimum turnout requirements’ (Ibid.). Despite the fact 
that President Aliyev repeatedly stressed his personal 
commitment to holding free and fair elections as an integral 
aspect of transforming Azerbaijan into a democratic, pluralistic 
society, in this first election authorities tested some methods of 
frauds that were ‘since then repeated in every election’ (Ottaway 
2003:60). Eventually, Aliyev’s New Azerbaijan Party got more 
than 62% of the votes and no other opposition parties gained 
more than 10%. The CEC announced that in 15 districts elections 
were to be reheld in February 1996, due to failures to meet 
minimum turnouts or because of massive infractions.  
 
Meanwhile, on the 18th December 1995 Azerbaijan initialed the 
negotiation for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with 
the EU, which took effect from the 1st January 1999. This would 
have been a first cornerstone for a process that aimed to 
strengthen the links with the West and that eventually would 
have allowed a further integration into Western organizations 
such as NATO and the EU. In an interview President Aliyev 
clearly stated that ‘although Islam is the ideology of some 
countries, in Azerbaijan we are building a secular state based on 
western and world standards. In other words, we are building a 
government based on the recognized principles of democracy 
and universal human rights for all’ (Azerbaijan International 5 
March 1997). Western countries, despite many reports 
concerning the basic violation of human rights and democratic 
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principles, often ‘turned a blind eye to many of Heydar Aliyev’s 
domestic policies’ (Yunusov 2011:69). It must be remembered 
that in September 1994, President Aliyev signed the ‘contract of 
the century’ in terms of oil exploitation with an international 
consortium (mostly composed by Western countries) that 
projected to invest $13 billion. This contract was the cornerstone 
for the economic and political survival of the country, which 
could ‘lead Azerbaijan out of Russian sphere of influence and 
toward the West’ (Ottaway 2003:62). 
 
Yet, the broader issues of the democratization process continued, 
and many flaws in the electoral legislation were addressed from 
a formal standpoint. As a matter of fact, the Venice Commission 
and the OSCE were insisting to review some aspects of the rules 
on the election of the President, and to update it in conformity to 
the requirements of contemporary democratic development. As 
a result, on the eve of the Presidential election in 1998 two laws 
were activated. The first one, the new Law on the Election of the 
President of the Azerbaijan Republic, was adopted on 9 June 
1998. The second one, the law on the Central Electoral 
Commission, was successfully enacted on 15 May 1998. These 
two laws were conceptually different from the earlier ones, 
because they were addressing some specific shortcomings and 
they set standards for the transparency of elections, created 
favorable conditions for candidates, and introduced a new and 
more progressive system for appointing the electoral 
commissions. Overall, these laws had a number of shortcomings 
(Idea 2004b:42), such as the procedures for establishing the 
voter’s registers at the precinct level, unambiguous rules 
regulating the campaign, the ballot printing and security and the 
aggregation of the election results (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 
1998). 
 
The Central Electoral Commission Law envisaged the 
establishment of a permanent 24-member Central Election 
Commission (CEC) and it represented the highest level of the 
election administration. At the second level, 82 Territorial 
Election Commissions (TEC) were appointed by the CEC 70 days 
before election day, following the casting of lots at the territory 
(rayon) level to determine the nine members of each TEC. A 
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similar procedure was implemented no later than 44 days before 
Election Day to form the approximately 4300 PECs, each 
consisting of seven members selected by lot and appointed by 
the respective TEC. According to the Law, both the Parliament 
and the President can appoint respectively half of the members 
of the Central Election Commission. Such a provision favored 
the incumbent as the President’s party dominated the Parliament 
with an overwhelming majority. (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 
1998).  
 
Aliyev won the presidential election in 1998 with 76.1% of the 
vote against weak rivals 76  (EIU Azerbaijan 1998). The 
international monitoring mission by the OSCE/ODIHR stated in 
its final report that the overall election process fell short of 
meeting OSCE commitments and international standards. The 
observers reported that, ‘in several instances, domestic observers 
and unauthorized local officials interfered with the work of the 
Precinct Election Commission’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 
1998:6). Moreover, ‘significant discrepancies between the 
signatures present on the voter lists and the ballots found in the 
boxes were observed during the ballot counting. Additionally, 
observers witnessed clear evidence of ballot stuffing’ (ibid.). 
However, the general atmosphere improved compared to the 
last elections and the understanding of the voting process 
increased. Thus, the scrutiny did not entirely misrepresent 
popular support for the president (EIU Azerbaijan 1998).  
 
Heydar Alyiev was thus able to consolidate his power, with a 
plan that was aimed first of all to secure the interests of his 
family and his inner circle (Yusunov 2011), and secondly to 
prepare his succession. As a matter of fact, since the late nineties 
he started to suffer from cardiac problems and in 1999 he had a 
major heart bypass operation in the United States. At the same 
time, the President was working both domestically and 
internationally to push Azerbaijan toward the West. On one side 
he kept on flattering the West. During his visit in the United 
States, in February 2000, he affirmed that Azerbaijan would like 																																																								
76 In fact, most of opposition candidates decided to boycott the elections 
because of the uneven composition of the CEC. 
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to join NATO in an effort to bring greater geopolitical attention 
in the Caucasus area (cf. Paliani 2002). On the other side, he 
facilitated the development of further democratization steps by 
allowing and inviting experts from international organizations, 
including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe to actively participate in the updating of both the laws 
on Milli Majlis election and on the Central Electoral 
Commission, which eventually were adopted in 2000. 77  The 
international involvement brought significant improvement on 
the electoral legislations and contributed to the decision of the 
opposition to not boycott the upcoming Parliamentary elections 
(Cornell 2001). 
 
On the 5th November 2000 the people of Azerbaijan were called to 
vote for the Milli Majlis. The ruling party, the NAP, won 79 out 
of 124 seats, while the opposition acquired just 13 seats. The 
election was harshly criticized by international observers 
because of the high degree of ballot stuffing, the exclusion of 
monitors in the polling stations, the manipulation of turnout 
figures and interference with electoral protocol. Already in the 
pre-Election day there were problems with political parties’ 
registration. Eight out of thirteen parties that presented the 
50,000 signatures necessary for registration in the party-list 
election were rejected by the CEC. The same problem was 
registered in the single-member constituencies, where more than 
half of the candidates were refused registration. Overall, 
according to international election observers the elections 
‘marked some progress over previous occasions, in particular in 
the preparatory phase and enhanced political pluralism, 
although the overall process fell short of international standards 
for democratic elections’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2000:1). The 
ODIHR conclusion was echoed by the National Democratic 
Institute report that stated that the elections represented “a 																																																								
77 The reformed CEC was thus composed by 18 members appointed for 
a six-year term of office with one-third changed every two years. Six 
were nominated by the party of the parliamentary majority (based on 
the proportional ballot in the preceding elections), a further six were 
nominated by the parliamentary minority parties, with the remaining 
six made of independent lawyers nominated by parliamentary 
deputies who were not members of political parties. 
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continuation of a pattern of seriously flawed elections in 
Azerbaijan that fail to meet even minimum international 
standards” (Council of Europe 9 November 2000:1).   
 
In terms of methods of frauds, observers reported ‘ ballot box 
stuffing, manipulated turnout results and pre-marked ballots 
[…] party proxies frequently suffered intimidation, harassment 
and even arrest […] unauthorized local officials often controlled 
the process and sought to influence voters […] in several 
instances, international observers were denied access to polling 
stations and some were expelled from election commission 
premises […] the vote counting and aggregation of results 
processes were completely flawed and manipulated’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2000:2). Moreover, as a way to 
demonstrate the government’s commitment to the democratic 
principle, the CEC and the Constitutional Court cancelled the 
results in 11 constituencies where serious violations were found, 
and ordered repeat elections only for the single-mandate 
contests.  
 
Given the high international attention on the Election Day ‘the 
regime was attempting to rig the election by keeping its most 
dangerous rivals off the ballot, thus relieving itself of the need to 
alter the results on Election Day’ (Cornell, 2001:126) and the 
government began to manipulate the electoral process months 
before ballot. As a matter of fact, thanks to the contradictions 
and inconsistencies in EMB’s implementation of different 
electoral laws, which were adopted at different times 
(International IDEA 2004b), the authorities could find dubious 
legal means to exclude participants. Moreover, they used some 
coercive measures, including physical intimidation until some 
weeks before the scrutiny. The government was particularly 
keen to exclude Musavat and the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan 
(EIU Azerbaijan 2001:14), led by Rasul Guliyev. However, 
‘foreign criticism about the exclusions was so severe that on 
October 6th Mr Aliyev changed his mind and appealed to the 
CEC to allow all parties to participate in the election’ (Ibid.) 
Following this stance on inclusive participation, the authorities 
resorted to the use of blatant ballot stuffing and other gross 
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election violations that eventually were revealed by the 
international observers in their reports.  
Confronting with Higher Western Leverage 
In December 2000 the Council of Europe, in provision of the 
Azerbaijan accession to the organization (which eventually 
became a reality on January 25th 2001) stated that Azerbaijan 
would be subject to stricter monitoring. At the same time, with 
the outbreak of the war on terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, Azerbaijan became a key ally for the United States as it 
represented a strategic bridgehead in the region (Frappi 2010). 
However, since the election of Putin as Russian President, the 
relationship among the two countries was ameliorating (EIU 
Azerbaijan 2001:15), which led to a deeper cooperation in the 
joint efforts to deter terrorism and smuggling between the 
shared borders. This was the starting point for a divergent path 
that from that moment onwards Azerbaijan took. As a matter of 
fact, the improvement in the relationship between Azerbaijan 
and Russia produced trade off vis à vis the Western leverage.  
 
As soon as Baku recovered his relationship with Moscow, the 
needs for Western assistance became no longer vital. Yet, Russia 
did not directly play the black knight role in Azerbaijan as it had 
done with other countries (see Ambrosio 2009, Levitsky and 
Way 2010), as Moscow could not really rely on Aliyev’s family 
and it would have preferred the former Communist party leader 
Ayaz Mutalibov for Aliyev succession (Cornell 2001). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to trace a common path in democratic 
backlash both in Russia and Azerbaijan, since Putin rose to 
power. In particular, the civil and political rights suffered were 
reduced with spillover effects in the freeness and fairness of the 
elections. Cameron and Orenstein have pictured very clearly the 
downturn of the civil and political rights in Russia and in the 
three South Caucasian countries: there are striking similarities 
between the situation in Russia and Azerbaijan.  
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 Figure 4 Political rights and civil liberties in Russia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 1999–2010. (Source Cameron and 
Orenstein 2012) 
 
The cooperation with the Western institutions was guaranteed 
for what concerned the development of a unified Electoral Code. 
However, the Azerbaijani authorities hided to their population 
the fact that the OSCE/ODIHR, the Venice Commission and the 
International Foundation for Electoral System were involved in 
this process.78 Even the opposition parties were not aware about 
it until December 2002 and subsequently, once they were called 
to work at the draft, they refused to participate in the process. 
The international organizations sent back the reviewed Electoral 
Code with around 300 suggested variations, but only few of 
them79 were modified accordingly (International IDEA 2004b). 
The new Electoral Code was ‘essentially a compilation and 
revision of existing laws’ (Sødergren 2004:5), without substantial 
changes, which however remained a ‘sufficient basis for the 																																																								
78 Author’s interview with Azerbaijani electoral expert in Paris (July 
2015) 
79 According to International Idea ‘a whole range of crucial suggestions 
concerning questions of the establishment of the electoral commissions 
and their activities, the transparency of elections, the procedure for 
filing complaints against violations of the electoral law, and a number 
of others were not taken into account’ (International IDEA 2004b:43). 
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conduct of free and fair elections’ (Ibid). Eventually, the 
population was involved in the last stage of the Electoral Code 
adoption, which was sealed by a popular referendum held on 5 
May 2003, just a few months before the crucial Presidential 
election.  
 
The presidential election, scheduled for the 15th October 2003, 
was perceived as a ‘window of opportunity’ (Yunusov 2011:69), 
by both international and domestic actors and it created high 
expectations on the government’s capacity to deal with it. The 
regime was experiencing a very delicate period. On the one side, 
Alyiev father had a rapid decline in his health conditions and he 
was hospitalized in the United States,80. On the other, Aliyev was 
aware that he could not count on his political apparatus to 
maintain control and thus had to rely on his son (Ottway 2003). 
Yet, the dynastic succession could exacerbate intra-elite tensions 
and provoke a rupture among the ruling class. Therefore, the 
process aimed to carry out the dynastic succession to Alyiev’s 
son, Ilham, began few years before.  
 
In 1995 Ilham was elected in the parliament and subsequently in 
1999 entered in the PAN political establishment. Subsequently, 
in 2002 Aliyev’s father proposed some constitutional 
amendments that would ease the path for the dynastic 
succession. The amendments allowed Heydar to appoint his son 
as Prime Minister on august 2003 (this move already put Ilham 
in the first position to take over his father in case of death).81 
Subsequently, the PAN nominated Heydar Aliyev as its 
candidate for the Presidential election; they decided that it was 
better not to weaken Heydar position and to avoid deepening 
the lame duck effect on the President (cf. Hale 2015).  Ilham 
announced his willingness to run as independent (he was 
supported by an ‘initiative group) a decision that was met with 																																																								
80 The real conditions of the former president were not made public 
until the scrutiny was passed. Author’s interview with Azerbaijani 
journalist in Tbilisi (May 2015) 
81  In addition the amendments eliminated the proportional list 
component of parliamentary elections. All 125 members of Parliament 
were elected in single seat constituencies, in a single round of voting.  
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severe criticism (Cornell 2011). Two weeks before the ballot, 
Heydar Aliyev stepped back and endorsed his son.  
 
The effects of this decision were not fully forecasted by the 
government, which could not avoid confusions both internally 
and externally the ruling bloc. The opposition 82  had a great 
opportunity to launch a united strong candidate but ‘proved 
unable to capitalize on this tactical advantage’ (Cornell 
2011:106). Isa Gambar, from the Musavat Party, was the most 
popular opponent but he did not encounter the support of many 
opposition parties and oligarchs. 
 
Despite the weak opposition candidate, the election was 
massively rigged by frauds and electoral malpractices. The 
ODIHR mission reported that the election ‘failed to meet OSCE 
commitments and other international standards for democratic 
elections’, mostly because of a lack of sufficient political 
commitment to implement a genuine election process’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2003:1). Yet, the legal framework, in 
particular after the revision of former electoral laws and the 
recodification in a unified Electoral Code, with all its 																																																								
82 In the early and mid-2000s, beside the Musavat Party, which is one of 
the oldest party in Azerbaijan a new range of opposition parties 
emerged. After Abulfaz Elchibey’s death in 2000, the Popular Front was 
split into the Classical Popular Front led by Mirmahmud Miralioglu, and 
a reformist faction led by Ali Kerimli. The latter is the heir to Elchibey’s 
party. The Azerbaijan Democratic Party, established by Serdar Jalaloghlu 
in 1991, became more active during this period. Jalaloghlu was a 
founder and board member of the Nakhchivan branch of the Popular 
Front from 1988 to 1990. The party’s leadership was handed to Rasul 
Guliyev from 1996 to 2006. Currently, the party is run by Jalaoghlu. 
Rasul Guliyev, now a dissident, was a parliamentary speaker under 
Heydar Aliyev from 1993 to 1996. He established the Open Society Party 
(Açıq Cәmiyyәt Partiyası) in 2007. Later, party leadership was transferred 
to Sulheddin Akber, deputy to the Minister of National Security under 
the Popular Front government. […] the establishment of so many 
parties split the opposition into many unnecessary fragments that 
prevented the opposition from working effectively (Sultanova 2014:20-
21). 
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shortcomings, was acceptable and in line with international 
standards (Sødergren 2003).  
 
The international observers (which also suffered from some 
movement constraints decided by Azeri authorities) observed 
electoral flaws before, during and after the Election Day. In 
particular, the pre-election period was characterized by 
widespread intimidation and unequal conditions for the 
candidates, with inefficient mechanisms for resolution od 
disputes. Observers on the Election Day witnessed ‘significant 
irregularities during voting and widespread fraudulent practices 
during the counting and tabulation of election results, notably 
ballot stuffing and tampering with protocols at both the precinct 
and constituency levels’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2003:2). 
Moreover, new technologies were used in an attempt to threaten 
voters’ right to vote privacy: since the 2003 elections, authorities 
installed video cameras inside the pooling station, allegedly to 
deter fraud, but actually to scare voters, as the video cameras 
were positioned above the voting booths (Sødergren 2004).  
 
In the aftermath of the publication of the election results, which 
inaugurated Ilham Aliyev as the winner of the election with 77% 
of the vote, violent protests broke out in several cities. In 
particular, the opposition objected to Ilham Aliyev’s claim that 
he had won in the first round. The day after, several thousand 
protestors gathered in Azadliq Square in the center of Baku. The 
authorities that forecasted the protests deployed soldiers and 
riot police to the scene, and demonstrators were violently 
dispersed (Sultanova 2014); the clashes had a heavy outcome: 
four people were killed, with many others were injured, 
including almost 100 police officers, and 600 opposition 
members were detained. Moreover, police attacked peaceful 
demonstrators in front of the Musavat Party headquarters and in 
Azadliq Square. These events brought under the spotlight of the 
international media the government policies. Eventually 
authorities had also to confront international judgment on single 
cases regarding mistreatment of demonstrators (such as the case 
of Muradova v. Azerbaijan – see European Court of Human 
Rights 2009). 
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 It is worth noting that since those events, the principal and 
symbolic Azadliq Square in Baku has been closed off for any 
kind of demonstrations. As a matter of fact, from the 2005 
Parliament elections onwards, the authorities denied any public 
gathering in Azadliq Square; demonstrations were subsequently 
organized in smaller and lesser symbolic places such as Galaba 
square. Authorities were very concerned that somehow 
protesters could undertake some sit-in strategies as those that 
characterized the Ukrainian Orange revolution or the Georgian 
Rose revolution, which implied the use of innovative tactics 
(such as rock concerts, pitched tents and colored garments). In 
order to avoid any sort of public gathering Azadliq Square was 
closed down from early 2006 till 2010 allegedly because of 
renovation works at Government House, 83 located nearby the 
square.  
 
Western actors did not raise harsh criticism on what happened 
both during and after the electoral process; thus, the Azerbaijani 
government was able to exploit the situation. Indeed, on one 
side, the preliminary statements by OSCE/ODIHR reported 
minor breaches of the electoral integrity (cf. OSCE/ODIHR 
Preliminary Statement Azerbaijan 2003), and it was extensively 
used by the authorities to assess the integrity of the electoral 
process. Moreover, the Azerbaijani authorities resorted to 
publicizing also the report from the CIS observation mission,84 
which claimed that no serious violations in the conduction of the 
election could be determined. On the other, the West did not 
have any intention to further pressurize the regime because in 
Azerbaijan there were not important factors on which Western 
pressure could have leant upon (Cornell 2011). In particular, 
there was not unity in terms of opposition, the organizational 
strength of the regime was solid, and there was neither an 
independent media nor any organized civil society movements 
that could mount a large-scale get-out-the-vote campaign. These 
factors can play a powerful role to determining the outcome of 																																																								
83 Author’s interview with Azerbaijani political dissident in Paris (May 
2015) 
84 Commonwealth of Independent States observation missions started to 
operate in 2003, however it is not considered to be a high-quality level 
monitoring organization (Bader 2012, Daxecker and Scheider 2014). 
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revolutionary movements (cf. Cornell 2011, Bunce and Wolchik 
2011). Eventually, this two-faced criticism by western 
international organizations provoked a deep disappointment85 
among populations (Yunusov 2011), especially after they saw the 
pressure that international actors mounted few months later to 
unblock the situation in Georgia in the midst of the Rose 
Revolution.  
 
In Azerbaijan the dynastic succession eventually became a 
reality. The election marked the start of ‘a new model of state 
management in the country, with an emphasis on “strong 
statehood” and economic growth’ (Hale 2015:294). However, the 
period between 2003 and 2005 was one of the weakest for the 
government, as the regime was still in a readjustment phase. 
Given the particularly weak situation, and the outbreak of the 
electoral revolution in neighboring Georgia and subsequently in 
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, the authorities continued to make life 
difficult for the opposition by intimidating criticism and 
spreading propaganda through the state-run media.86 Moreover, 
Ilham Alyiev was even more brazen than his father when he had 
to deal with opposition: since he came to power authorities ‘did 
not even bother to conceal the new president’s antipathy toward 
his political opponents, which included all pro-Western, pro-
Russian, and pro-Islamist movements’ (Yunusov 2011:71). The 
younger Aliyev managed to oust some of the most powerful 
networks in his initial coalition and he was able to increasingly 
find a role for his own family’s network (Hale 2015).  
 
The parliamentary elections that took place on November the 6th 
2005, were the testbed for the new political establishment, not 
only for the younger Aliyev’s capacity to hold on to power vis à 
vis the opposition forces, but also to assess the unity of the ruling 
elite (Cornell 2011). Many opposition parties, despite suffering 
from repression, participated in the election and they attempted 																																																								
85 The public was particularly annoyed and shocked by the stance of the 
American administration, which not only closed its eyes to the massive 
election fraud and abuse of power, but actually rushed to congratulate 
Ilham Aliyev on his victory even before the official election results 
were announced (Yunusov 2011:70). 
86 Author’s interview with opposition refugee in Tbilisi (May 2015). 
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to challenge the regime (Sultanova 2014). Over 2000 candidates 
and 48 political parties or party blocs contended for the 125 
parliamentary seats. The international organizations were 
deeply involved in the election monitoring and OSCE/ODIHR 
sent 617 short-term observers. As a matter of fact, on the 11th May 
and subsequently on 25th of October President Ilham Aliyev 
issued two Executive Orders setting out updated guidelines for 
free and transparent elections. At that time President Aliyev was 
particularly engaged with the aim of acquiring the international 
reputation as a reformist leader of a country with significant 
geostrategic and economic potential (International Crisis Group 
2005). The President also admitted that in previous elections 
‘there were shortcomings, which were beyond the control of the 
Azerbaijani leadership, he attributed them mainly to 
incompetence, irresponsibility, and, in some cases, to the “post-
soviet mentality” of some bureaucrats and members of the 
Central Election Commission’ (Kara 2007:721). Moreover, on 
June 6th the Electoral Code was amended in order to meet some 
recommendation. Despite some slightly improvements a number 
of shortcomings remained in the electoral framework, in 
particular referring to: the composition of election commissions, 
which remained problematic as it favored the incumbent 
authorities; the Election Code provisions regarding complaints 
were ambiguous, permitting procedural variations; the Law on 
Freedom of Assembly in practice provided local executive 
authorities with considerable discretion to restrict and ban 
election rallies and other campaign events. (cf. OSCE/ODIHR 
Azerbaijan 2005). Overall, Azerbaijan’s electoral system was 
‘identified as one area of democratization where the government 
has shown the least amount of progress’ (Guliyeva 2005:48) still 
in 2005.  
 
However, despite all the formal government attention, as well as 
the massive presence of international observers, the elections 
‘did not meet a number of OSCE commitments and other 
international standards for democratic elections’ (OSCE/ODIHR 
Azerbaijan 2006:3). The observers reported many episodes of 
frauds and electoral malpractices. These included the presence of 
unauthorized persons in the polling stations and interfering in 
the work of election commissioners, intimidation of voters, 
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improper application of inking procedures (i.e., checking voters’ 
fingers for ink), cases of ballot box stuffing, and inflating votes 
for some candidates by swapping ballot papers from one stack to 
another, candidates’ representatives being expelled from the 
count, protocols not being completed in the presence of 
observers or being left blank (cf. OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 
2006). Moreover, it must be signaled the persistence of video 
cameras and the presence of biased exit pollsters in inside 
polling station. The exit polls were a new form of vote 
manipulation, as they would serve the scope of legitimizing the 
official results (I am going to speak about this particular method 
of malpractice in the paragraph concerning frauds and 
malpractices).  
 
President Aliyev was aware about the effects of frauds both at 
the international and domestic arena. Therefore, the day after the 
election in a speech broadcasted on television, he acknowledged 
the fact that there were some episodes of frauds, and that he 
would have set the stage for prosecution of those who were 
responsible. Moreover, he announced that in some cases the 
authorities would have repeated the vote. It was the first time 
that the President broke the ‘climate of impunity for electoral 
frauds’ (Cornell 2011:118). Subsequently, the CEC and the 
Constitutional Court invalidated the results in 6 constituencies 
where the elections had to be repeated. Therefore, the final vote 
count showed that the NAP won 61 seats, the Freedom bloc 5 
seats and many other parties less than 3. However, the 
‘independent candidates’ won 43 seats, scoring +14 seats 
compared to the previous elections. Those independent 
candidates resulted to be affiliated with the NAP, or endorsed 
him once elected (Kara 2007, OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2006). It 
is a way for the regime to claim openness to other political 
actors.  
 
In the aftermath of the publication of the election results, the 
CEC received more than 1000 complaints, which it failed to 
address systematically (cf. OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2006). 
Moreover, opposition parties (in particular the leaders of the 
Freedom Bloc) organized sit-in and manifestations in Baku to 
contest election’s results, but were squashed by the police that 
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massively intervened to wipe-out the demonstrators with tear 
gas and water cannons; the socio-political environment was 
particularly tense as the authorities viewed the attempted sit-in 
actions as ‘an effort to duplicate the techniques used by the 
Ukrainian opposition during the December 2004 Orange 
Revolution’ (Eurasianet 28 November 2005). Moreover, a 
combination of government restrictions and weak popular 
support prevented the opposition from mounting large-scale 
demonstrations in protest at the conduct of the November 2005 
parliamentary election (EIU Azerbaijan December 2005). 
However, the international community soon after the election 
results were displayed acknowledged the election’s outcome, 
conferring legitimacy to the new parliament (Yunusov 2011).    
 
In those years, western international actors (United States in 
particular) had no vested interested in provoking a revolution in 
Azerbaijan. The post-Soviet region was already shocked by the 
Rose Revolution, the Orange Revolution and the Tulip 
Revolution; moreover, Azerbaijan was strategically important to 
the West due to its oil and gas resources; thus, ‘keeping 
Azerbaijan politically stable [had] priority over moving it 
towards becoming a pluralist democratic polity’ (Kara 2007:723; 
Cornell 2011). Moreover, since early 2006 the opening of the new 
oil pipeline connecting Baku to Ceyhan (Turkey) allowed the 
regime to fully exploit its enormous oil reserves. What followed 
was rapid economic growth, which also supplied some ‘visible 
benefits to substantial parts of the population and thus served as 
one important basis for Aliyev’s popular support’ (Hale 
2015:295). According to World Bank data, the country averaged 
economic growth rates of 15 percent between 2003 and 2010. 
That is demonstrated by the Government’s high-appreciation 
rate, which scored 55% of adults that declared to trust or fully 
trust the government, whereas appreciation’s rates in Armenia 
was 42% and in Georgia 31% (Caucasus barometer 2008). 
According to Cornell, Ilham Aliyev ‘has been able to build a 
relatively strong popular following, a task facilitated by windfall 
oil revenues, but he does not generate widespread enthusiasm 
either’ (Cornell 2011:174-175). Azerbaijan, contrary to the other 
South Caucasian countries, is the least exposed to international 
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financial markets, which is one of the reasons why it was not so 
affected by the global financial crisis of 2008. 
A Renovated Stability 
Thanks to the 2005 elections, Aliyev was reassured about his 
entourage and about his grip on the pyramidal power structure87 
that characterizes the country (Hale 2015). In the same year, 
Aliyev ordered the arrest of some prominent ministers in his 
government, who had been challenging his leadership (cf. 
Cornell 2011). The dynastic transition was over. The next period 
of the presidency was characterized by a dramatic shift both 
domestically and internationally. Internally, Aliyev’s 
government crushed even more citizens’ freedoms and civil 
rights, in particular against journalists (cf. Human Right Watch 
Azerbaijan 2010), whereas externally he sought more contacts 
with the West. Since 2006 Aliyev began to visit European 
capitals as well as Washington and signed various cooperation 
agreements with international donors. Subsequently, in 2009 he 
also signed the memoranda within the framework of the EU 
Eastern Partnership. When external actors raised the issue of 
human rights abuses, he replied that the Azerbaijani laws on 
defamation were not in line with European standards and that 
therefore must be amended; moreover, he promised that he 
would have pardoned the journalists sentenced to prison (OSCE 
Yearbook 2009).  
 
Meanwhile he prepared his candidature for the 2008 Presidential 
election. During this campaign Aliyev showed the intention to 
detach from his fathers’ heritage and to propose some kind of 
reformist agenda. He centered his campaign on themes of 
economic progress, local infrastructural improvements, and 
preparation for war - if necessary to regain Nagorno-Karabakh, 
and a battle against corruption (Hale 2015). The opposition did 
not even try hard to win the election, and most of them 
boycotted the election (EIU Azerbaijan December 2008), as it was 
clear that opposition’s candidates did not have any chance to 
win. From a legal point of view, the parliament passed a new 																																																								
87 Author’s interview with Azerbaijani political expert in Tbilisi (May 
2015). 
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law on Freedom of Assembly, which provided with some formal 
ameliorations. Yet, this law was subsequently strictly and 
unfairly implemented, in particular by the local authority in 
Baku (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2008). Afterwards, in an effort 
to address some of the shortcomings individuated by the Venice 
Commission, the parliament amended some aspects of the 
Electoral Code. The 2008 presidential election was organized and 
managed by the CEC, which suffered from the withdrawal of the 
members nominated by the opposition parties. Substitutes joined 
the commission only in October, less than one month before the 
Election Day. However, according to the OSCE/ODIHR 
observation mission, ‘preparations for the election were carried 
out smoothly and within the legal deadlines’ and ‘the 
OSCE/ODIHR EOM enjoyed good cooperation with the CEC’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2008:8).  
 
Ilham Aliyev won the scrutiny during the first round with more 
than 87% of the votes. The second classified was Igbal Aghazade 
from the Azerbaijan Hope party, who scored less than 3% of the 
preferences. The high-percentage of the votes for Aliyev had a 
double explanation. On one side, given that most of the 
opposition candidates boycotted the election, there were not 
serious challengers. On the other, despite the fact that the pre-
election process was better managed in respect to the previous 
elections, many frauds and malpractices were observed during 
the voting acts and voting counts. For what concern the voting 
act, the OSCE/ODIHR observers reported that ‘there were 
important procedural shortcomings, in particular with regards to 
safeguards against multiple voting. In a significant number of 
polling stations, citizens voted in groups or the voters’ secrecy 
was not guaranteed. In some instances, there were indications of 
serious violations, including ballot box stuffing, and apparently 
identical signatures on voter lists, an indicator of electoral 
malfeasance’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2008:3). Subsequently, 
for what concerns the vote count, frauds were even more 
conspicuous with ‘many significant procedural shortcomings 
observed, including failure to follow basic reconciliation 
procedures’ and with cases of ‘tampering with voter lists, results 
and protocols, including some cases of overt manipulation (Ibid). 
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Moreover, the video cameras were still present inside the polling 
stations. 
 
Therefore, this election, despite ‘mark[ing] considerable progress 
towards meeting OSCE commitments and other international 
standards, in particular with regard to some technical aspects of 
election administration, the election process failed to meet some 
OSCE commitments’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2008:1). It was 
the first time that the OSCE/ODIHR pronounced such a 
‘positive’ judgment for a scrutiny in the country. This result was 
determined by two factors. On one side the efforts of Aliyev to 
have at least a legal framework in line with international 
standards, and on the other the fact that the election was not 
really contested, determined the lesser negative assessment by 
the international observers. Oddly, the aftermath of the 
publication’s result was not characterized by protests or 
violence, which reinforced the idea that a real opposition was at 
this point overwhelmed by the Aliyev political machine.  
 
Soon after the election Aliyev prepared the next step of his final 
consolidation of power. Thanks to this renewed position of 
strength, he pushed the parliament to start the process to review 
the Constitution and add a clause to the article concerning the 
two-term maximum for the presidency. The parliament prepared 
a draft, which had to be subsequently approved by a 
referendum, mentioning that the possibility to run for other 
terms was applicable only in situation of war. At that time 
Azerbaijan was officially at war with Armenia. The opposition 
reinvigorated and openly criticized the initiative as a way to 
transform Azerbaijan in a full dictatorship and monarchy (Hale 
2015). According to the government this proposition would have 
given the power to the people to reelect a leader that they liked 
(Valiyev 2009). Moreover, the authorities wisely set the 
referendum for the eve of the major Novruz holiday in order to 
lessen the possibility of protests taking place (Hale 2015). Aliyev 
was confident that he could bet on the unity of his pyramid 
system and won the scrutiny. The referendum, which was 
conducted without an international observation mission, 
resulted in an overwhelming victory for the president’s 
proposal. Aliyev was already booking his reelection in 2013. 
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The subsequent parliamentary elections that were held in 2010 
saw the full consolidation of the NAP, which won 71 out of 125 
seats. Moreover, for the first time the opposition parties did not 
enter in the parliament (Gulyiev 2013), as independent 
candidates won the remaining seats. From a legal framework 
standpoint, these elections were affected by some amendments 
to the Electoral Code that shortened the period of the election 
campaign (it started just 23 days prior the E-day), so ‘limiting 
candidates’ opportunity to campaign in an already restrictive 
political environment’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2010:5) and 
removed candidates’ access to public campaign funding, without 
addressing main shortcomings of the electoral framework, 
including those ruling the CEC (ibid.). The latter was still not 
impartially composed, as the pro-government forces had ‘a 
decisive majority in all commissions’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 
2010:6). Yet the overall organization of the scrutiny was carried 
out smoothly and without major delays. One of the main 
problems concerning this election regarded voter registration. 
Despite all the effort by the CEC to improve and update the 
centralized voter register, which included around 4.8 million 
registered voters, there was a huge discrepancy between the 
CEC’s register and the data from the State Statistic Committee, 
which assessed that there were more than 6 million people in the 
age of vote in the country. This led the CEC to allow direct 
registration at the polling station in case a voter could not find 
his/her name on the register. This solution created many 
supplementary episodes of mismanagements, as the PECs had to 
consider during the E-day more than 35.000 requests 
(OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2010:8).  
 
Another source of concern was the registration of electoral 
candidates, a procedure that was handled at Constituencies 
Electoral Commission (ConsEC) level. The electoral observers 
noticed a lack of openness and transparency in the activity of 
many ConsECs with regard to the registration process 
(OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2010:9). Moreover, given the fact that 
ConsEC did not provide with a full explanation for the refusal to 
register, many candidates ‘appeared, in most instances, to be due 
to unfairly restrictive implementation of provisions of the 
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Election Code and other legislation’ (Ibid.). For what concern the 
Election Day, despite the fact that observers did not observe any 
particular episode of violence, they reported ‘a high occurrence 
of serious irregularities and procedural violations, including 
ballot box stuffing’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2010:17). 
Therefore, the overall assessment of the 2010 Parliamentary 
election was not positive and its conduct ‘was not sufficient to 
constitute meaningful progress in the democratic development 
of the country’88 (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2010:1).  
 
Following the last election, opposition parties were no longer 
represented in the parliament; this outcome provoked a deep 
disaffection toward politics among the general population. The 
only way for those who opposed the regime was to develop new 
methods for contesting power. The youth looked at other post-
soviet realities (such as Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine) in 
order to develop grassroots’ initiatives aimed to challenge the 
regime, which were successful in defeat authoritarian leaders 
(see Bunce and Wolchik 2011). Therefore, the opposition united 
and formed several groups such as Positive Change (Müsbәt 
Dәyişiklik), Free Youth (Azad Gәnclik) and N!DA, which 
eventually had an impact over the Azerbaijani society, especially 
in the run-up of the 2013 Presidential election. These groups 
aimed to bring together those youths who wanted to change the 
country ‘through non-traditional methods’ (Sultanova 2014) and 
they were among those who organized the protests that took 
place in Azerbaijan since 2011 till 2013. This lively activism, 
which sometimes resulted in tumultuous events, was labeled the 																																																								
88 This particular way of assessing the overall electoral conduct is the 
product of a harsh confrontation between the different actors 
(observers from the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly and 
the observers from the OSCE/ODIHR mission) that composed 
international observation missions. ‘Finally, a compromise was reached 
on how to respond to the question whether these elections met 
international standards: ‘While the November 7, 2010 parliamentary 
elections in the Republic of Azerbaijan were characterized by a 
peaceful atmosphere and all opposition parties participated in the 
political process, the conduct of these elections overall was not 
sufficient to constitute meaningful progress in the democratic 
development of the country.’ (European Stability Initiative 2012:27). 
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‘Azerbaijan spring’ (Klomegah 2011) and demonstrated both to 
the regime and to the international that the Azerbaijani society 
was not in total apathy (Bedford 2014). However, these groups 
were halted by government repression, which hindered 
numerous activities. Several opposition leaders were also 
arrested in the run up to the 2013 Presidential election. 
 
In the meantime, the government was reorienting its foreign 
policy goals and it was on one side reducing its ties with the 
United States (Frappi 2010) and on the other building up 
stronger relationships both with Turkey and Russia. As a matter 
of fact, the Azerbaijani government pressurized Turkey to stop 
the normalization of its relationships with Armenia as they were 
excluding any reference to the Nagorno Karabach conflict. 89 
Subsequently, Baku and Ankara signed a gas deal, which ended 
a long dispute between the two countries (Economist 
Intelligence Unit Azerbaijan 2013) and envisaged the 
construction of a new pipeline (Trans-Anatolian pipeline), which 
would widen the Turkish market for the Azerbaijani oil’s 
production. At the same time Aliyev strengthened his relations 
with Putin, who paid a visit to Baku in August 2013, just few 
weeks before the Presidential election. The visit, which also 
highlighted the Russia’s ‘clout’ on Azerbaijan (The Moscow 
Time 13/08/2013), brought along a new cooperation agreement 
between oil producers of both countries and new Russian arms 
selling opportunities to the Azerbaijani government. Indeed, 
since 2011 the government had increased its military spending 
and started to buy massive amounts of weapons in particular 
from Russia, a decision that triggered high concerns in Yerevan. 
 
Moreover, Azerbaijan was continuing to negotiate with the 
European Union the possible signature of the Association 
Agreement, which was expected to take place in November 2013. 
The negotiations started in 2010 and despite some positive steps 
the Azerbaijani government demonstrated far less interest in this 
process than its neighboring countries (Economist Intelligence 
Unit Azerbaijan 2013). Overall, during the Ilham Aliyev 																																																								
89 Author’s interview with an Azerbaijani Political Analyst in Tbilisi 
(May 2015). 
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presidency, Azerbaijan turned its foreign policies further from 
the West and closer to regional actors such as Turkey and 
Russia. At the same time, Baku decided not to participate in any 
supranational integration projects. As a matter of fact, Baku did 
not sign either the Association Agreement with the EU or the 
accession to the Eurasian Union. The Azerbaijani government 
proved to be very capable of managing different strategic 
chessboards without losing its independency and its 
arbitrariness. This particular Azerbaijani’s attitude to play with 
other actors was labeled as ‘caviar diplomacy’ as the authorities 
were very capable of interacting and dealing with officials from 
everywhere. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that when 
deputies from the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 
attended meetings with their Azerbaijani counterparts, soon 
after the greetings they asked ‘Where is the caviar?’ (European 
Stability Initiative 2010:1).  
  
Moreover, in March 2013 Baku decided to downgrade the status 
of the OSCE Office in the country, reducing its independence 
and its activities. Since that moment all projects would have to 
be officially approved by the Foreign Ministry and their 
implementation would be closely monitored90. This decision was 
another hole in the wall of the Western leverage in the country 
and a blatant symbol of the authoritarian path that the 
government was pursuing. This was also a decision that 
demonstrated the good shape of the regime and the high-level of 
consolidation that Aliyev was able to build along the past years. 
One of the reasons has to be found in government capacity to 
learn from other actors’ policies in the field of oil revenues 
management (see Guliyev 2013), which prevented Ilham 
Aliyev’s pyramid system, far more dependent on the oil 
production than his father’s one, to resist the financial crisis and 
the volatility of oil prices. At the same time Aliyev brought his 
party, the NAP, at the center of his rule, making one of the 
important centerpiece that prevented the splits in the elite (Hale 
2015).  
 																																																								
90 Nevertheless, Baku invited an OSCE/ODIHR mission to observe the 
upcoming election. 
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The 2013 Presidential election saw the participation of ten 
presidential candidates, among which there was only one, Jamil 
Hasanli a renowned Cold War historian at the Academy of 
Sciences in Baku, who firmly contrasted Aliyev’s rule.  The 
others were spending ‘the majority of their airtime giving 
Hasanli a hard time or defending the incumbent from the 
“vicious attacks” of the outspoken opposition candidate, as he 
was not present to do this himself’ (Bedford 2014:11). As a 
matter of fact, Aliyev did not undertake political campaign 
activities, leaving the floors to his ‘puppet’ candidates to defend 
him and to disorient the voter populations. Meanwhile the 
authorities were fully engaged in detering any possible forms of 
dissent around the country, especially in some key spots in the 
capital (such as symbolic squares of strategic highways). 
Moreover, from a legal point of view, the Electoral Code was 
amended both in 2012 and 2013 with some modifications aimed 
to increase sanctions for public order offenses, including 
organizing and participating in unauthorized demonstrations 
and therefore limiting the political parties’ capacities to connect 
with voters; there were also restrictions on the law regulating the 
freedom of assembly and NGOs (see Freedom House 2014 and 
OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2013). The OSCE/ODIHR observation 
mission clearly affirmed that ‘these amendments further limited 
the freedoms of expression and assembly and restricted the 
functioning of civil society and are contrary to OSCE 
commitments and international standards’ (OSCE/ODIHR 
Azerbaijan 2013:6).  
 
At the same time the government was not addressing serious 
shortcomings in the Electoral Code, which were raised both from 
OSCE (see OSCE ODIHR election final reports 2010, 2013) and 
from domestic actors. On June 21st the Azerbaijani Public 
Chamber organized a workshop to discuss the Electoral Code; 
around 60 participants (several party leaders, NGO heads and 
electoral experts) discussed about the quality of the legal 
framework and they agreed to highlight three main problems: 
‘the need for the equal representation of political parties in the 
composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC), the 
Constituency Election Commissions (ConECs), and the Precinct 
Election Commissions (PECs); the need to lift the barriers for the 
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candidate registration process; […] to outsource the verification 
procedures for candidate registration to a group from outside 
the commission to ensure neutrality’ (ElectionsWatch 
21/6/2012). The opposition considered boycotting the elections 
in case those improvements would have not been addressed, but 
eventually most of opposition parties coalesced in a bloc that 
supported Jamil Hasanli. 
 
Overall, the legal framework deteriorated according to the 
international standards, and the OSCE/ODIHR final report 
underscored ‘the need for continued electoral reform in an 
inclusive format’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2013:1). Moreover, 
the problem concerning the discrepancies between the CEC’s 
voter register and the figures provided by the State Statistical 
Committee persisted. The election was also characterized by a 
negative assessment of the voting process, with many episodes 
of frauds, including ballot box stuffing, obscure voting 
tabulation procedures, tampering of protocols and entry lists 
and votes being reassigned to another candidate (see 
OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2013). In addition, it is worth noting 
an episode that took place the day before the E-day. The election 
authorities prepared a mobile app for portable devices 
downloadable by Azerbaijani citizens, which would enable them 
to follow the counting process. However, because of a possible 
technical problem the app provided final election results one day 
before the scrutiny. The figures showed Aliyev gaining 72.76 
percent of the vote and Hasanli with 7.4 percent of the vote 
(Eurasianet 9/10/2013b). The government provided two 
different explanations in a row, neither of which was convincing 
(cf. Fisher 2013, Bigg and Dilaverly 2013).  
 
The incumbent President eventually won the scrutiny with more 
than 84% of the preferences, whereas the opposition candidate 
Hasanli scored only 5.53%. The latter, soon after the 
communication of the results, issued a statement where he 
claimed that he would not recognize the results and called for 
the repetition of the scrutiny. The newly reelected President 
affirmed publically that the electoral process was free and fair 
instead. The international electoral observers clashed again 
assessing the overall electoral process. For the Council of 
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Europe, which sent a delegation from the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Council of Europe jointly with a delegation from 
the European Parliament, the overall conduct of the electoral 
process was in line with international standards (PACE and EP 
2013) whereas for the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission 
‘significant problems were observed throughout all stages of 
election day processes and underscored the serious nature of the 
shortcomings that need to be addressed in order for Azerbaijan 
to fully meet its OSCE commitments for genuine and democratic 
elections’ (OSCE/ODIHR Azerbaijan 2013:1). The clash triggered 
many criticisms, in particular over PACE’s observation mission; 
the European Stability Initiative (ESI), a think tank focused on 
the Caucasus and the Balkans, harshly criticized the PACE’s 
assessment of the election and called for the resignation of the 
PACE’s rapporteur Pedro Agramunt (ESI 2013). The concerns 
regarding the unrealistic assessment by the PACE mission were 
echoed by many other actors, including the United States 
government which agreed with the OSCE's concerns and 
affirmed ‘the election fell short of international standards’ (Peter 
2013). Eventually the EP delegates to the mission backed away 
from the position of PACE and fully supported the 
OSCE/ODIHR assessment (Freedom House 2016). Given the 
particular contestability of the different election’s assessments, I 
relied also on other sources in order to verify the soundness of 
the observed elements (such as direct interviews with local 
observers, journalists and political analysts). I am not going to 
discuss these divergent standpoints and their politically charged 
meanings91, as they would go beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Following the harsh criticism provided by the OSCE/ODIHR’s 
final report, the Azerbaijani authorities responded that they 
would reconsider Azerbaijan’s cooperation with OSCE. This 
process led the government to the unusual decision to close the 
OSCE office in Baku; the decision heightened criticism of 																																																								
91  Authors’ interview with PACE officials (June 2015) which finds 
supporting ground form Freedom House, Freedom in the World report 
(2016), which argues ‘Some critics speculated that the positive 
assessment was the result of successful lobbying efforts on the part of 
the Azerbaijani government and European business interests in the 
country’ (Freedom House 2016). 
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Azerbaijan's record on civil society and media freedoms by 
Western officials and international human rights watchdogs 
(Schreck 2015) and it was understood as a sign of ‘the 
aggravation of relations with the West’ (Human Rights 
Freedoms 2015, June 5). Indeed, in the country the civil and 
political rights situations along with media freedom overall 
worsened (Freedom House 2016, Economist Intelligence Unit 
2015, Human Right Watch 2016) as the government continued its 
crackdown over independent nongovernmental organizations, 
opposition leaders and media. The wrongdoings were amplified 
by the organization of the first edition of the European Game in 
2015, when many Western Head of States decided not to 
participate at the opening ceremony (Shearlaw and Jones 2015).  
 
Later in 2015 the Azerbaijani people were called to vote for the 
parliamentary election, which the opposition parties decided to 
boycott (BBC News 2015, November 1). Moreover, for the first 
time in Azerbaijani history the OSCE/ODIHR refused to send an 
electoral observation mission in the country because it was 
deemed that there were too many limits that authorities were 
putting on the observers. The Need Assessment Mission (NAM) 
sent by OSCE/ODIHR, in order to evaluate the situation in the 
country a few months before the scrutiny, highlighted ‘that the 
country faces significant challenges with respect to the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms in the pre-election period, pointing to 
systematic harassment and criminal prosecutions of those who 
express critical views of the government. Several parties 
informed the OSCE/ODIHR NAM of difficulties in securing 
meeting venues and office space. Concerns were raised about 
possible misuse of state resources and an increase in 
intimidation of voters and potential candidates in the run-up to 
the elections’ (OSCE/ODIHR NAM Azerbaijan 2015:2). The 
election was obviously won by the NAP that gained 69 seats; the 
others were occupied by ‘independent’ candidates (43 seats) and 
by other minor political parties that gravitated around Aliyev’s 
system as those who were genuinely opposing NAP boycotted 
the election (BBC News 2015, November 1).  
 
The Azerbaijan case holds important implications for this 
analysis. First of all, it is the most blatant example of a sharp 
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deterioration in civil and political freedoms and rights in the 
South Caucasus. This process has worsened since Ilham Aliyev 
fastened his power on the pyramid system that rules the 
country. Second, the evolution of the electoral management has 
been affected by the overall worsening of the human rights 
situation in the country, which as spillover effects hindered the 
development of a genuine, or at least meaningful opposition. 
Azerbaijan proved to be little receptive to the suggestions to 
improve the electoral framework or to the conduct of the 
electoral process, which were coming both from international 
and local actors. Instead the government passed some 
amendments that were detrimental for the electoral integrity. 
Thirdly, the government successfully reduced the impact of the 
Western leverage in the country, as it was capable to develop the 
‘Caviar diplomacy’ with multiple actors, without being forced to 
accommodate any external power. Finally, from a malpractices 
analysis point of view, the Azerbaijan case presents a 
combination of new and more sophisticated methods of 
manipulating the elections (such as the installation of video 
cameras inside the polling stations, or the development of a 
mobile app to project falsified turnouts) as well as the endurance 
of blatant and trivial methods of frauds (such as ballot box 
stuffing, voter intimidations, tampering of votes’ registers). The 
next paragraph is devoted to analyzing these elements. 
Learning episodes in Azerbaijan  
Like Armenia, Azerbaijan did not experience an electoral 
revolution, despite many protests having occurred in the 
country during the last two decades. Azerbaijan’s elections have 
come under scrutiny by international monitors for biased 
electoral commission decisions, improper campaigning practices, 
inaccurate voter lists, unequal media coverage, voter coercion, 
ballot box stuffing, protocol tampering, and inconsistent ballot 
invalidation (see Herron 2010, OSCE/ODIHR reports from 1996 
to 2013). The majority of these types of malpractices have been 
used since the first election and, unlike the other Southern 
Caucasian countries, they continued to be present in all 
subsequent elections. Indeed, the ways by which these types of 
malpractices are carried out are identical to those used in the 
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nineties and did not evolve as in the other countries92. Even in the 
last presidential elections, there were reports of Armenian 
carousels (RFE/RL 09/10/2013, Eurasianet 09/10/2013) and 
clear evidence of ballot stuffing (OSCE/ODIHR 2013). Instead 
vote buying was never particularly common in Azerbaijan, with 
only some cases in the 2005 Parliamentary election. Authorities 
preferred to perform other types of voter pressure, such as 
intimidation or blackmail.  
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some changes in the 
conduct of malpractices during the turnover between Ilham 
Aliyev and his son in the first half of the 2000s. This succession 
was characterized by high pressures and violent demonstrations 
in 2003. In addition, the Orange and Tulip revolutions, which 
took place a few months later, increased the possibility of 
attempts to emulate the electoral revolutions even in Azerbaijan. 
The following parliamentary election, which was conducted in 
November 2005, proved to be the most important one for Aliyev, 
as it tested the integrity and the unity of the regime (Hale 2015).  
 
One of the first changes in electoral malpractices concerns the 
decision to install video cameras inside polling stations. This was 
an original innovation that has been adopted subsequently in 
many other post-Soviet countries (for example Georgia, Russia, 
Ukraine). Azerbaijan installed these video cameras during the 
2003 Presidential election and, despite international 
condemnation and some changes (such as the introduction of 
web cameras), is still using them (as for the 2015 Parliamentary 
elections). The decision to install video cameras was adopted just 
one day before the 2003 election by the Executive Authority, 
which is the Government’s executive branch at the regional 
level. In all but two polling stations, the video cameras were 
installed (Sødergren 2004), in some cases in the direction of the 
ballot box area (Sødergren 2004). The records were handled by 
the executive authority and not by an independent electoral 
management body, which constitutes a violation of the electoral 
code (Sødergren 2004). Despite claims from the regime that they 																																																								
92 Authors’ interview with an Azerbaijani electoral expert in Paris (June 
2015). 
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installed video cameras for transparency and security purposes, 
the international community and electoral experts warned the 
intimidation of voters and lack of secrecy (Sødergren 2004, 
OSCE/PA 2003). This is particularly important since some recent 
studies have demonstrated when voter secrecy is not protected, 
forms of clientelistic strategies (such as post-electoral 
punishment) are more powerful (Mares 2015). Since 2008 
Presidential election, following a OSCE/ODIHR 
recommendation, the authorities decided to provide web-access 
to the video camera in the polling stations, designed to enhance 
the transparency of the process. Yet, video cameras were 
installed (at least in one third of the polling stations monitored) 
in a way that could still affect voters’ behavior, exerting 
psychological effects on voters (Herron 2010).  
 
Another type of innovation aimed, in theory, to enhance the 
quality of the election (ICG 2005), was the electoral decree 
announced by Aliyev in March 2005, and enforced right before 
the 2005 parliamentary elections, a particularly weak moment in 
the regime. The decree outlined new regulations for election 
administration, threatening officials with punishment for 
violation of the rules, and introducing the use of exit polls 
(though the companies that ultimately conducted the polls were 
accused of being partisan, reflecting negatively on the 
government). All these elements were designed to curb possible 
imitation attempts to trigger an electoral revolution in 
Azerbaijan, ‘by creating some avenues for citizens to air 
grievances but preventing the opposition from galvanizing 
adequate support to sustain large protests over time, 
government reduced the potential benefits of participation in 
public protest and sent signals that costs for unauthorized 
protest would be high’ (Herron 2009:156). Additionally, in order 
to assure public support, Aliyev relied on the new incomes from 
the oil sector to raise the minimum wage 20% just one month 
before the election (see IMF July 2005, Hale 2015). Therefore, it 
can be argued that this decree was a tool to reinforce the general 
legitimacy of the regime. Aliyev wisely understood, from his 
observation of the others Colored Revolutions, which types of 
electoral manipulation’s methods could be used and which 
needed to be avoided (Herron 2009).  
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This is also consistent for what concerns another type of 
malpractice, which involves civil society, and has effects on the 
electoral process too. In the Colored revolutions, western 
oriented and/or foreign funded NGOs proved to be a decisive 
factor for the success of regimes change. Azerbaijan government 
decided to follow Russian example for regulating NGOs. In 
December 2013, the parliament passed a law that obliged each 
foreign NGO to have an Azerbaijani citizen as deputy chief 
(even in branch offices), and limited foreign donations to AZN 
200 (185 EUR) (Vučković, 2014). Moreover, subsequent 
amendments decreed that if an NGO closes it must provide full 
documentation to the Ministry of Justice. These amendments are 
reminiscent of the laws on foreign NGOs, which were passed 
one year earlier by Russia’s Duma (RFE/RL 17/12/2013). The 
resemblance in tactics has been confirmed also by the PACE’s 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights that addressed 
together Russian and Azerbaijani laws on NGOs in a 
memorandum concerning the prevention of inappropriate 
restrictions on NGO activities in Europe (Vučković, 2014:2). 
Anecdotal evidence further supports that the Azerbaijani 
authorities learned from Russian experiences and emulated their 
regulations93.  
 
It seems that the Azerbaijani authorities did not need to ‘update’ 
or ‘improve’ their methods of rigging elections, as was the case 
in Georgia and Armenia. This could be determined by two 
reasons. First, Azerbaijan experiences less Western leverage or 
pressure (including in terms of aid), and its leaders openly claim 
that the Western conceptualization of democracy is not suitable 
for Azerbaijan. For example, Ramiz Mehdiyeva, a member of the 
government and the principal ideologue of the regime, asserted 
that “Sovereign Democracy” suits better Azerbaijan 
(International Crisis Group 2010). Relations between Azerbaijan 
and OSCE have worsened, with the Azerbaijani government 
downgrading OSCE offices in Baku and eventually closing them 
altogether (RFE/RL 05/06/2015). Second, Azerbaijan is an oil 																																																								
93 Authors’ interview with an Azeri electoral expert in Tbilisi (May 
2015). 
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and gas rich country and all the oilfields are managed by the 
national company SOCAR, which has a ‘tentacular’ diffusion 
among society. It is often reported that at least one member of 
each family in Azerbaijan works for SOCAR94. Because of this 
resource, Azerbaijan could be defined as a rentier state (Franke et 
al. 2009), characterized by high political stability and state 
capacity (including coercive capacity). In practice, Azerbaijan is 
a consolidating autocracy, centered on the Aliyev family, which 
has strong linkages with the political and business elites of the 
country. According to Nation in Transit, in 2005 when oil 
revenues skyrocketed, the Azerbaijani government began to 
misuse far more administrative resources than ever before 
(Freedom House 2014). Aliyev’s ability to manage the huge 
revenues from the oil sector proved to be fundamental to 
strengthening his grip over elites and society in Azerbaijan. 
Within two years of his first election he firmly built his own 
single pyramidal system (Hale 2015). As a result, the state 
suffered less from institutional and informational uncertainties 
(Schedler 2013), which contribute to electoral uncertainty. 
Type of 
Malpractice 
When 
introduced 
Type of 
learning 
From where 
Video 
Cameras 
Since 2003  Innovation n/a 
Raised 
minimum 
wages 
2005 Negative 
Learning 
Tulip and 
Orange 
Revolutions 
Biased Exit 
Polls 
Since 2005 Negative 
Learning 
Orange 
Revolutions 
NGOs 
regulation 
Since 2013 Positive 
Learning 
Russia 
 
The case of Azerbaijan is one with less evolution in fraud and 
malpractice. Electoral experts claim that in some cases of ballot 
stuffing is done even more blatantly than before. 95  With the 																																																								
94 Author’s interview with Azerbaijani refugee in Tbilisi (May 2015). 
95Authors’ interview with an Azeri electoral expert in Tbilisi (May 2015) 
and in Paris (June 2015).  
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closure of the OSCE office in Baku, it could be argued that 
Azerbaijan is moving away from international standards in 
conducting and managing elections. The only relevant changes 
were introduced during the transition between Aliyev father and 
son, when the regime was weaker. In this period the regime 
proved to be innovative, though attentive to external lessons. 
Conclusion 
Azerbaijan is the most stable and durable regime among the 
South Caucasian countries; moreover, it experienced the lowest 
level of Western democratizing pressure throughout the 
decades. These characteristics affected the regime’s management 
and mismanagement concerning elections. In the first place, the 
Azerbaijani authorities did improve the electoral legal 
framework and introduced democratic institutional checks and 
electoral management bodies, yet, they never fully implemented 
those provisions. Secondly, Azerbaijan rolled back and amended 
electoral regulations in a detrimental way, as well as closed any 
kind of cooperation with OSCE. What account for such 
development? 
 
In this chapter I took into consideration the international context 
in which the Azerbaijani authorities carried out their policy 
choices and it is possible to find some peculiar factors vis à vis 
the other two neighbouring countries. First of all, Azerbaijan oil 
and gas resources played an important role in keeping the 
country out of aid-conditionality mechanism and they provide 
important resources for what concern the most important sector 
for Baku’s foreign policy: security. At the same time, Western 
actors developed divergent interests in Azerbaijan, which 
eventually contributed to a smoother leverage toward Baku. As a 
matter of fact, according to Levitsky and Way, competing 
interests may hinder or even nullify Western-democratizing 
efforts. However, Western linkage with the country was high, as 
since the mid-nineties Western oil and gas companies were 
involved in the exploitation of Azerbaijani natural resources. 
These links did not eventually trigger any forms of 
democratization effects. Therefore, despite the fact that for 																																																																																																																									
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Levitsky and Way linkage plays a bigger role in 
democratization’s process, I claim that it is wiser to look at what 
type of linkage there is between the West and the country. In this 
case, linkage did not trigger democratization, on the contrary, it 
helped to separate Western interests. Eventually, contrasting 
interests shamefully affected Western electoral observation 
missions, which assessed differently the elections in 2010 and 
2013. Finally, the Azerbaijan political elites were able to pursue a 
foreign policy path independently from any 
international/regional organizations. In turn, Baku has been able 
to set the agenda with international partners from a more equal 
standpoint.96 In conclusion, the context exerted lesser binding 
effects for Azerbaijan, in which electoral integrity barriers where 
not sustained and enforced by strong Western responses.  
 
Electoral integrity never reached an acceptable level in 
Azerbaijan and frauds and electoral malpractices have since the 
early nineties widespread every time an election has been 
observed. Contrary to Armenia and Georgia, frauds and 
electoral malpractices in Azerbaijan did not evolve or change. 
When I looked at the OSCE/ODIHR reports concerning elections 
in the nineties and I compared them with those that were more 
recent, I discovered the same kind of electoral malpractices. 
Given the fact that the Azerbaijani authorities did not experience 
the same Western pressure, they resorted to use the same 
methods to rig the elections. There was just one period where 
Azerbaijan suffered more from electoral uncertainties, and that 
was during the 2003-2005 period. In this span of time Ilham 
Aliyev was consolidating his pyramidal system after he took 
over the presidency from his father. Therefore, during the 
elections in those years, authorities developed new methods to 
affect voters’ choices and to elude international criticisms. 
 
																																																								
96 Author’s interview with Azerbaijan Ambassador in France (Paris, 
May 2016) 
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Conclusion: Comparative Lessons from the 
Southern Caucasus  
 
 
The concluding chapter is devoted to drawing lessons from the 
case studies, verifying the hypothesis, outlining some theoretical 
reflections, and to discussing potential future research. By 
stemming from the argument that elections and their 
mismanagement are crucial aspects to be analysed in order to 
understand how regimes experience Western democratization 
pressure, the thesis takes into consideration the international 
dimension of elections in nondemocratic regimes. It is based on 
some theoretical arguments that refer to IR as well as to 
comparative politics. It could be a hazard but I am confident that 
the analysis of the cases study provided with some ground 
material for sketching some important remarks.  
 
The thesis’ main aim has been to study how the international 
dimension can affect the electoral mismanagement in selected 
countries under analysis. I tackle this issue from two 
perspectives: the first one concerns the role of external actors in 
affecting the electoral mismanagement along the last decades. In 
particular, I looked at the changing context, which could 
determine different choices for domestic actors when they rig 
elections. In the second perspective I analyzed the international 
dimension from a socialization standpoint. In other words, I 
looked at how authorities in the South Caucasus took advantage 
of socialization dynamics, such as learning, in order to cope with 
electoral uncertainties. 
 
These arguments are underpinned by two main hypotheses. For 
what concerns the first one, I expect that where the Western 
Leverage and Linkage became more preponderant I would have 
witnessed two processes: on one side that formal electoral 
management improved substantially, on the other that 
malpractices changed along the years and contributed to hinder 
a full democratisation process. On the contrary, where Western 
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Leverage and Linkage was lower, electoral management did not 
improve substantially and the incumbents did not need to 
change their methods to rig elections. The second hypothesis 
relates to authorities’ socialisation activities. I supposed that 
incumbents learn how to rig elections both from the past and 
from others’ experiences. As a matter of fact, so far there has not 
been any analysis concerning learning activities in electoral 
related issues.  
 
Both hypotheses rely on the idea of change, context and learning. 
As a matter of fact, these three concepts are intertwined and they 
are determinant in understanding the development of the 
electoral management in the three South Caucasian countries. 
The first concept, change, refers to different paths that 
incumbents may take once they have to manage an election. This 
stems from the assumption that rulers want to preserve their 
power and win the elections. Thus, changes can refer to both 
formal and informal facets. For example, formally the authorities 
can decide to modify or amend some articles in the electoral 
codes to get closer or further from electoral integrity principles. 
Yet, from an informal standpoint they can also change methods 
to nullify formal improvements. It is therefore important to trace 
such mix of formal and informal changes. When authorities 
carry out changes, they are driven by both preferences (which 
entail learn) and contextual constraints (which entail 
international actors’ actions).  
 
The second concept is context. In this case it refers to the norm 
and valued charged international system in which states are 
located (cf. Badie 2011). As a matter of fact, Goertz claims that 
governments live in an international environment that posits 
constraints for arbitrary behaviors and he identifies barriers as 
modes of context. For what concerns electoral management, this 
thesis argues that since the end of the Cold War post-Soviet 
states were affected by electoral integrity principles. Therefore, 
this new international context served as a barrier that set some 
standards and banned some other practices. Given the fact that 
barriers are the result of power relations, they can be stronger or 
weaker depending on Western pressure, which is composed by 
linkage and leverage. Moreover, barriers can be broken by other 
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actors, such as black knights (e.g. Russia through CIS 
observation missions) that can provide an alternative 
legitimization, or by other states that try to find ways to elude 
the barriers (e.g. Azerbaijan with the adoption of video cameras).  
 
To break or avoid a barrier posed by the electoral integrity, 
incumbents in different countries can look at past or other 
experiences to circumvent those principles. Those experiences 
can be very insightful because they include important 
information concerning the barrier itself. As a matter of facts, 
according to Goertz, barrier models consist of two principal 
components: the barrier itself and the pressure upon it generated 
from below. Every time an actor attempts to infringe the barrier 
it generates important information that can be used by other 
actors. In particular, authorities can learn to what extent the 
barrier can be eluded, how far they can go in case they want to 
rig elections and which methods work better in order to avoid 
international condemnation. Learning becomes fundamental for 
incumbents that want to reduce the uncertainty of the scrutiny 
(which is one of the funding principle of a free and fair election). 
Thus, in my understanding, barriers are broken or eluded when 
there is a diffusion effect of some methods of frauds or electoral 
malpractices.  
 
In this theoretical frameworks of ‘change’, ‘context’ and 
‘learning’ are intertwined together in order to explain how 
electoral management and malpractices developed during the 
last decades in South Caucasus. In what follows, I am going to 
present the outcomes of this analysis and I am going to verify 
whether the hypothesis proved true in the case of the election 
management in the three South Caucasian countries since their 
independence.  
The Western Democratizing Pressure 
The international dimension affected the development of 
electoral management and mismanagement practices in the three 
South Caucasian countries. The analysis of the cases study 
brought some empirical evidence about such impact. Hereby, I 
am going to analyse the implications of this study. Indeed, the 
three cases present three different paths that each country 
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undertook along the decades. They represent a very interesting 
portfolio in order to analyze some of the elements that produced 
such variegate divergences. 
 
The international context posed the same barriers (but with 
different weights) in terms of electoral integrity: all the three 
South Caucasian countries were included soon after the 
independence in the OSCE and subsequently they started the 
path toward the accession of the Council of Europe. In all the 
three countries, international experts collaborated to prepare 
new democratic frameworks to hold elections, they set up 
similar systems of monitoring and they proposed the same 
guidelines to conduct the electoral management. However, from 
a foreign policy standpoint, external actors (in particular the 
United States and the European Union) were not always united 
in pressuring and demanding the same results in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. The context, which in this case worked 
as a barrier, changed and so changed the costs of deviant 
behaviors. Thus, from an international standpoint, electoral 
integrity standards had a different weight in each country. 
 
First of all, the empirical analysis demonstrates that there have 
been radical changes in the way elections are ruled and 
managed, as well as deep modifications for what concern the 
methods of frauds and electoral malpractices in Armenia and in 
Georgia. On the contrary, Azerbaijan did improve its legal 
framework only during some limited periods of time, and 
subsequently authorities amended the electoral code in a 
detrimental way. Moreover, in Azerbaijan there is a constant 
presence of the same type of frauds and electoral malpractices. 
What accounts for such variation? The first hypothesis argues 
that the international dimension has important effects on it. As a 
matter of fact, Armenia and Georgia are the countries where the 
Western leverage and linkage are higher than in Azerbaijan; 
therefore, this factor determined, on the one side, the substantial 
improvement of the legal framework and, on the other, an 
evolution concerning methods of frauds and malpractices. 
Whereas, Azerbaijan because of its regime structure, which can 
be labeled as rentier state, and because of its ‘caviar diplomacy’, 
it did not suffer from Western pressure as its neighbors.  
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In Figure 3, I compare both the Western democratizing pressure 
in each country and the OSCE/ODIHR final assessment 
concerning key elections among the decades in the three 
countries. I built the dataset stemming from the analysis of the 
cases studies and from the OSCE/ODIHR reports. The Western 
democratizing pressure is calculated over a scale of three, where 
zero is when Western democratizing pressure is zero and three 
when the Western democratizing pressure is at its peak. 
Subsequently, in the figures concerning OSCE/ODIHR 
assessment there is a scale of five. In this case every election has 
been treated according to the OSCE/ODIHR judgment in the 
final report. Thus, five means that the elections fully meet the 
international standards, whereas zero means that it felt short of 
international standards. Interestingly, there is a good match 
between phases of higher western pressure and better electoral 
management and when the Western democratizing pressure is 
lower, so it is the OSCE/ODIHR electoral assessment. 
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Figure5: Comparison among Western democratizing pressure and 
OSCE/ODIHR Elect ions Assessment  	
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In the first decade after the independence, the barriers of the 
electoral integrity were not very strong in the three South 
Caucasian countries, as the Western actors with the strongest 
democratizing power were not so much involved in the region. 
Therefore, Shevardnadze in Georgia, Ter-Petrosyan in Armenia 
and Aliyev in Azerbaijan formally adopted a democratic legal 
framework, but at the same time they did not respect it and they 
brazenly rigged the elections. They were confident that the West 
would have not interfered in their polities: as Shevardnadze 
once declared, ‘don’t you know how these Westerners are? They 
will make a fuss [about electoral fraud] for a few days, and then 
they will calm down and life will go on as usual.’ (Karumidze 
and Wertsch 2005:24). Moreover, in the early nineties the 
electoral frameworks were disunited, in disarray and often they 
overlapped between Soviet and new laws. Overall, almost all the 
elections in the nineties were characterized by a heavily uneven 
playing field.  
 
The context changed gradually toward late-1990 and early-2000s, 
when the countries were close to join the Council of Europe 
(Georgia got the accession slightly before). In those years all the 
three South Caucasian countries adopted new Electoral Codes, 
drafted in cooperation with Western organizations (Armenia 
adopted it in 1999, Georgia in 2001 and Azerbaijan in 2003). 
Therefore, formally the three countries were getting closer to 
electoral integrity principles. This demonstrates that in those 
years electoral integrity became a stronger barrier for what 
concern electoral management and mismanagement. Yet, 
Western pressure did not work with the same weight and it 
resulted in three different outcomes concerning electoral 
integrity. In Georgia, when Shevardnadze broke democratic 
rules concerning elections Western actors pressurized the 
government and endorsed the revolutionary stances. Whereas, 
both in Armenia and Azerbaijan when incumbents did not 
respect electoral integrity principles, Western actors condemned 
the practices but they did not support regime change. Thus, 
Western pressure, despite increasing, was not uniform and 
electoral integrity barriers had different strengths in each 
country. As I explained on a case-by-case basis, Western actors 
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did not want or did not manage to have the same foreign policy 
vision on each regime. As a result, they were less effective in 
demanding the respect of electoral integrity principles. 
 
These outcomes provide new evidence about the impact of 
international forces on the electoral integrity. In fact, in her 
recent analysis Pippa Norris claims that electoral integrity is 
affected by four main factors 97  among which there are the 
international forces. These forces include cosmopolitan 
communication, electoral and development aid and the 
deployment of election observation missions. However, for what 
concern the development aid and the deployment of election 
observation mission, Norris claims that ‘the analysis failed to 
establish a significant link at aggregate level between these 
forces and the quality of the elections’ (Norris, 2015:112). In this 
thesis I am relying on a different dataset based on 
OSCE/ODIHR elections’ assessment rather than on the PEI 
index. Yet, there is evidence that international forces do have an 
impact on the quality of elections. For the sake of the argument, 
this claim is helpful insofar as it allows for a better 
understanding of the drivers of management and 
mismanagement changes.  
 
Finally, these findings are in line with Levitksy and Way’s 
argument concerning the effectiveness of Western democratizing 
pressure. In addiction, in the analysis I also took into 
consideration the role of Black Knight, which in this case is 
played by Russia in bilateral relations to each country or through 
the CIS organization. Indeed, Russia is the only actor that has a 
counter-hegemonic power in the region. However, Russia rarely 
interfered directly into the electoral process in the South 
Caucasus, whereas in other post-Soviet countries Russia exerted 
a bigger role in legitimizing or stabilizing an allied regime (see 
Tolstrup 2014). Following the analysis of each case study, it 
emerges that the black knight still is exerting a limited role for 
what concern electoral affairs. In fact, they do dispose of few 
tools to intervene in the filed of the elections. One of the most 																																																								
97  That are: structural constraints, institutional checks, electoral 
management bodies and international forces (see Norris, 2015) 
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effective methods is to send CIS observers to conduct parallel 
observation missions. Yet, their reports are rarely considered 
objective and accurate even by domestic political actors 
(Ruzaliev 2005). 
 
Notwithstanding, Russia exerted indirect effects over electoral 
integrity in the region: as a matter of fact, it served to local 
authorities (such as in Azerbaijan and Armenia) to gain 
bargaining power vis à vis the West. In other words, when 
incumbents in Armenia and Azerbaijan started to look toward 
Moscow in terms of linkage, they reduced the ‘dependence’ on 
West’s conditionality. Therefore, they became more resistant to 
Western pressure even in electoral affairs. This is particular 
evident in Azerbaijan, where since Ilham Aliyev became 
president he turned the foreign policy’s preferences (including 
trade) more toward Russia (Azerbaijan export to Russia 
increased about 200% from 2002 till 2005)98. At the same time, 
Azerbaijan started to challenge international organization such 
as OSCE concerning the validity of its principles (Fawn 2013).  
 
In the near future, Russia - with the establishment of the 
Eurasian Union, may become more proactive in challenging the 
liberal democracy principles in electoral affairs. Indeed, on one 
side Russia may acquire more leverage vis à vis third countries 
for what concern political elite selections. On the other, new 
forms of political regime – such as sovereign democracy, may be 
amplified within the Eurasian Union. It is too early to verify this 
issue, yet there is another non-western organization in the region 
that already exerts a similar role.99  
 
The Socialization Mechanism 
The three cases presented so far reveal that incumbents do 
innovate and learn when they need to cope with electoral 																																																								
98  Data from The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. 
99  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is defending two core-
principles for its member states: stability and diversity (Ambrosio 
2008). 
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uncertainties. Therefore, it is possible to claim that malpractices 
evolve and change at the same time. In the Southern Caucasus, 
we can observe differences in the evolution of malpractice: in 
Georgia there has been a move toward new and more concealed 
ways to carry out malpractices, triggered mostly by learning 
processes from other regimes; in Armenia there have been 
relevant changes developed by looking to their own experiences 
along with the recurrent use of traditional malpractices; in 
Azerbaijan there were fewer innovations and changes, with the 
persistence of traditional frauds and malpractices (albeit in 
tougher forms), with some learning episodes from Russia. These 
cases help us to trace the development and spread of 
malpractices over time and space and give the opportunity to 
draw some conclusions about learning mechanisms in hybrid 
regimes. 
 
Thanks to this analysis it is possible to elucidate some reasons 
behind the choice to modify and innovate electoral fraud and 
malpractice. First of all, there is sound evidence that where the 
Western democratizing pressure is higher, authorities try to 
elude Western monitoring activities by changing the way they 
falsify elections. Following the electoral revolutions, the 
assessment by international bodies became one of the 
preconditions to having an acceptable and legitimizing result vis 
à vis the domestic polities. Of course, international endorsement 
is not the only determining factor: as for example Bunce and 
Wolchik have demonstrated there are also other important 
elements that may trigger an electoral revolution (see Bunce and 
Wolchik 2011). Nonetheless, international forces do play an 
important role that has not been fully considered yet in studies 
of electoral integrity (see Norris 2015). As this thesis has 
demonstrated, the impact of international forces can be very 
significant in terms of election management and 
mismanagement. The cases of Georgia and in Armenia are 
meaningful as both countries fully experienced the effects of the 
international criticism on their elections managements. 
 
Moreover, the evaluation of these case studies brings further 
evidence to the growing sector of research that analyzes 
international observers’ effects over electoral malpractices. For 
	 233	
example, Simpser and Donno (2012) speak about strategic 
adaptation for what concerns the Armenian government’s 
attempts to find more hidden forms of manipulations following 
the 2003 international contestation of its election management. 
Adaptation implies a change in policies, which are more in line 
with the changing context. As a matter of fact, following the 2003 
elections, the peril of an electoral revolution became more vivid 
and incumbents needed to find better ways to assure election 
results and avoid international and domestic critics. Elites in 
power understood the deficiencies of the critical aftermath of 
2003 election, and they actively worked in order to avoid the 
same mistake in the next scrutiny. Learning came from a 
negative election management example. What the elites were 
used to do was not sustainable because the context had changed.  
 
Secondly, the analysis of socialization episodes in the region 
showed that when an election is highly contested authorities are 
more watchful about the methods of frauds. Incumbents in post-
soviet space were particularly concerned by the development of 
revolutionary movements in the aftermath of rigged elections. 
Post-election violence has been analyzed as a characteristic of 
hybrid regimes (Hale 2011), which, eventually, could become a 
revolution. This analysis matches with Fairbanks analysis of 
fraud and electoral malpractices in hybrid regimes: according to 
him this type of regime is more vulnerable to post-electoral 
protests because incumbents pretend to be democratic without 
being so and without having the same control over the society as 
in consolidated autocracies (Fairbanks 2004). Both Armenia and 
Georgia (and to a lesser extent Azerbaijan) were affected by local 
and international pressure and heightened scrutiny, and worked 
to change the ways they rigged elections. To dodge 
revolutionary protests, they looked at other countries’ 
experiences to avoid mistakes and to understand how to 
implement new ideas. This is particularly true in Georgia, which 
adopted video cameras following Azerbaijan’s example. This 
move was possible because video cameras in polling stations has 
always been a highly contested issue, which could be easily 
masked as tool to avoid fraud rather than initiate it. Armenian 
authorities, because of both stronger domestic pressure and 
international attention, especially since early 2000, had to 
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develop new and more concealed ways to rig elections and 
avoid protests. Whereas in Azerbaijan, the most authoritarian 
country in the region, the regime demonstrated a tendency to be 
more solid and less affected by international pressure.  
 
Therefore, it is possible to draw a distinction among the 
countries relating to the revolutionary experience. As a matter of 
fact, looking at the types of malpractice there is a pattern that 
pools Armenia and Azerbaijan: their first source of concern was 
to deter protests and violent demonstrations, which would catch 
the attention of the international community and cause 
widespread condemnation. This is especially observable after the 
first episode of electoral revolution that occurred in Serbia in 
2000, and then triggered demonstration effects elsewhere. In 
Armenia the regime introduced new types of malpractices, such 
as vote buying, but at the same time they did not abandon more 
coercive strategies such as the misuse of administrative 
detentions for electoral protests. In addition, the quest for 
legitimization in Armenia led authorities to adopt two elements 
aimed at increasing the legitimacy of the state: GONGOs’ 
electoral observation and exit polls. In Azerbaijan the authorities 
improved substantially the way they rig elections, in particular 
during the delicate transition (with vote-buying and video 
cameras). Subsequently, they clamped down on civil society and 
media. Thus, Armenia and Azerbaijan adopted some strategies 
that were more aimed at deterring possible electoral protests 
rather than merely manipulating voters. 
 
In conclusion, it appears that these three cases from the Southern 
Caucasus point to an evolution and change in the tactics of 
electoral malpractices over time. Incumbents change methods of 
frauds and malpractices according to their international and 
domestic situations, and they learn from others about when they 
need to cope with higher electoral uncertainties. Additionally, 
this analysis provides a new understanding concerning the way 
authorities choose and carry out malpractices, which for the time 
being did not include learning as a factor that may lead to 
mismanagement’s evolution.  
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Concluding Remarks 
In the broad spectrum of the academic research on 
nondemocratic regimes there are still many unaddressed issues, 
which can be further analyzed to better understand the mode of 
operations and evolution of such regimes. This thesis addressed 
one of these topics and it shed some light on a particular 
phenomenon that concerns an issue that is not limited to the 
nondemocratic political context. Frauds and electoral 
malpractices are commonly used everywhere in the world, and 
they can do severely limit the democratic quality of an election. 
Therefore, it is fundamental for electoral integrity purposes to 
better analyze and understand past and future challenges to it. 
In this thesis I analyzed how and why frauds and electoral 
malpractices changed over the last decades and what are the 
triggering mechanisms of such changes. I discovered that the 
international context does play an important role at a domestic 
level for what concerns electoral mismanagement.  
 
Electoral mismanagement changes, evolves and adapts to new 
international conditions and poses serious threats to electoral 
integrity. The latter was conceived as a barrier for states’ 
authorities that set up elections in the South Caucasus. As a 
matter of fact, I assumed that incumbents want to stay and keep 
power and they do whatsoever it is necessary to maintain it. Yet, 
as presented in the case studies analyzed, since the early nineties 
incumbents are subjected to electoral standards in the way they 
manage the elections. Therefore, the international context poses 
barriers in the form of electoral integrity principles. However, 
the barriers’ capacity to resist authorities’ infringements are 
dependent on a consistent and united Western democratization 
pressure. The three South Caucasian cases demonstrated that 
this is not the case. Western actors often proved to have different 
and contrasting interests in the country. They therefore exerted 
inconsistent levels of pressure on the authorities. Eventually, the 
case studies show that according to different levels of 
democratizing pressure, there are three different ways 
authorities rig the elections. In Azerbaijan authorities did not 
change the way they rigged the elections, whereas in Georgia 
and in Armenia there has been a sharp modification for what 
concern electoral malpractices (in particular in the last decade). 
	 236	
These changes may be further analyzed in future research to 
assess the impact of new methods of frauds on the electoral 
integrity.  
 
Moreover, the thesis argued that socialization mechanisms such 
as learning practices can be apt also to explain changes in 
electoral frauds and electoral malpractices. The compared 
analyses on mismanagement brought to light several episodes 
where authorities in one country looked at their past experiences 
or at their neighbor countries in order to find solution to shared 
problems. Therefore, this outcome can bring further 
understanding on how authorities rig the elections, which 
eventually can reduce the uncertainty of the overall electoral 
process. To date, frauds and electoral malpractices were 
analyzed within their own polity and, despite some studies 
carried out a comparative analysis, none have assessed the 
presence of socialization practices. This analysis may trigger 
future research aiming to verify if learning mechanisms are 
widespread practices also observable in other regions. Broadly 
speaking, the study of learning in mismanagement affairs helps 
to further understand how and why elections are rigged in the 
case of nondemocratic regimes; however, I am confident that 
there is room for the study of learning mechanisms as well as in 
frauds and malpractices in democratic regimes. 
 
This thesis stems from the concept of hybrid regimes, which is 
becoming a type of regime in and of itself. This category still 
lacks a complete conceptualization and its characteristics are yet 
to be fully defined. In this analysis I identified some key features 
concerning nondemocratic elections in hybrid regimes, which 
may add a small contribution in the study of such regimes: 
electoral legal frameworks improve but at the same time there is 
an evolution in methods of frauds and electoral malpractices. 
Thus, in hybrid regimes there is a deeper dichotomy rather than 
in democratic or authoritarian regimes for what concerns the gap 
between formal rules and informal practices in the field of 
electoral management. In the South Caucasus, on the one side, 
Armenia and Georgia – that are hybrid regimes – improved 
substantially their electoral framework but at the same time they 
improved also their methods of mismanagement. On the other, 
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Azerbaijan, which is consolidating its authoritarian structure, 
did not improve its electoral framework and it is still using the 
same methods of frauds that it has been using since the early 
nineties. Therefore, the way authorities manage and mismanage 
the elections can be an indicator for regime identification. Of 
course, in order to have sounder validity, new research is 
required to verify this claim in other contexts. 
 
Finally, I would like to underline that this thesis is not arguing 
that the international dimension is the only driver for what 
concerns electoral mismanagement. I am aware about structural, 
institutional and management factors that may undermine the 
quality of elections. However, I am firmly convinced that to date 
there has been an academic oversight in terms of the 
international dimension in electoral 
management/mismanagement affairs. To conclude, the general 
contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 1) 
International dimensions matter in the study of electoral 
management and mismanagement; 2) Methods of electoral 
frauds and malpractices change and evolve according to 
Western democratizing pressure; 3) Authorities learn from their 
own past as well as from external countries’ experiences how to 
better rig elections; 4) in hybrid regimes there is a bigger gap 
between formal electoral rules and informal practices than in 
democratic and authoritarian regimes. Future research will 
hopefully provide us with new evidence about these remarks, 
which could be verified in other elections and other countries 
around the world.  
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Appendix I 
Measuring Leverage  
Low Leverage: Cases that meet at least one of the following 
criteria:  
. Large Economy: Total GDP more than $100 billion (1995, 
current US$) (Source: World Bank World Development 
Indicators (online: www. worldbank.org/data))1 " 
. Major Oil Producer: Annual production of more than one 
million bar- rels of crude oil per day average (1995) 
(Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
“International Energy Annual” (online: http://www.eia. 
doe.gov/emeu/iea/)) " 
. Possession of/capacity to use nuclear weapons (1990–
1995) " 
Medium Leverage: Cases that meet none of the criteria for low 
leverage but meet  
at least one of the following criteria:  
1. Medium-Sized Economy: Total GDP between $50 billion 
and $100 billion (1995, current US$). Source: World Bank 
World Development Indicators (online: 
www.worldbank.org/data) " 
2. Secondary Oil Producer: Annual production of 200,000 to 
one million barrels of crude oil per day average (1995) 
(Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
“International Energy Annual” (online: http://www.eia. 
doe.gov/emeu/iea/)) " 
3. Competing Security Issues: Country where there exists a 
major security- related foreign-policy issue for the United 
States and/or the EU. " 
4. Beneficiary of Black Knight Assistance: Country that 
receives significant bilateral aid (at least 1 percent of 
GDP), the overwhelming dominant share of which comes 
from a major power that is not the EU or the United 
States (1990–1995). A major power is defined as a high-
income country (per capita GDP of $10,000 or higher) or a 
major military power (annual " military spending in 
excess of $10 billion, 1990–1995) (Source: “Correlates of 
	 240	
War,” available at www.cow2.la.psu.edu). China, France, 
Japan, and Russia are considered potential Black Knights.  
High Leverage: Cases that meet none of the criteria for low or 
medium leverage.  
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Appendix II 
Measuring Linkage  
Linkage is measured by the following four components:  
. Economic Ties: Measured by the extent of trade with the 
United States and 15 EU member countries (exports and 
imports over GDP) (log) (1990– 2000), excluding years 
when a country is democratic. " 
. Social Ties: Measured by the average annual number of a 
country’s citizens traveling to or living in the U.S. and EU 
(1990–2000) as a share of total country population (log), 
excluding years when a country is democratic. " 
. Communication Ties: Measured by per capita average 
annual interna- tional voice traffic 1993–2000 (log) and 
per capita average annual " Internet access (1995–2000) 
(log), excluding years when a country is democratic.  
. Intergovernmental Ties: Measured by membership in the 
Organization of American States (OAS) or potential 
membership in the EU.  
 
For each of the four dimensions, each country is given a score (1–
5) based on its ranking relative to all non-Western countries in 
the world (5 = highest quintile; 1 = lowest quintile). The scores 
on the four dimensions are summed into a total score, which was 
recalculated so that scores range from 0 to 1. 
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